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Abstract 
 
The past two decades have seen extensive research on governance structures of the 
firm, executive compensation and performance. However, most of these studies 
are in the context of profit-making organisations with relatively very little 
attention being given to this subject in respect of non-profit making organisations. 
This study examines the determinants of executive compensation and firm 
performance in charities. Specifically this study attempts to answer the following 
questions: 
What are the main determinants of CEO compensation in the UK Charities? What 
performance measures do the UK Charities use? What are the factors that 
influence performance in the UK charities?  
Using both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, the study reports a number 
of interesting findings. Regarding the executive compensation, the study finds that 
organisational size, CEOs quDOLILFDWLRQDQG&(2¶VWHQXUH have a positive bearing 
on executive pay. However, the results suggest that the sector of the organisation 
and CEO duality have no impact while and CEO experience had significantly 
negative relations with CEO pay. Turning to the performance measures, it was 
found that five performance measures categories are used by the UK charities, 
namely, financial, the customer; the internal business process, benchmarking and 
learning and innovation. To get deep insights into performance, the study 
examined WKH PDQDJHUV¶ RSLQLRQV RQ the factors influencing performance. 
However, CEO pay and the sector of operations have a statistically negative 
influence on performance. The results indicated that four factors, namely, board 
size, board independence, CEO pay and sector of operations, have statistically 
significant influences on the overall performance of the UK charities.  The also 
results suggest that board size and board independence have positive and 
significant influence on performance. In terms of individual performance 
measures, the size of the board has a positive and significant influence in respect 
to financial, customer, internal business and overall performance. The results also 
indicate that board independence has an influence on financial performance, 
 iii 
 
internal business, benchmarking and overall performance. On the contrary, 
benchmarking has a positive, but not significant, relationship with CEO pay. This 
relationship is not surprising, as it supports the social comparison and equity 
theory. The results also show that the gender of the CEO appears to have a 
positive, but not significant, impact on WKH&(2¶VSHUIRUPDQFH, with the exception 
of innovation and learning. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction to the study 
 
1.1 Introduction: 
The size of the charity sector in the UK has increased rapidly over the past decade 
and now comprises a vast and growing segment of economic activity. There are 
over 180,000 charities registered with the Charity Commission of England and 
Wales as of June 2010, with an estimated annual turnover of £52.5 billion (Charity 
Commission, 2010). In Scotland, 23,806 charities are registered with the Office of 
the Scottish Charity Regulator (OSCR 2008) of which 355 of them are also 
registered with the Charity Commission and have  an estimated annual income of 
£8 billion after the excluding those that are also registered with the Charity 
Commission. In Northern Ireland (NI), there are around 4,500 charities with an 
annual income of approximately £600 million (NI Council for Voluntary Action, 
2005; Connolly and Dhanani, 2009). According to  the UK National Council for 
Voluntary Organisations (2008) the sector now employs over 600,000 people, an 
increase of  about 25% over the last decade (Hyndman and Connolly, 2010). Due 
to the manner of its contribution to the public good and its jurisdiction, the sector 
has formed active partnerships with government in the provision of a wide range 
RIVHUYLFHV7KHVHFWRU¶VJrowth in size and prominence has also led to increased 
visibility and public scrutiny by varying stakeholders including government 
oversight agencies, private donors and foundations, clients, the media and the 
public at large (Connolly and Hyndman, 2004). This has also been exacerbated by 
a series highly publicised financial scandals (Brody 2001; Home Office 2003; 
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Beattie et al. 2002 and Charity Commission 2004a) of which, the likes of Enron, 
Palmalat in Italy, Arthur Andersen, Global Crossing and WorldCom are only few 
of the latest examples. Partly as a result of this attention, the charitable sector has 
been subject to continued regulation, with government directives and voluntary 
codes focusing on the nature of executive pay and its disclosure. . For example, 
two current legislations have recently been enforced in the UK include the 
Charities Act (England and Wales) which was enacted  in 1997 and subsequently 
revised in 2000, 2005, 2006 and the latest one in 2011 which will take effect in 
March 2012 and the Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act. The other 
OHJLVODWLRQVEHIRUHWKHVHLQFOXGHGWKH'LUHFWRUV¶5HPXQHUDWLRQ5HSRUW5HJXODWLRQV
(Department of TradHDQG,QGXVWU\³'7,´DQG³WKH5HSRUW5HJXODWLRQV´
which attempted to address these concerns by demanding that charitable 
companies increase the proportion of pay that is performance-related rather than 
fixed salary, and by increasing the level of disclosure of executive reward. 
However, despite the fact that many regulations have impact on remuneration 
practices, the way in which executive pay is set does not seem to address issues of 
µIDLUQHVV¶ and even more broadly, how this might influence the conduct of 
executive directors (Connolly and Hyndman, 2004). In particular, who and what 
determines the CEOs pay in charities remains largely unexplained (Akpeti, 2001). 
 
At the same time, as the government has increasingly obligated the charities into 
providing public services, there has been increasing, and multiple pressures on 
nonprofit organisations to demonstrate excellence in performance (Cairns et al, 
2005) as well as discharge accountability to their stakeholders to gain trust and 
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credibility from beneficiary and client groups (Connolly and Dhanani, 2009). As a 
result, there have been moves towards greater quality checks and performance 
measurement (Mordaunt and Cornforth, 2004). For example, the UK regulators 
have attempted to facilitate accountability by initiating the formal development of 
charity reporting practices through the publication of the original Statement of 
Recommended Practice (SORP) 2 Accounting by Charities (Accounting Standards 
Committee (ASC) 1988) which was influenced by  the work of Bird and Morgan-
Jones (1981) together with reports by the National Audit Office (1987) and Sir 
Philip Woodfield (Woodfield Report 1987) on the supervision and regulation of 
charities (Connolly and Dhanani, 2009). The revised SORP which was issued by 
the Charities Commission in 2000 was updated in 2005, to reflect new Financial 
Reporting Standards (FRS) (Beattie, Goodacre and Masocha, 2006).  
 
Many researchers have highlighted the importance of measuring performance in 
nonprofit organisations. They suggest that it helps reassuring the stakeholders who 
often provide resources that donations are being utilised for the key charitable 
missions of these organisations and also helps bring greater financial flexibility 
and tighter function to these organisations (Bryson, 1995; Kearns, 1996; Letts, 
Ryan and Grossman, 1999; Pappas, 1995). ,WDOVRKHOSV³FRXQWHUFULWLFLVPIRUSRRU
PDQDJHPHQWDQGLQHIIHFWLYHQHVV´(Connolly and Hyndman, 2004:131). However, 
Connolly and Hyndman (2003) also argue that holding charities to account is 
problematic owing to the difficulty in identifying key performance measures. In 
fact, some scholars, (for example, Au, 1996; Kanter and Summers, 1987; 
Ostrander and Schervish, 1990) have indicated that the nature and characteristics 
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of these organisations and the fact that their objectives are based on social values 
tend to make conceptualisation of their effectiveness even more complex. 
Therefore, despite the debate on how to measure performance in nonprofit 
organisations, consensus on what is performance still eludes researchers.  
 
In the similar vein, concerns also exist about the effectiveness of nonprofit boards. 
In the context of the UK, there have been a series of important reports and changes 
aimed at improving the self-regulation of firms at board level (see, Hampel, 1998; 
Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 1995). The most recent (Higgs, 2002) suggests a 
number of changes to strengthen the responsibility of non-executive directors in 
the interests of improved performance and accountability. It is apparent from the 
academic literature that governance is more critical in nonprofit organisations than 
for-profit firms. A research by Fama and Jensen (1983) highlights the lack of an 
active ownership market among nonprofit organisations and emphasise the 
function of internal governance practices among nonprofit organisations. Oster 
(1995) concurs by suggesting that the sophistication of the services provided by 
the distinctive nonprofit organisations and the lack of a clear metric like 
profitability as a performance measure also add to strain the governance abilities 
of the nonprofit board. For nonprofit organisations that have relations with 
government agencies, strong governance structures safeguards not only the status 
of the nonprofit organisations but also the interests of the public sector (Frumkin 
and Keating, 2001). However, just how effectively these boards are in terms of 
improving performance in nonprofit organisations remains a controversy, 
considering that previous research in this area have largely concentrated on only 
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financial measures of performances which do not seem to capture what these 
organisations are created for.   
 
1.2 Research Aims and objectives 
The purpose of this study is to examine the determinants of executive 
compensation and performance in charities. The study therefore explores the 
performance measures used by the U.K charities, the effects of the board 
composition, CEO duality and CEO pay on firm performance in the charities.  
 
 Specifically this research attempts to answer the following questions: 
1. What are the main determinants of CEO compensation in the UK 
Charities? 
2. What performance measures do the UK Charities use? 
3. What are the factors that influence performance in the UK charities? 
 
 
1.3 Definition and Scope of the Study 
7KH WHUP µQRQSURILW¶ LV PLVOHDGLQJ 7KHUH LV QR UXOH WKDW VD\V WKDW QRQSURILW
organisations may not make a profit (Frumkin and Keating, 2001). However, 
nonprofit organisations are constrained regarding what they do with the profit they 
make, and it is primarily this restriction that sets nonprofit organisations apart 
from their business counterparts. This XQLTXH FKDUDFWHULVWLF LV WHUPHG µWKH
nondistribution FRQVWUDLQW¶+DQVPDQQ, 1980). This means that these organisations 
are lawfully forbidden from permitting anyone to have a lawful claim on the 
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UHVLGXDO SURFHHGV µ7KH SURILWV PXVW HLWKHU EH UHLQYHVWHG LQ ZD\V WKDW GLUHFWO\
promote the mission of the organisation or be distributed to individuals (e.g., 
through lower prices to service recipients) who do QRW FRQWURO WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶
(White, 1995: 12).  
A charitable organisation is type of a nonprofit organisation (NPO). According to 
charities Act (2006);  
A charity, or charitable organisation, in England and Wales, is a particular 
type of voluntary organisation. A voluntary organisation is an organisation 
set up for charitable, social, philanthropic or other purposes. As a result, the 
voluntary organisation should use any profit or surplus only for the 
organisation's purposes, and it is not a part of any governing department, 
local authority or other statutory body. All charities are voluntary 
organisations, but not all voluntary organisations in England and Wales are 
charities. 
This study will also focus on large charities with an income of over £1m. This is 
because the SORP committee of the Charity Commission, which is the regulatory 
body for charities in England and Wales, legally requires such large charities to 
comply with the SORP regulations and recommendations on accounting and 
financial reporting (NCVO, 2006). Hyndman and Connolly (2009) echo the same 
views and point out that, ³Moreover, the requirements for large charities (charities 
with incomes in excess of £1 million per annum) relating to these aspects of 
reporting became even more extensive at the same time through the requirement to 
complete a Summary Information Returns (6,5´ (Hyndman and Connolly, 2009: 
17). )XUWKHUPRUHLWLVDOVRPDQGDWRU\IRU³larger charities to disclose information 
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regarding their governance arrangements and about policies and practices relating 
to their LQYHVWPHQWVDQGUHVHUYHV´(Charity Accounts and Reports 2000: 21)  
 
1.4 Motivation for Study 
For a variety of reasons outlined below, the UK charities provide a fascinating 
context in which to study executive compensation, performance and governance 
issues. First, charities play a pivotal role in the U.K. economy. Evidence from the 
UK Labour Force Survey (Office for National Statistics (ONS), 2004) indicates 
that the sector employed 2.2% of the overall paid workforce and that general 
charities contributed £7.2 billion to UK GDP in 2001/02. With a current turnover 
of over £52 billion, the contribution of charities to the UK economy cannot be 
overemphasised. Second, management pay in the nonprofit world has come under 
scrutiny as never before. New legislation requires nonprofit organisations to 
document how much they compensate their senior managers and requires that 
boards justify and outline the compensation determination process (Preston, 2002). 
However, despite pressure from regulators, the compensation packages have 
skyrocketed for several CEOs in the nonprofit sector (Schwinn and Wilhelm, 
2003). This shows that the monitoring system is fraught with problems.  Wages 
SDLG LQ  WR WKH VHQLRU &(2V RI WKH QDWLRQ¶V OHDGLQJ QRQSURILW RUJDQLVDWLRQV
LQFUHDVHGE\WZLFHWKHLQIODWLRQUDWHDQGWKH&(2V¶ZDJHVRIWKHOHDGLQJFKDULWLHV
and foundations more than doubled from 1997 to 2002 receiving higher proportion 
increases compared to their counterparts in the business sector (Schwinn and 
Wilhelm, 2003). Besides, despite the rising trend and importance of charities, most 
studies on executive compensation tend to concentrate disproportionately on for-
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profits firms. Moreover, most of the studies have concentrated mainly on US firms 
with relatively little attention on UK charitable organisations (see Twombly, 2002; 
Hallock, 2002). 
 
Third, there is an increasing pressure on nonprofit organisations to demonstrate 
excellence in performance (Cairns, 2005). The UK nonprofit organisations have 
seen different government performance measures put in place such as quality 
checks and audits, named and shamed, and reforms in governance structures over 
the past decade (Blair, 1998; Schwinn and Wilhelm, 2003). Furthermore, the UK, 
regulators have continued to show FRPPLWPHQWWRLPSURYHWKHTXDOLW\RIFKDULWLHV¶
accountability, by constantly reviewing and revising the charity Statement of 
Recommended Practice (SORP) which is currently in its fourth iteration 
(Hyndman and McMahon, 2009). For instance, the current revised SORP, 2005 
also places more emphasis on the inclusion of the performance and governance 
requLUHPHQWV LQ WKH WUXVWHHV¶ DQQXDO UHSRUW (Hyndman and McMahon, 2009 and 
Witfield, 2005). 
 
Unlike, in for-profit organisations, the information on performance in nonprofit 
organisations is generally unavailable, expensive, theoretical, and not easily 
quantified (Weisbrod, 1988). Measures of performance and improvement that are 
usually common in the business world (profitability measures like Return on 
Assets (ROA), Return on Investment (ROI), profits, and share price) are 
essentially absent in nonprofit organisations. Finding appropriate performance 
metrics to satisfy stakeholders, as well as determining which performance 
 9 
 
measures should be linked to the salary appears difficult (Handy DQG.DW] 
Steinberg, 1990). Consequently, nonprofit organisations boards frequently depend 
on more indirect and unsatisfactory measures of performance, such as an activity 
or process measures (Weisbrod, 1988). From the current literature it is evident that 
most studies have looked at only financial measures of performance neglecting the 
IXQGDPHQWDOQRQILQDQFLDOPHDVXUHVWKDWIRUPWKHEHGURFNRIWKHFKDULW\¶VPLVVLRQ
It is against this backdrop that this study attempts to examine the determinants of 
executive compensation in charities, the performance measures that are used in the 
UK charities and the factors that influence performance in charities.  Therefore, 
the gap in research regarding executive compensation and performance in UK 
charities provides a fertile ground for further research in this field. Thus, the aim 
of this study is to contribute and extend the existing body of literature to create 
better understanding on the two key issues, that is, executive compensation and 
performance in charities. 
 
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation 
This chapter has provided an overview of the background to the study, motivation 
of the study, the research aims and objectives and scope of the study. The next 
chapter (chapter two) contains a review of the relevant literature on governance 
and executive compensation relating to nonprofit organisations in general and 
charities in particular.  Drawing from the extant literature, the chapter discusses 
the theoretical literature underpinning the executive compensation and governance 
which encompass agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependency theory 
and stakeholder theory. This is followed by a review of literature in respect of 
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factors influencing executive compensation and challenges of executive 
compensation. We conclude the chapter with a review of performance and 
measures of performance in nonprofit organisations.  
 
Chapter three outlines the methodology of the study. The chapter discusses the key 
UHVHDUFK SKLORVRSK\¶V WUDGLWLRQV DQG WKLV VWXG\¶V SKLORVRSKLFal stance, research 
design, as well as data collection issues. Specifically under this section, we 
describe the sample selection procedure, the design of both interview and survey 
questionnaires. The response rate and sample characteristics are then reported. The 
final section discusses the reliability and validity issues of the study.  
Chapter four investigates the determinants of executive compensation of the UK 
charities. Executive compensation has long attracted much attention from the 
media, financial economists, regulators, the investors and the public. However, as 
executive compensation continues to explode. The problem seems to be more 
pronounced in nonprofit organisations, due to the lack of an active ownership 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Although, there is still considerable disagreement about 
the extent and basis of such problems and how to deal with them (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004), most studies in this area have concentrated in for- profit 
organisations.  
 
Chapter five focuses on measures performance used in the UK charities. The issue 
of what and how performance should be measured has been controversial in 
nonprofit organisations (see, Sowa et al 2004; Cameron, 1981, 1982; Connolly, 
Conlon, and Deutsch, 1980 and Etzioni, 1964; Pfeffer, 1982; Price, 1972). This 
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chapter examines what measures performance in the UK charities. The chapter 
provides a synthesis of what constitute performance in the UK charities and 
illuminate new avenues for scholars and practitioners to research this important 
topic. 
 
The mDQDJHUV¶ RSLQLRQV RQ WKH IDFWRUV WKDW LQIOXHQFH performance in the UK 
charities are examined in chapter six. Having identified the measures of 
performance in the UK charities, this chapter delves into the effects of board 
structure and executive pay on the performance identified in chapter five. 
Employing both financial and non financial measures of performance, an 
exploratory factor analysis is used to provide parsimonious set of distinct non-
overlapping financial and non-financial performance measures. Factors 
influencing performance which encompasses board structure and executive pay are 
examined in the context of UK charities.  
 
 
Chapter seven presents a summary of research background, methodology of the 
study and findings about determinants of executive compensation and firm 
performance in UK charities. The chapter also discusses the conclusions and 
recommendations. It gives the overall conclusion to the study by giving a 
comprehensive review of the entire research. An attempt has been made to 
answers to the research questions building up constructive arguments for each of 
the questions. The chapter finalises with a discussion on the stuG\¶V OLPLWDWLRQV
and agenda for future research. 
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1.6 Summary 
This chapter has established the context of the study, set out the aims and the 
scope of the research and described the importance of the study. The basic 
structure of the thesis has also been described here. It is evident from the above 
discussion that the study revolves around examining the determinants of executive 
compensation, what measures performance in charities, what factors affect 
performance in the UK charities.  
The next chapter provides a detailed review of literature regarding executive 
compensation and performance in nonprofit organisations, charities in particular.  
Theoretical perspectives on executive compensation as well as different models of 
performance are also reviewed. This review of literature underpins chapters four to 
seven. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the distinct strands of thoughts identified in the literature, to 
explain executive compensation and performance of charities. The chapter has 
four sections as follows: The first section reviews the theories of governance in 
general which encompasses agency theory, stewardship theory, resource 
dependency theory and stakeholder theory.   The second section reviews the 
literature on executive compensation from the perspectives of psychological, 
social comparison and equity, human management standpoints and other 
determinants of executive pay. Identified and discussed are also the challenges of 
executive compensation in charities. Following that are measures of performance 
employed in charities and the factors that influence performance in charities.  
 
2.2 Theoretical perspectives: Executive Compensation and Governance 
This section explores the theories identified in the literature to explain executive 
compensation and governance. The section reviews and discusses the agency 
theory, stewardship theory, resource- dependency theory and the stakeholder 
theory. 
 
2.2.1 The Agency theory and Executive compensation  
Although the non- profit literature on Principal-Agent relations is extremely 
scarce, (Du Bois, et al., 2003) this study argues that the perspective can contribute 
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a lot in the understanding of the behaviour and internal organisation of nonprofit 
organisations. Agency theory looks at how an optimal contract is accomplished in 
circumstances in which principals (shareholders) delegate work to agents (top 
executives) in exchange for rewards (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This theory 
concentrates on two problems connected with this agency condition: (a) goal 
conflicts between the principals and agents, and (b) differentiation in their feelings 
toward risks.  Basically, two alternatives are available for principals (behaviour-
based contract and outcome-based contract), and principals choose the lowest-cost 
option. When principals can monitor WKHDJHQWV¶DFWLYLWLHVHDVLO\DWVPDOOFRVWWKH\
prefer behaviour-based contract. In this case, rewards are paid like salary 
(LVHQKDUGW,QFRQWUDVWZKHQSULQFLSDOVFDQQRWPRQLWRUWKHDJHQWV¶actions 
at minimum cost, they opt for an outcome-based contract, and rewards are paid as 
incentives designed to motivate behaviour that is related to the desired outcomes. 
Since the rewards differ with performance, they shift performance risk from 
principals to agents. The agents, who are alleged to be risk-averse, accept such 
agreements only when sufficient risk premiums are offered (Hansman, 1987). 
 
The agency problem in nonprofit organisations is related to the relationship 
between the organisation and the donor, where the nonprofit organisation acts as 
the agent of the donor or principal This relation is sometimes described as the 
external Principal-Agent relation, in contrast with the internal Principal-Agent 
relation where the organisation is the principal and the manager is the agent 
(Hansmann, 1987). According to Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 contributors of NPO 
who provide money; donations and government subsidies and voluntary labour can 
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be seen as shareholders even though these actors do not have clearly defined 
residual claims. Essentially, they are owners who bear the risk associated to each 
business and managers act as decision-PDNHUV 7KXV D QRQSURILW RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V
decision system has the same general features that a for-SURILW¶V V\VWHP WKDW
means, the separation of decision management initiation and implementation- from 
residual risk bearing and then, from control ratification and monitoring of vital 
decisions.  
 
The agency problem in this context refers to the difficulties donors have in 
ensuring that their resources are not expropriated or wasted on unappealing 
missions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The clashes of interest between owners and 
managers presented in 1976 by Jensen and Meckling seemed to be quite clear; 
however, it is fairly atypical this relationship in a nonprofit organisation even 
though we have already defined the actual owners and managers and the possible 
divergence of interests. Fama and Jensen (1983a) argue that, for nonprofit 
organisations, the survival value of the decision system itself provides an 
assurance for donations to be effectively used and not easily expropriated. 
Researchers like Herzlinger (1996: 99) and Steinberg (1990:141) argue that 
Principal-Agent relations in nonprofit organisations are even more problematic 
than in for-profit firms. The performance of managers is hard to measure and the 
board of directors lack effective control mechanisms because of the lack of 
ownership incentives and complex, hard-to-define objective functions.  
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 (Glaeser, 2001) also notes that even though the manager himself could be a 
volunteer, the agency problem springs from the separation of owners and decision-
makers is persistent, because altruism, the concern for the welfare of others, does 
not make an individual a perfect agent who performs some service on behalf of the 
principal This means that the agency problems cannot be solved by instilling 
greater altruism in people (Jensen and Meckling, 1994; Jensen, 1994). In fact, as 
trustees have no pecuniary incentive to monitor the effectiveness of managers, the 
administrators might be expected to have considerable discretionary power being 
able to divert resources for their own benefit (Ricketts, 1994). For instance, a 
series of financial scandals found in US nonprofit organisations has generated calls 
for more accountability and oversight (Frumkin and Keating 2001). 
 
Core et al (1999) orate that firms facing greater agency problems is more likely to 
have higher-paid CEOs, suggestive of large managerial power and entrenchment. 
In order to keep agency problems at a minimum, Jobome (2006) suggest that 
organisations should adopt governance mechanisms which, curtail managerial 
power. These mechanisms include the adoption of various board committees, e.g. 
independent audit, nomination and remuneration committees (Cadbury 
Committee, 1992; and Combined Code, 2003), whose adoption should, therefore, 
exhibit a negative association with CEO pay. In addition, board design should aim 
WR UHGXFH ERDUG VL]H ODUJHU ERDUGV DUH YLHZHG DV SURQH WR WUXVWHH µIUHH-ULGLQJ¶
hence potentially ineffective in exerting control over CEO decisions and pay 
structures. However, Jobome (2006) asserts that nonprofit do not have many of the 
 17 
 
governance mechanisms that for-profit firms rely upon (e.g. prescriptive corporate 
governance codes, shareholder pressure, takeover market, creditor pressure); yet 
they keep management pay low relative to other sectors, contrary to the classic 
DJHQF\ H[SRVLWLRQ 6RPH VWXGLHV VXJJHVW WKDW µVHOI-VHOHFWLRQ¶ +DQG\ DQG .DW]
 RU µVRUWLQJ¶ 5RRPNLQ DQG :HLVEURG  DPRQJVW QRQSURILW PDQDJHUV
may substitute for the absence of the typical checks and balances demanded by 
shareholders in the for-profit context. 
 
2.2.2 Stewardship Theory  
The theoretical considerations of stewardship provide a point of view of 
managerial motivation which is an alternative to agency theory (Donaldson 1990a, 
1990b). Under this theory, the executive managers are ³RUJDQLVDWLRQDOO\FHQWUHG´
executives that identify closely with the organisation and thus derive satisfaction 
from behaviours that promote the organisation. There is, therefore, no room for an 
assumption regarding divergent preferences as there is in agency theory (Davis et 
al., 1997). Davis et al. (1997) further delineate the characteristics which 
distinguish stewardship from agency theory as being actors that foster trust, focus 
on self-actualisation, serve the collective goal of the organisation, are intrinsically 
motivated, and have a high value commitment and a long-term orientation (Oslon, 
2005). As a result, a pay incentive will not necessarily stimulate managers to 
perform better, suggesting an insignificant pay-performance link. In other words, 
stewardship theory recognises intrinsic motivation and it predicts a weak 
relationship between tenure and pay (Jobome, 2006).  
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Furthermore, stewardship theory recognises that performance variations can arise 
if the structural situation facilitates effective action. The issue is whether or not the 
organisational structure helps the executive to formulate and implement plans for 
high corporate performance.  Argyris (1964) believes that the principal who 
endorses stewardship theory will empower the steward with the information, the 
tools and the authority to make good decisions for the organisation, contrary to the 
controls that are put in place through agency theory. In fact, Argyris (1964) 
suggests that putting control structures on stewards will significantly de-motivate 
the steward and be counterproductive for both the steward and for the 
organisation. Authors such as Donaldson (1990a, 1990b) and Barney (1990) 
support the stewardship view and suggest that if the CEO is given complete 
authority over the firm, performance is more likely to be enhanced, as decision 
making can be done in a timely manner. 
 
2.2.3 Resource- dependency Theory and Executive Compensation 
Resource dependency theory has implications for explaining the determinants of 
CEO pay in the nonprofit organisation (Wernerfelt, 1995; Barney, 1991; and 
Castanias and Helfat, 2001). Broadly speaking, the resource-based view highlights 
the need for there to be a fit between the external environment in which the 
organisation functions and its internal resources. For example, some variables that 
DUHSRWHQWLDOO\VLJQLILFDQWLQH[SODLQLQJH[HFXWLYHSD\LQFOXGHWKH&(2¶VOHYHORI 
experience or qualification, and strands of the resource-based view stress the role 
of such human capital (e.g. Castanias and Helfat, 2001). It is plausible, therefore, 
that given the so-called skills shortage in the nonprofit managerial market, CEO 
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pay could be driven by the need to attract the human capital required to achieve 
the objectives of the organisation and the resources available to do so. Using 
resource-based arguments, better qualified and experienced CEOs would be paid 
more, because they provide more human capital for the organisation, in which case 
qualifications and &(2¶V DJH would exhibit positive relationships with pay 
(Jobome, 2006). 
 
Resource dependency theory also suggests that the board functions as a resource 
for organisations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Hillman and Dalziel (2003) 
proposed an integrated perspective that acknowledges disadvantages in agency 
theory and that boards operate as resource catalysts for organisations by providing 
linkages to necessary resources. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) discussed the notion 
of board wealth, which includes human capital (expertise, experience, and 
reputation) and relational capital. Relational capital is networks and linkages to 
external constituencies. According to (Brown, 2004) resource dependency 
perspectives investigate, for instance, how board members provide connections to 
influential funders (private and public), bring technical competencies (i.e., 
financial or legal) to an organisation, and how the board provides strategic 
direction for the organisation. Therefore the board is not only performing 
monitoring and control functions but they are also adding value by bringing 
resources.  
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2.2.4 Human Resource Management Theory and Executive Compensation 
The strategic management of human resources proposes that the conceptualisation 
and setting up of a suitable compensation package is essential for the 
establishment of a competitive benefit for human resources (Milkovich and 
Newman, 1996). CEOs, just like other paid staff in an organisation, can be 
motivated to achieve certain performance goals. For CEOs, their wages are not 
their incentives to perform well, but also by the prestigious value attached to their 
job and the fact that they hold the highest responsibilities (Roussel and Trepo, 
1996; Gomez-Mejia, 1994). Therefore, the setting of CEO compensation must, 
consider four main, complementary goals namely; organisational performance, 
incentive to work, attraction and adherence of the best executives. The concept of 
total compensation should meet financial imperatives, sustain the motivation of 
executives and guarantee the stability of the organisation.  
 
According to Zajac (1990), compensation techniques cannot be detached from 
those of choice and succession of management in organisations. The board of 
directors should make sure that they recruit a CEO who is skilled enough to 
improve the performance of the organisation, by achieving mission objectives in 
nonprofit firms. However, the major problem that nonprofit organisations confront 
is that radical for-profit businesses have managed to obtain a competitive 
advantage by attracting and employing often times with lucrative offers, 
outstanding and well-respected staff. Prestigious expertise is therefore more likely 
to favour business services corporations for the obvious reason that 
undercapitalised nonprofit organisations can rarely offer compensation comparable 
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to what large for-profit firms can pay (Goddeeris, 1988). If for-profit organisations 
continue to attract the best talent, nonprofit organisations are likely to be 
questioned as to whether they have knowledge and skills to compete at high levels. 
With time, if discrepancies between the sectors become excessively powerful, 
nonprofit organisations may face a real talent drain that will result in the sector its 
competitive advantage (Frumkin, 2001). 
 
2.2.5 The stakeholder Theory 
Although Freeman (1984) is widely recognised as the initiator of stakeholder 
theory; he acknowledges that many of the main ideas date back to the 1960s. The 
theory as such stems from the resource dependency theory. In short the theory 
describes different managerial behaviour in order to reach different goals in 
response to stakeholders that affect, or are affected by, the decisions taken by the 
company. How management should handle the relationships, is a question 
frequently debated within the theory.  Max Clarkson one of the writers on this 
topic describes stakeholders as follows: 
Stakeholders are persons or groups that have, or claim, ownership, rights, or 
interests in a corporation and its activities, past, present, or future. Such 
claimed rights or interests are the result of transactions with or actions taken 
by, the corporation and may be legal or moral, individual or collective. 
Stakeholders with similar interests, claims, or rights can be classified as 
belonging to the same group: employees, shareholders, customers and so on 
(Clarkson 1995: 106). 
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Clarkson's view remarkably shows that stakeholder interests in an organisation 
may be founded on ethical grounds as well as lawful ones. According to Freeman 
stakeholders, are "any group or individual who can influence or is influenced by 
the accomplishment of the organisation's objectives" (1984:46). In most business 
organisations, the stakeholders could comprise of shareholders, workers, clients, 
suppliers, creditors, competitors, government agencies, professional groups and 
the public. All these individuals or groups will have an impact on how the 
organisation function or may be affected by the organisation because they have the 
LQIOXHQFHRYHUWKH³UHVRXUFHVDnd support, limit the firm's access to new markets 
or boycott the organisation's products" (Seeger, 1997:9). Therefore, Stakeholder 
theory is primarily a management instrument which contains methods for 
identifying and managing stakeholders.  
 
An extensive amount of work was carried out to identify the virtual importance of 
diverse stakeholders (e.g. Mitchell et al, 1997). Mitchell et al (1999) contributed to 
the understanding of this concept and suggested that classes of stakeholders are 
created when stakeholders possess one or more of three relationships attribute 
namely power, legitimacy and urgency. When urgency is included as an attribute, 
it adds a vibrant constituent to the process whereby stakeholders achieve 
significance to the management. Mitchell et al (1999) combined the attributes 
generating a typology of stakeholders shown in figure 2.1 below. 
 
According to Mitchell, et al (1999) Latent stakeholders only possess one of the 
three attributes and have low stakeholder salience.  
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                          Fig 2.1: The stakeholder Typology:  
 
Source: Mitchell, et al (1999: 874).  
 
However, if the present attribute is power, such stakeholder is called dormant 
stakeholder. Dormant stakeholder holds power but do not have either legitimacy or 
urgency. The power remains unused. Examples of a dormant stakeholder are laid 
off workers who could have hate towards their former employer and voice their 
opinions on radio or television (Mitchell, et al 1999).  
 
Discretionary stakeholders have legitimacy only but lack the power to influence 
the firm and do not have any urgent claims. Demanding stakeholders have urgency 
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as their only attribute. They are Stakeholders without power and legitimacy, but 
ZLWKXUJHQF\WRZDUGVWKHLVVXHDQGDUHUHIHUUHGWRDV³PRVTXLWRHVEX]]LQJLQWKH
HDUV RI PDQDJHUV´ E\ 0Ltchell et al (1997: 108). Examples of demanding 
VWDNHKROGHUV FRXOG EH D ORQHO\ SURWHVWHU RXWVLGH WKH FRPSDQ\¶V KHDGTXDUWHUV 
Expectant stakeholders have two attributes and their salience will be moderate. If 
the present attributes are power and legitimacy, they are called dominant 
stakeholders; but if the attributes are legitimacy and urgency these are called 
Dependent stakeholders. However, Dangerous stakeholders are the ones 
possessing power and urgency as attributes. Definitive stakeholders are the ones 
perceived by managers as having all the three attributes and their salience will be 
high. Cordery and Baskerville (2005) assert that, recipients of charitable services 
will never be in the definitive stakeholders because they do not have power to 
compel the trustees or management, or to impose their will. Therefore, Cordery 
and Baskerville (2005) posit that donors can move into the demanding category or 
into the powerful category if exercising adequate influence, whilst recipients 
remain in the discretionary or dependant categories. (Cordery and Baskerville 
2005). Finally, all those who possess none of these attributes are classified into a 
UHVLGXDO µ1RQVWDNHKROGHU¶ FDWHJRU\ ,W KDV KRZHYHU EHHQ QRWHG WKDW RYHU WLPH
the combination of stakeholders may change (Donaldson and Preston 1995).  The 
typology is fundamental in identifying key stakeholders and determining the 
relative power of relevant stakeholders. It is, therefore, critical to understand the 
interests of main stakeholders in order to manoeuvre an organisation or a project 
with a minimum of conflict. Moreover, nonprofit sector is characterised to be 
multifaceted settings with numerous stakeholders that usually have manifold, 
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vague and diverging objectives. One of the key challenges facing the nonprofit 
sector manager is exactly how to handle the complexity (Box, 1999; Heeks, 2002; 
Layne and Lee, 2001; Boyne, 2002). Similarly, Anheier (2000) contend that this is 
complicated in the nonprofit sector because they have multiple bottom lines and 
diverse stakeholders linked with precise bottom lines and expecting their needs to 
be met. In a nonprofit organisation, stakeholders include workers, such as the 
CEO, managerial staff, administrative staff and professional staff. However, 
nonprofit are likely to have a huge group of volunteers who may significantly add 
to the employees (Lyons, Hocking, Hems and Salamon, 1999). The service users 
may usually require immeasurable services from the organisation, creating intense 
demands on the other stakeholders. Hudson (1999) highlights that these multiple 
stakeholders are even more confusing when the services are part funded by various 
agencies like grants or contracts from government,  charitable groups, or donations 
from businesses or individuals, and by service users, through fees.  
 
Frumkin and Keating (2001), however, divide the stakeholders in the nonprofit 
sector, into two main groups: those outside the organisation and those inside the 
organisation. Among external stakeholders, they say, it is possible to concentrate 
RQ WKUHH PDMRU JURXSV GRQRUV ZKR SURYLGH UHVRXUFHV WR VXSSRUW WKH FKDULW\¶V
mission, clients benefit directly from the charity services and the community that 
benefit circuitously from the services.  
Donors have an interest in nonprofit performance, and accountability to 
ensure that charitable resources are not siphoned off for non-charitable 
purposes. Clients care about nonprofit performance and accountability 
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because, in the absence of oversight, services may decline in quality or 
become too costly. Taxpayers and community members want performance 
and accountability because their tax burden may increase if exemptions 
are granted to ineffective organisations or by government grants funding 
programmes that are not productive for the community (Frumkin and 
Keating 2001 : 9-10). 
)UXPNLQDQG.HDWLQJDOVRWDONVRIWKH³,QVLGHQRQSURILW´7KH\SRVLWWKDW
two different groups have a stake in nonprofit organisations performance and 
accountability: the board and staff. According to Frumkin and Keating (2001), 
board members have legal responsibilities of care, loyalty, and agreement that 
require them to steward charitable resources conscientiously. Staffs, within the 
charitable sector often work for low earnings have a financial and intuitive stake in 
the effectiveness of their organisations. As nonprofit grow and change to meet new 
accountability standards, the main problem is that there are limited funds to attract 
and employ the much-needed, competent employees (Blacksell and Phillips, 
1994). In organisations that traditionally depend on volunteers, the push to 
organise and professionalise may cause these nonprofit to hire paid workforce 
(Billis, 1989). The human resource challenge is heightened because nonprofit are 
forced to compete with their private counterparts for outcome contracts. 
Stakeholder theory has been utilised in a variety of settings to support strategy 
development and execution, EXW WR WKH DXWKRU¶V NQRZOHGJH VWLOO WKH UROH RI
stakeholders and executive compensation has not received any attention yet. This 
study assumes that, need to attract and retain a talented CEO may largely 
determine executive compensation in nonprofit organisations. In addition, the 
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extensive array of stakeholders, who presumably support the nonprofit because of 
its charitable mission, combines with the difficulty of measuring organisational 
output in the nonprofit sector to create an opportunity for shirking on the part of 
nonprofit executives (Weisbrod 1989; Steinberg 1990). 
 
2.2.6 The Psychological Perspective on CEO Compensation 
Some researchers assert that the diverse aspects of the total compensation can also 
occur in line with numerous organisational goals of performance, internal and 
external equity, choice and retention of skilled executives (Gomez-Mejia and 
Balkin, 1992; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997; Roussel and Trepo, 1996; Zajac 
and Westphal, 1995). The idea of total compensation should therefore, be linked to 
a variety of practices. In case of the nonprofit organisations, these would be   (1) 
having a deVLUDEOH SDFNDJH ZKLFK FDQ PHHW WKH &(2¶V H[SHFWDWLRQV DQG
preference; (2) consider external equity and make the package competitive in 
relation to other firms (3) uncomplicated, comprehensible, fair and consistent so 
that it is acceptable with the other the workforce, the other stakeholders and the 
public (Akremi, Roussel and Trepo 2001). $FFRUGLQJ WR 2¶5HLOO\ DQG 0DLQ
(2005) when thinking about governance and executive compensation, there is need 
to examine how CEOs might, intentionally or unintentionally, manipulate their 
boards. For instance, there is to consider the social, psychological mechanisms that 
PLJKWLPSHGHWKHERDUG¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHDQGWKHUHE\LPSLQJLQJRQWKHLUDELOLW\WR
REVHUYH WKH &(2 DQG DOLJQ VKDUHKROGHU LQWHUHVWV 2¶5HLOO\ DQG PDLQ 5) 
SURSRVHG WZR SUHYDOHQW SV\FKRORJLFDO SURFHVVHV WKDW FRXOG GLPLQLVK WKH ERDUG¶V
independence and these are; norms for reciprocity, and CEO social influence.  
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2.2.6.1 Norms for Reciprocity 
0DLQ2¶5HLOO\DQG:DGHYLHZHGWKHERDUGRIGLUHFWRUVDVD social group 
VXEMHFWWRWKHQRUPVRIUHFLSURFLW\$VDFXVWRPUHFLSURFLW\VWDWHVWKDW³ZKHQRQH
party benefits another, an obOLJDWLRQ LV JHQHUDWHG´ *RXOGQHU, 1960:174). The 
anticipation is that when a person is helped they will feel obligated and it can 
generate a lot of valuable continuing exchanges. However, not reciprocating may 
provoke sanctions (e.g., Sethi and Somanathan, 2003; Fehr and Gaechter, 2000). 
Reciprocity is so pervasive and essential to human relations that it forms the 
foundation for some of psychological theories such as fairness and equity (Adams, 
1963) and social exchange (Blau, 1994). 
 
To demonstrate the power of reciprocity, Whatley et al (1999) highlighted that 
when people in an experiment received a small, unanticipated favour, they were 
consequently compelled to comply with a request despite knowing that the giver 
may not know they had reciprocated.  Kunz and Woolcott (1976) had their 
experiment too in which they received a large number of responses from strangers 
they send Christmas cards. There is compelling evidence that servers can raise tips 
as way of reciprocating (Tidd and Lochard, 1978; Rind and Strohmetz, 2001). 
Similar confirmation is also apparent from studies of reciprocity in employment 
settings (see for example, Uhl-Bien and Maslyn, 2003). However, Dabos and 
Rousseau (2004) established that reciprocity in the work relations was positively 
associated with future performance but negatively related to turnover. 
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In a different experiment, Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold and Gaechter (1998), 
investigated the effects of reciprocity on pay setting and found that, similar to 
$NHUORI¶V  LGHD RI HPSOR\PHQW DV D JLIW H[FKDQJH UHFLSURFLW\ HQFRXUDJHV
earnings that are relentless above the competitive rate. In the context of corporate 
governance, there are clearly tangible advantages, both monetary and status-
related, from being on a board. As much as the CEO can be regarded as to a 
certain extend responsible for aspects of their recruitment, for example, by being 
part of the nominating committee or paying generous fees, a board member can 
feel obliged to reciprocate (Westphal, 1998; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989).  
 
However, on the positive side, reciprocity may strengthen the social relations that 
allow boards to serve as experts and advisors to the CEO, whereas, on the negative 
side, reciprocity may result in defensive and justifications behaviours for poor 
performance (Wade, Porac and Pollock, 1997; Porac, Wade and Pollock, 1999) 
and even the suppression of unwelcome news and misreporting of data 
(Abrahamson and Park, 1994; Bar-Gill and Bebchuk, 2002). By virtue of its 
pervasive nature, it seems that reciprocity will remain a factor in board-CEO 
relations. However, whether it yields positive or negative effects will depend 
significantly on the situation. 
 
2.2.6.2 Social Influence  
Evidence from earlier research indicates that CEOs have the ability to determine 
their own compensation levels sometimes. Main, O'Reilly and Wade (1995) in 
their study, confirmed that CEOs who had strong social influence over their 
 30 
 
boards, were likely to earn considerably higher compensation than that forecasted 
by traditional economic theories. Other researchers have found similar effects for 
the impact of power and influence on executive compensation (e.g., Belliveau, 
2¶5HLOO\DQG:DGH)LQNHOVWHLQDQG+DPEULFN, 1989; Lambert, Larcker and 
Weigelt, 1993; Pollock, Fischer and Wade, 2002; Wade, O'Reilly and Chandratat, 
1990). People are often attentive to those who are comparable, those of higher 
prominence, those with social capital, and those who seem to have expertise. 
/RUVFKDQG0DF,YHU¶VVWXG\LQGLFDWHGWKDWRYHUSHUFHQWRIWKHGLUHFWRUV
they surveyed acknowledged that the CEO had significant informal control over 
the board. 
 
Early studies, (for example, Byrne, Clore and Worchel, 1966) indicated, that the 
same economic status was a foundation for increased appreciation and that 
attitudinal resemblance increased the level of salary subjects were prepared to pay 
others (Golightly, Huffman and Byrne, 1972). Concluding from these practices, 
2¶5HLOO\ HW DO  GHPRQVWUDWHG WKDW DIWHU FRQWUROOLQJ IRU HFRQRPLF
determinants of pay, CEOs whose compensation committee chair earned than the 
CEO, received more income. According to Westphal and Zajac (1995) existing 
board members favoured new appointments that were demographically more 
KRPRJHQHRXV DQG DOVR VLPLODULW\ LPSURYHG WKH H[HFXWLYH¶V FDVK SD\PHQW
Supported by the research that showed that demographic similarity may increase 
social impact, Main, 2¶5HLOO\ DQG :DGH  DQG 7VXL DQG 2¶5HLOO\  
reported that the level of CEO compensation was higher, as long as more similar 
board members were in age to the CEO. 
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2.2.7 The Perspective of Social Comparison and Equity 
From the literature on executive compensation, some researchers note that CEO 
compensation strategies in nonprofit organisations are based on a process of social 
FRPSDULVRQ %HOLYHDX 2¶5HLOO\ DQG :DGH  2¶5HLOO\ 0DLQ DQG &U\VWDO
1988). This may be because the economists believe that, in a perfectly competitive 
labour market, each worker is willing to work for wages no lower than he could 
obtain in alternative employment.  The implication of the theory of social 
comparison to CEO pay emphasizes the significance of equity and organisational 
justice (Greenberg, 1990; Adams, 1965). Two view points, namely, internal equity 
and external equity can be used to address the management of equity regarding 
executive compensation. By using internal equity, the CEOs can benchmark their 
compensation to that of their subordinates within the organisation whereas with 
external equity the CEO compares their compensation to that of CEOs of their 
competitors. The other view which is internal coherence, lower-level employees 
tend to compare their pay to that of other workers in the organisation, including 
the compensation paid to CEOs (Cowherd and Levine, 1992). Individuals are not 
only concerned about the quantity of compensation (distributive justice), but also 
to the processes of calculating it, the information, the involvement and the 
QHJRWLDWLRQ RI ZDJH GHFLVLRQV SURFHGXUDO MXVWLFH )URP WKH &(2V¶ SHUVSHFWLYH
the idea of organisational fairness can enhance the strategies of total compensation 
for chief executives when it considers the elements of satisfaction and motivation 
with regard to salary. When CEOs compare internal wage differences with their 
subordinates they consider their responsibilities and constraints. They also 
benchmark their salary with that of CEOs of competing organisations. Boards of 
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directors and remuneration committees attempt to resolve the objectives of internal 
and external justice. The compensation must be competitive and desirable to 
motivate and retain the skilled CEOs. The purpose of internal equity is extremely 
complex because income differences must be adequately huge to take into account 
the responsibilities, capability and risks of CEOs, but not too hefty in order not to 
develop feelings of injustice amongst the other workers (Cowherd and Levine, 
1992; Magnan et al, 2000; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997).  
 
In situations where CEOs enjoy pay differences that are not justified by their 
efforts or results, feelings of unfairness result from judgements. This can create an 
unacceptable social conflicts, dysfunction, and strikes and may even stimulate 
condemnation from stakeholders, the media and unions (Sanders, 1995; Gomez-
Mejia, 1994). Given the significant implications, board members are expected to 
explain and rationalise their decisions concerning CEO compensation so that the 
stakeholders will perceive the decisions as impartial in terms of internal coherence 
DQG HIIHFWXDO LQ WHUPV RI FUHDWLQJ WKH VKDUHKROGHUV¶ ZHDOWK LQ EXVLQHVV ILUPV
However, no doubt the same applies to nonprofit whose stakeholders might press 
to see the accomplishment of the organisational mission. CEO compensation 
strategies are therefore, basically depend on the management of perceptions and as 
a result, board members are more concerned about the message to convey than the 
actual effect or valuable use of a style or nature of compensation (Zajac and 
Westphal, 1995; Westphal and Zajac, 1994). The sense of balance between 
internal and external equity entails that compensation strategies must be deemed 
acceptable, attractive, lawful and realistic by the CEO and all the stakeholders. 
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Therefore, the board of directors must urge CEOs to improve performance as they 
also address their feelings of justice. According to Henninger (2000) and Gélinas 
(2001) compensation strategies are defined according to practices legitimised by 
the market, from an institutional perspective.  
 
2.3 Legislation Issues in Charities 
The extensive growth and increased importance of the charity sector coupled with 
the various frauds and other misdemeanours taking place within charities in recent 
years has led to the introduction of a variety of regulatory and legislative systems 
across the UK to help monitor and control the sector. Sinclair, Northcott and 
Hooper (2011) posit that accountability is critical for the charities sector as they 
help maintain the confidence and financial support of the public by reporting the 
charities activities. Furthermore, given the recurrent scandals that have plagued the 
charities, as well as allegations that creative accounting techniques are used to 
mislead funders, accountability has increasingly become a vital issue for charities 
(Khumawala & Gordon, 1997). While many within charities are against the 
imposition of accountability measures in charities (for example see Riddel 1999) 
arguing that given the altruistic nature of charities accountability is not necessary 
as charities are assumed to act reliably and with integrity (Connolly & Dhanani, 
2009), advocates of accountability, ( see for example, Eisenberg, 2005 and Berger, 
2009)  condemn that idea. In fact Eisenberg says; 
More and more, non-profit organizations self-righteously argue that 
because they provide good works, they need not be accountable to anybody 
± including the donors who support their work. Confidence has given way 
to cockiness (Eisenberg, 2005: 187). 
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Whereas Berger puts it concisely by saying:  
 
:H PXVW JHW SDVW WKH QRWLRQ RI GRLQJ WKH ÄJRRG ZRUNࣔ ZLWK QR
accountability. We must get past the idea that nonprofits are too complex 
or unique to be measured. The non-profit sector must get its act together 
and make sure it is really helping provide meaningful change in 
FRPPXQLWLHV DQG SHRSOH¶V OLYHV ,W LV OLIH RU GHDWK IRU PDQ\ RI WKRVH ZH
serve whether we are effective or not (Berger, 2009:3).  
 
Eisenberg (2008:1) further highlights that ³Lnappropriate behaviour and excessive 
compensation are still a regrettable part of our [not for profit, including charities] 
ZRUOG´ 0RUHRYHU DSSURSULDWH accountability by charities helps them guard 
against any damaging media publicity that disheartens stakeholders (Berger, 
2009). 
 
2.3.1 Regulatory Bodies for UK Charities 
 In England and Wales, charities are regulated by a statutory organisation, the 
Charity Commission. It conducts general monitoring of charities and has powers 
set out by parliament in the Charities Acts to conduct statutory investigations. The 
latest Act is the Charities Act 2011, which repeals and replaces the Recreational 
Charities Act 1958, the Charities Act 1993 and many of the provisions of the 
Charities Act 2006. The other purpose of the Charity Commission is to guide the 
information content of, and financial accounting practices in, charity annual 
reports and reviews, which it accomplishes mainly through the Statement of 
Recommended Practice (SORP) for charities (Hyndman and McMahon, 2010 and 
Charity Commission, 2005). As already been highlighted, the SORP is partially 
influenced by the work of Bird and Morgan-Jones (1981), which highlighted 
UHPDUNDEOHLVVXHVLQ WKHFKDULWLHV¶DQQXDOUHSRUWVDQGDFFRXQWV7KHUHVHDUFKKDG
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exposed that the sector was characterised by out-dated accounting practices, 
failure to apply the appropriate accounting standards as well as massive variability 
in accounting practices between charities (Hyndman and McMahon, 2010). 
However, some of the recommendations came from the Private Action, Public 
Benefit (Cabinet Office, 2002) report. Apart from the annual reports and accounts, 
charities also discharge accountability to their stakeholders through annual reviews 
DQGWKURXJKGLVFORVXUHVRQWKH&KDULWLHV¶DLPVREjectives, activities, performance, 
and future plans (Connolly and Dhanani 2009). While the annual report which is 
mandatory is useful to large donors ZKR KDYH WKH DELOLW\ WR µXQGHUVWDQG DQG
interpret not only the financial statements but also the financial performance and 
SRVLWLRQ RI FKDULWLHV¶ annual reviews are perceived as the more user-friendly 
GRFXPHQWV WKDW DUH VXLWDEOH IRU RWKHU VWDNHKROGHUV µZKR PD\ ODFN WKH QHFHVVDU\
ILQDQFLDO DFXPHQ WR LQWHUSUHW GHWDLOHG ILQDQFLDO LQIRUPDWLRQ¶ (Connolly and 
Dhanani, 2009: 7).  
Another piece of legislation has also recently come into force in the UK is the 
Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act. The Office of the Scottish 
Charity Regulator (OSCR), Scottish charities regulator, was established by the 
Scottish Parliament in 2003. Similarly, a Charity Commission for Northern Ireland 
was established in 2009 (Hyndman and McMahon, 2010). It is therefore evident 
that the government has reinforced its remit for the sector through legislation 
across all parts of the UK. Other examples of the regulatory initiatives include the 
establishment of the Guidestar UK website and The Strategy Unit (2002) which 
were established to promote and encourage charity accountability, the ImpACT 
Coalition and the introduction of Summary Information Returns (SIRs) which was 
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D UHVSRQVH WR WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V UHYLHZ RI WKH VHFWRU +RPH 2IILFH   and 
Connolly and Dhanani  2009). However, GuideStar UK monitors the 
accountability practice of charities with an annual turnover of more than £25 
million. GuideStar is considered reliable because it sources its information from 
WKHFKDULWLHV¶DQQXDOUHSRUWV6LQFODLU1RUWKFRWWDQG+RRSHU 
 
2.3.2 Challenges of Accountability in Charities 
Increased oversight and regulations have been hypothesised to be important 
drivers of higher administrative costs, therefore, to meet the complex regulatory 
and formal procedural requirements, charities may be forced to hire professional 
administrative expertise within both the board and staff (Gronbjerg 1993; Stone 
1996; Saidel 1991; Perri and Kendall 1997), thus relying less on volunteers. 
Furthermore, the charity sector may end up being under increased to 
professionalise their operations and to introduce a degree of bureaucratisation 
which is likely to limit their flexibility, adaptability and autonomy (Frumkin, 
2002). Besides, that administrative work and reporting procedures can be complex, 
tedious, and burdensome, as the charities are required to produce detailed monthly 
performance reports within fixed deadlines. Therefore, fulfilling all of these 
requirements may hinder the administrative staff from concentrating on the core 
organisational mission of providing services to the public (Tonkiss and Passey, 
1999). Additionally, it can also cause severe managerial strain that can erode 
motivation and commitment (Bernstein (1999). 
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2.4 Empirical Determinants of Nonprofit Organisation Compensation 
Evidence from extant literature shows remarkably little empirical research on the 
determinants of CEO pay for nonprofits. Frumkin and Keating (2001) believe that, 
since nonprofit organisations operate in noncompetitive environments and benefit 
from tax exemptions and donations, CEOs have the opportunity to receive 
unwarranted compensation, operate incompetently or divert funds from achieving 
WKHLURUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VPLVVLRQ to salaries. Those who believe that the nonprofit sector 
has become too professionalised and "corporate" cite excessive compensation as 
an example of how organisations are losing sight of their mission and their 
distinctiveness as nonprofit organisations (Mason, 1996). In such cases, nonprofit 
organisations perceived to be paying the CEOs highly are likely to erode donor 
confidence and cause increased public scepticism. Berger, (2010:1) explains why 
donor confidence can be eroded when he says, ³'RQRUVZDQW WRNQRZ WKDW WKHLU
FKDULWDEOHGRQDWLRQVZLOOJRDVIDUDVSRVVLEOHWRVXSSRUWWKHFKDULW\¶VJRRGZRUNV 
UDWKHU WKDQ SDG D &(2¶V ZDOOHW´. However, the agency theory proposes that 
principals should offer agents incentives to motivate them to be effective and 
reduce self-seeking behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). While it is 
appropriate for profit making organizations to offer incentives to the agents, for 
nonprofit organisations it brings another concern which Frumkin and Keating 
 WHUP WKH µYLRODWLRQ RI QRQ- GLVWULEXWLRQ FRQVWUDLQW¶ Unlike for profit 
organisations who can maximize profits and then pass them on to the shareholders, 
nonprofit organisations are legally prohibited from making distributions of its 
earnings to individuals who exercise control over it, for example, members, 
officers, directors, or trustees. Rather the net earnings, if any, should be ploughed 
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back into the system to support further production of services that form the basis 
RI WKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VIRXQGDWLRQ+DQVPDQQ, 1980). Therefore, paying incentives 
based on excess earning conflicts directly with the non-distribution requirement, 
since it means converting revenues and cost savings into higher earnings and 
benefits for employees instead of services for customers. As a result, the CEOs of 
nonprofit organisations are usually compensated lower than their counterparts in 
private sectors and government (Preston, 1989; Steinberg, 1990; Handy and Katz, 
1998 and Ruhm and Borkosi, 2003).  
 
Due to the non-distribution constraint, nonprofit organisations compensation 
strategies have traditionally been regarded as being based on the difficult-to-
measure idea of advancement of the mission, rather than based on growth and 
revenues or earnings, although it is an improper approach for nonprofit 
organisations (Kertz, 1997; Frumkin and Andre-Clark, 1999). For this reason, 
nonprofit organisations have sought to avoid performance-related pay for their 
employees (Jobome, 2006). The challenge for nonprofit organisations is to frame 
and support an appropriate balance between regulations that effectively prevent 
abuses, yet maintaining the freedom that have traditionally been afforded to 
nonprofit organisations to carry out their duties without interference. In other 
words, there is a need to compensate executives in a way that will help in the 
selection and retention of talented executives, motivate performance yet retains the 
tax- exemption and stability of the organisation.  
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 2.4.1 The Sector of the Organisation 
The nonprofit sector, however, is not homogeneous. The sector includes a vast 
array of groups that provide different goods and services. Some nonprofits offer 
health and human services, while others provide education programmes. 
Moreover, the organisational practices and cultures of nonprofit vary significantly, 
ZKLFK UHODWHV WR 2VWHU¶V  ILQGLQJ WKDW RUJDQLVDWLRQDO DIILOLDWLRQ PDWWHUV
significantly in executive wage setting. Oster, (1998) used a 1995 Chronicle of 
Philanthropy Survey similar to the 2001 survey and finds that hospitals provide 
their executive directors the greatest compensation packages while social services 
provide the smallest. Twombly and Gantz (2001), using the complete sample, find 
that hospitals pay the highest salaries followed by the higher education. The third 
highest paying a set of organisations is health (excluding hospitals), but the 
median executive salary for these organisations is half of the median executive 
salary for higher education organisations and a third of the median executive 
salary for hospitals. Employee benefit plans are also most likely to hospitals and 
higher education. Religion related organisations paid the lowest executive director 
salaries but also were most likely to augment base pay with expense accounts. 
Even within sectors of the nonprofit universe, significant variation may also exist.  
 
2.4.2 Organisational Size 
Gomez-Mejia et al (1987) suggest that size of the organisation instead of 
efficiency is more influential on CEO compensation. In line with this, Andersen, 
(2002) developed a role-sizing framework for top jobs. It is thus believed that the 
complexity of the organisation also pays a crucial role, as well. $QGHUVHQ¶V 
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methodology relies on the principle that the size and complexity of the 
organisation influence the basic salary of a top job. Although the focus was on the 
profit making organisations, Eldenburg and Krishna, (2003); Frumkin, and 
Keating, (2001) and Hallock, (2000) provide compelling support for a significant 
and positive relationship between executive compensation and organisational size 
in nonprofit. Gray and Benson, (2003) also believe that size is a fundamental 
variable in investigating the determinants of CEO pay in nonprofits. These also 
support Agarwal (1981) who argued that size is a critical determinant of CEO pay 
because it signifies a proxy for organisational complexity. The management of 
complex organisations places considerable demands on the executive and call for 
more skillfulness and experience as compared to the management of smaller, 
simpler organisations. Large, complex organisations may require CEOs capable 
and skilled, which leads to higher salary (Hallock, 2002). 
 
Frumkin (2002) also posits that, size or organisational scale may be more 
significant determinant of compensation in nonprofit than for-profit organisations, 
since inputs such as programme expenses and substantial assets are the most 
QRWLFHDEOH DQG TXDQWLILDEOH DVSHFW RI WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V SURGXFWLRQ SURFHVV
Organisational size may also be a decisive factor in salary because governing 
boards frequently determine compensation by comparison against senior CEOs in 
nonprofit that are similar in size and from the same sector (Barbeito and Bowman, 
1988). 
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Finally, Organisational size provides legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 
1995; Zucker,  )UXPNLQ  DVVHUWV WKDW ³ODUJH RUJDQLVDWLRQV XVXDOO\ 
gain more exposure, have greater reputation, therefore, given the scope of their 
activities, they are considered more effective. Thus, it has been found out that, 
managers at these leading organisations can be highly compensated because they 
are categorically perceived as worthy and entitled to earn more.  In short, the chief 
executive officer of a large and complex organisation will receive a higher basic 
salary than that of a smaller, less complex company, whether it is in a nonprofit or 
for-profit organisation. 
 
 2.4.3 The CEO¶V*HQGHU 
Reports in the popular press show that senior female CEOs as well as other top 
positions RIWKHQDWLRQ¶VQRQSURILWDUHQRUPDOO\SDLGOHVVWKDQPDOHVLQFRPSDUDEOH
jobs-as high as a 50% gender discrepancy exists for CEOs (Lewin, 2001; Lipman, 
2002). The pay difference is mostly among the large nonprofit (Lipman, 2002; 
Guidestar, 2004). A recent review of nonprofit compensation found the gender gap 
to persevere when compared to earlier surveys and that women earn considerably 
less than males in all employment categories. Although women were more likely 
to manage smaller organisations, even when controlling for organisation size, 
women earned less (GuideStar, 2004). This probably shows that executive gender 
PD\EHDGHWHUPLQDQWRIWKHH[HFXWLYH¶VFRPSHQVDWLRQ 
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2.4.4 The &(2¶V&KDUDFWHULVWLFV 
Preston (1989) argue that, many people choosing to work in the nonprofit sector 
engage in what he called ³ODERXUGRQDWLRQV´DQGDUHZLOOLQJWRDFFHSWORZSD\ than 
someone who works in the for-profit sector (for doing a similar job), because these 
individuals may, in effect, be donating labour to the organisation. In addition, they 
PD\ EH LQGLFDWLQJ WR SRWHQWLDO GRQRUV DQG RWKHUV WKDW WKH\ VKDUH WKH GRQRUV¶
preferences for the activities of their organisation (for example, helping the needy) 
DQGDUH WKXVPRUH OLNHO\ WRXVHDJUHDWHUSURSRUWLRQRIGRQRUV¶ IXQGs for service 
provision and not benefiting themselves (a means of dealing with information 
asymmetry problems). This ties in with the Hansmann¶V (1980) signalling 
hypothesis in that, manager of nonprofit derives utility from the nonprofit¶VHUYLFH
provision. In this case the CEO characteristics should not affect the setting of their 
compensation. 
 
However, given the feature of lower wages in the charity sector (which there is 
evidence of); it may be difficult to recruit quality staff that are not in some way 
FRPPLWWHG WR D FKDULW\¶V REMHFWLYHV ,Q DGGLWLRQ LQ WKH 8. DQHFGRWDO HYLGHQFH
suggests that some CEOs transfer from the private sector late in their career as a 
µFRQWULEXWLRQ¶ WR VRFLHW\ LQ DUHDV ZKHUH WKH\ DUH SDUWLFXODUO\ LQWHUHVWHG 
Apparently, Frumkim and Keating (2001) cite Young (1977) who notes that lower 
wages in charitable jobs act as a way of attracting only those CEOs who are 
willing to refrain from their need for profit. As Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992, 
p.169) note:  
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..... Executives are highly educated and possess many years of work 
experience in responsible jobs requiring much personal sacrifice. Few 
people have the ability, stamina, or willingness to pay the associated 
personal price in terms of stress, family life, loss of privacy, and minimal 
leisure time. So their higher pay may be seen as a return on this capital 
investment. 
In terms of future expectations, rewarding competent executives with high pay can 
be as an inducement to retain them and also to maintain high standards of 
commitment, effort and performance (Pratt, 1996). 
 
 2.4.5 Donor Preferences 
Twombly (2002) suggests that, donor preferences are among the other factors that 
GHWHUPLQH H[HFXWLYH FRPSHQVDWLRQ LQ QRQSURILWV +H VD\V ³7KH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK
charitable givers support individual organisations, may have a significant impact 
RQQRQSURILWZDJHVHWWLQJ´The degree of donor involvement in the organisation 
may limit salaries if donors respond to increased salaries with a reduction in 
funding. Oster (1998) also finds that increased reliance on donations limits 
executive compensation; for every percentage point increase in reliance on private 
donations, average compensation falls by $1000. Hallock finds that donors seem to 
steer away from nonprofit hospitals that are competing with for-profit hospitals. In 
hospitals with increasing competitive pressures and compensation tightly linked to 
performance, donor contributions are reduced. The level of competition among 
nonprofit vying for donor support to a large extent influence the manner in which 
donor preferences influence the behaviour of nonprofit organisations. For 
example, if an organisation with few competitors ignores donor preferences, it will 
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loose fewer donations as compared to the one that has many competitors. 
Therefore, nonprofit that rely heavily on public contributions might be disinclined 
to pay high salaries to their executives. 
 
 2.4.6 Competitive Pressure 
As noted by Twombly (2000), the economic prosperity in the United States has 
created a highly competitive labour market that cuts across the nonprofit and for-
profit sectors, necessitating the use among nonprofit of innovative methods to 
attract and retain qualified leaders, while reducing the likelihood of donor 
concerns over excessive executive salaries. Those backiQJ ³FRPSDUDEOH SD\´
argue that the success of nonprofit organisations relies on charitable managers 
specifically because of the complexity in evaluating a true bottom line in 
nonprofit. As a result of the service-oriented nature of the sector, the uncertainty of 
the finances and difficult- to- measure outcomes, nonprofit organisations must be 
prepared to spend uncompromisingly to attract and retain top human capital. Since 
the responsibilities of numerous nonprofits are increasingly becoming more 
challenging and demanding, there is need for personnel with strong management 
and leadership skills to ensure organisational growth (Letts, Ryan and Grossman, 
1999).  
 
There is, however, some evidence that alternative compensation methods are 
becoming prevalent in the nonprofit sector. In its study of compensation practices, 
the Applied Research and Development Institute International Inc. (1995) found 
that some nonprofit reduced their reliance on fixed salaries for top executives. 
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Others have found that pension contribution and health coverage are relatively 
high in the nonprofit sector (DuMond 1997). 
 
 2.4.7 The Media 
The research on the media shows that reporters play an influential role in 
GHWHUPLQLQJWKHSXEOLF¶VSHUFHSWLRQVRILVVXHVDQGHQWLWLHVHIIHFWLYHO\µVetting the 
DJHQGD¶ IRU SXEOLF GLVFRXUVH 0F&RPEV DQG 6KDZ  5RJHUV 'HDULQJ DQG
Bregman, 1993; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Weaver et al, 1981). Consistent 
ZLWKWKLVYLHZWKHDWWULEXWLRQVWKDW MRXUQDOLVWVPDNHUHJDUGLQJILUPV¶DFWLRQVDQG
outcomes can materially impact how firm managers and stakeholders perceive 
WKHVH DFWLRQV $V D UHVXOW WKH MRXUQDOLVWV¶ DWWULEXWLRQV PD\ LQGLUHFWO\ DIIHFW
PDQDJHUV¶ WHQGHQF\ WRSHUVLVWZLWKH[Lsting actions or adopt new ones (Clapham 
and Schwenk, 1991; Staw, McKechnie, and Puffer, 1983; Wagner and Gooding, 
 7KH TXRWH EHORZ H[HPSOLILHV MRXUQDOLVWV¶ SURSHQVLW\ WR DWWULEXWH D ILUP¶V
outcomes, including its performance, to the actions of its CEO. 
 
Welch has delivered extraordinary growth, increasing the market value of 
GE from just $12 billion in 1981 to about $280 billion today. No one, not 
0LFURVRIW¶V :LOOLDP + *DWHV ,,, RU ,QWHO¶V $QGUHZ 6 *URYH QRW :DOW
'LVQH\¶V 0LFKDHO ' (LVQHU RU %HUNVKLUH +DWKDZD\¶V :DUUHQ ( %XIIHWW
not even the late Coca-Cola chieftain Roberto C. Goizueta or the late Wal-
Mart founder Sam Walton has created more shareholder value than Jack 
Welch (Business Week, 1998). 
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,QDGGLWLRQWRH[SODLQLQJ*HQHUDO(OHFWULF¶VSHUIRUPDQFHWKLVTXRWHDOVRKLJKOLJKWV
the manner in which journalists inform the public about the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of firms and their leaders (Baum and Powell, 1995; Lamertz and 
Baum, 1998; Pollock and Rindova, 2003) thus it is applicable to nonprofit 
RUJDQLVDWLRQV DV ZHOO ,Q WKH SURFHVV RI DWWULEXWLQJ D ILUP¶V DFWLRns and 
SHUIRUPDQFH WR LWV &(2V MRXUQDOLVWV FUHDWH µFHOHEULW\ &(2V¶ +D\ZDUG 
$IWHU FUHDWLQJ VXFK FHOHEULW\ MRXUQDOLVWV FDQ WKHQ FKDQJH VWDNHKROGHUV¶
expectations about (a) the CEO and their behaviour (Kelley, 1972), and (b) how to 
respond to CEO actions (e.g., Bem, 1972; Festinger, 1957; McArthur, 1972). 
Therefore, recognising how attributions affect the behaviour and interactions of 
social observers with celebrity CEOs and above all, there is no doubt that this 
possibly can have effects on how the executive pay can be determined. 
 
2.5 Corporate Governance in Nonprofit Organisations 
The collapse of leading corporations such and Enron and WorldCom led Congress 
to enact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 in the USA. This legislation seeks to 
protect shareholders by implementing regulations aimed at preventing accounting 
and corporate mismanagement and fraud. Recent scandals in the nonprofit sector, 
including problems of fraud and mismanagement (United Way, Red Cross) and the 
excessive compensation paid to trustees and managers, as revealed by the Boston 
Globe and, recently, the LA Times, it became clear that governance problems are 
not confined to for-profit corporations (Scott, 2004).  The academic literature 
considers governance to be more valuable among nonprofit than the business 
sector. For instance, in their early work in finance by Fama and Jensen, (1983) 
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argue that the absence of an active ownership market among nonprofit accentuates 
the role of internal governance practices among nonprofit (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
Similarly, Oster (1995) posit that nonprofit organisations have complex products 
and services yet they lack simple performance measures like profitability. 
However, in the sectors that contract with government agencies, strong governance 
structures exist to safeguard not only the status of the nonprofit but also the 
welfare of the public sector. As Hevesi and Millstein, 2000 puts it, when the city 
of the governance practices inspects its nonprofit partners, the intention is to 
improve both the functions of those nonprofit and, as a consequence, improve the 
provision of public services.  
 
2.5.1 The Board and Nonprofit Governance 
Boards play a decisive role in the governance of nonprofit organisations. Boards 
do not only evidently make the essential choice of the CEO; they also play a 
significant role in policy, monetary decisions, and strategy formulation. Agency 
theory posits a conflicting connection between the board and the CEOs. It is the 
ERDUG¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRVFUXWLQL]HWKHVHOI-interested behaviour of executive (i.e., 
management) to ensure stockholder (the owners) interests. In principle, the theory 
suggests that, as one aligns board member interests with stockholders, they will be 
more vigilant in the monitoring tasks. Providing incentives to board members 
(e.g., stock ownership) and distancing board members from management (e.g., 
limit insiders) helps accomplish this. Insiders are typically those with significant 
ties to management such as former/current executives of the organisation (Fama 
and Jenson, 1983).  
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2.5.2 Agency Theory and the Board 
According to Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003), agency theory is by far the most 
utilised framework in the corporate governance literature when linking board 
effectiveness and organisational performance. Agency theory suggests that CEOs 
are self-serving, may have goals that diverge from those of the shareholders and, if 
not monitored, may engage in actions which are detrimental to shareholder wealth 
maximisation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Donaldson and Davis (1991) suggest 
that the use of a board of directors to monitor managerial actions on behalf of the 
VKDUHKROGHUV FDQ EH XVHIXO LQ UHVWUDLQLQJ VXFK PDQDJHULDO ³RSSRUWXQLVP´ They 
argue that if the CEO serves as the chair of the board, the impartiality of the board 
may be compromised. Agency theory suggests that as you align the interests of the 
board with that of the stockholders, the board is more likely to be vigilant in its 
monitoring role. This may be achieved by providing incentives to board members 
(e.g., stock ownership) and by distancing board members from management (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). However, the above discussion is in the context of for-profit 
organisations.  
 
In the context of NPOs, a number of studies support the contention that board 
effectiveness improves organisational performance and thereby protects the 
interest of stakeholders. For example, Callen et al. (2003) found a positive 
relationship between the presence of major donors on the board and 
organisational performance. However, the applicability of agency theory to non-
profit boards has been questioned because of the difficulty in identifying the 
owners of the organisation. Miller (2002) investigated the applicability of agency 
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theory to non-profit boards and found that the idea of a conflict-based 
relationship between the board and the executive management was at odds with 
WKHERDUGPHPEHUV¶FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIWKHLUUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHmanagement. 
Similarly, research on non-profit boards suggests that effective governance in 
NPOs tends to benefit from a trusting relationship between the board and the 
executive (Herman and Heimovics, 1991). Miller (2002) concluded that most 
board members in NPOs rely heavily on the chief executive and consider the 
chief executive as one of the most important assets in the organisation. Beyond 
the chief executive, many board members could not readily identify to whom 
they were accountable, sometimes merely suggesting it was only to themselves 
(Ostrower and Stone, 2001).  
 
2.5.3 Resource-Based Theory and the Board 
The resource-based view sees the firm as a portfolio of tangible and intangible 
assets and capabilities. Barney (1991; 2001) suggests that the unique resource 
HQGRZPHQWVZLWKLQDILUPVHUYHWRH[SODLQWKHGLIIHUHQFHVLQILUP¶VSHUIRrmance 
because they allow firms to efficiently and effectively take advantage of 
opportunities or neutralise potential threats. Castanias and Helfat (2001) point out 
WKDWRQHLPSRUWDQWDVSHFWRIDILUP¶VXQLTXHUHVRXUFHVLV WKHILUP¶VPDQDJHPHQW
which helps to generate rent. In this light, resource-based theory views the board 
functions as a resource for organisations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Brown 
(2004) supports this argument by indicating that board members can augment the 
links between the organisation and influential funders (private and public), bring 
technical competencies (i.e., financial or legal) and provide strategic direction for 
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the organisation. Apart from performing monitoring and control functions, Chait, 
Holland, and Taylor (1991) recoJQLVH WKDW WKH ERDUG¶V UROH LV WR OLQN WKH
organisation to the community. This role suggests that the board can bring a sense 
of legitimacy to the organisation by maintaining and instituting relationships with 
key constituencies and key stakeholders. These relationships should bring financial 
resources by expanding contacts with donors and should bring public relations 
benefits by having the board function as boundary-spanners into the community 
(Adams and Perlmutter, 1995). ,QVXPPDU\WKH132¶VERDUGDFWLvities encompass 
the selection and firing of executives, monitoring, advising on plans and strategic 
direction, developing programmes, fundraising and financial analyses, making 
significant financial contributions, communicating with the public, and assessing 
its own performance (Klausner and Small, 2005). The above suggests that NPO 
boards act as a critical resource to enhance the efficiency within an organisation, 
DQG WKLV SDSHU DWWHPSWV WR HOXFLGDWH KRZ WKH ERDUG¶V PDQDJHPHQW UHVRXUFHV
influence the performance in such organisations. 
 
 2.5.4 Board Composition and Executive Compensation 
The primary mechanism for addressing agency conflicts in nonprofit organisations 
is the Board of Directors (Brickley and Van Horn, 2004).  Individual-board 
members, however, are not accountable to owners (as they do in for-profit 
organisations) and therefore they may or may not be committed to fulfilling the 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V PLVVLRQ 7KH SURVSHFW IRU SHUVRQDO JDLQ FDQ HQWLFH LQGLYLGXDOV WR
apply to serve on the board. As Bowen (1999: 82) notes: Various nonprofit 
organisations face challenges board members whose aims are to advance their own 
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agendas. In a competitive marketplace, poorly organised organisations do not 
survive eventually. Tax subsidies and donations can protect incompetent nonprofit 
organisations from competitive strains.  
 
Fama and Jensen (1983a) argue that a nonprofit board will be effective managers 
RUHPSOR\HHVDUHQRWSDUWRI LW7KH\DVVHUW WKDW³QRQSURILWERDUGVLQFOXGHIHZLI
any internal agents as voting mHPEHUV´ WR VDIHJXDUG DJDLQVW PDQDJHULDO
expropriation of organisational resources such as donations (Brickley et al 
(2004:5). According to one professional organisation, having the CEO serving as a 
voting member of the board can bring in a clash of interest (Board Source, 2002). 
By extension, if other private interest groups such as physicians on hospital boards 
or representatives of groups that receive charity on humanitarian association 
boards participate on the board it is likely that also agency conflict is also 
increased.  
 
Corporate governance literature finds that CEOs have opportunities to line their 
compensation on the board. In the business world, however, shareholders and the 
risk of takeover can expel nonperformers on the board and in management 
(Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). In the nonprofit sector, some academics and 
professional associations have argued that, executives should not participate in 
voting as a member of their boards because there is an inherent risk of misuse of 
authority.  A CEO who has voting powers on the board but not accountable to the 
shareholders could exert excessive influence to expropriate donations and other 
organisational resources (Frumkin and Keating, 2001). Moreover, critics argue 
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that, if a CEO in a nonprofit is a voting member of the board, the outsiders are 
likely to regard it as giving too much authority to its CEO, thereby making donors 
reluctant to give. To test these claims, Brickley, Van Horn and Wedig (2004) 
FRQGXFWHG FRPSOHPHQWDU\ WHVWV ³'R boards that include CEOs hold their 
executives to performance standards? Do donors withhold contributions from 
those boards, where a CEO is present? The difference in the level and rate of 
H[HFXWLYHZDJHDUH³KLJKer in organisations where the CEO and other officers are 
voting mePEHUVRI WKHERDUG´ WKH\ reported executives receive estimated yearly 
raises that are 2.5 percentage points higher for each extra member of the managing 
team positioned on the board. They find that nonprofit CEOV DUH ³IDU IURP
overcompensated´ WKH PHDQ VDODU\ LV  ,Q FDVHV ZKHUH DQ H[HFXWLYH
receives higher pay, Bricklely, Van Horn and Wedig (2004) find his or her job 
performance tied to that pay.  Bricklely, Van Horn and Wedig (2004) also find that 
highly paid CEOs have had longer tenures. In addition, say the authors, if the CEO 
and other managers are voting members of the board, donations to the nonprofit 
increase rather than decrease. 
 
From the strategic management of human resources perspective, the strategies of 
determining a suitable compensation structure are essential for the establishment 
of a competitive benefit for human resources (Milkovich and Newman, 1996). 
However, (Roussel and Trepo, 1996; Gomez-Mejia, 1994) note that, CEOs are not 
only enthused by their compensation only, but also by the prestigious worth 
attached to it, that of the manager holding the prestigious responsibilities. The 
strategies of setting CEO compensation must, therefore, consider the four key 
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corresponding objectives: organisational effectiveness, motivation to work, 
attraction and reliability of the skilled CEOs. The concept of total compensation 
should, thus, be financially viable, able preserve the motivation of the CEOs and 
guarantee the stability of the organisation.  
 
 2.6 The Challenges of Nonprofit Compensation 
Just like for-profit organisations, nonprofit organisations are also businesses, 
though they are nonprofit businesses. This means they ought to have strong 
management practices, including reasonable personnel policies, adequately 
compensated staff members and a marketing / customer service orientation. 
Frumkin and Keating (2001) believe that, since nonprofit organisations operate in 
noncompetitive environments and benefit from tax exemptions and charitable 
donations, CEOs have the opportunity to be remunerated extremely, operate 
LQHIIHFWXDOO\ RU GHIOHFW UHVRXUFHV IURP DFKLHYLQJ WKHLU RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V PLVVLRQ
Thus, they cite excessive compensation and the violation non distribution 
constraint as the changes for threats to public trust. Salls (2004) suggests that, the 
demand for the sector to be transparent poses as the greatest existing challenge. 
 
 2.6.1 Excessive Compensation 
Recently, excessive CEO pay has dominated the headlines for several nonprofit 
organisations. Those who believe that the nonprofit sector has become too 
professionalised and "corporate" cite excessive compensation as an example of 
how many organisations are losing sight of their mission and their distinctiveness 
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as nonprofit organisations (Mason, 1996).  Because revelations of inordinately 
high compensation can erode donor confidence and cause increased public 
scepticism, board members should pay close attention to compensation decisions. 
The compensation of nonprofit executives usually lags far behind that of their 
counterparts in the private sector or government (Preston, 1989, Steinberg, 1990, 
Handy and Katz, 1998 and Ruhm and Borkosi, 2003). It is thus that many of those 
ZKR RSW IRU HPSOR\PHQW LQ WKH QRQSURILW VHFWRU HQJDJH LQ µODERXU GRQDWLRQV¶
preferring altruistic and other non-pecuniary benefits to monetary rewards (Rose-
Ackerman 1986, Preston 1989). 
However, Letts, Ryan, and Grossman (1999) state that, because the work of many 
nonprofit organisations is growing ever more complex and more demanding, there 
is need for personnel with strong management and leadership skills to ensure 
organisational growth. Thus, the increasing understanding of the need to attract 
and retain competent employees has added to the trepidation over how to design 
compensation strategies and programmes that are fair and reasonable. Hence, 
Axelrod (2001:91) (the president of National Centre for Nonprofit Boards), says, 
It is, of course, incumbent upon all board members and chief executives to 
avoid excesses. It is equally important that governing boards recognise 
that they must set a fair, adequate and competitive compensation level, or 
they will be difficult for them to attract and retain the leaders who can help 
$PHULFD¶VLQFUHDVLQJO\FRPSOH[QRQSURILWRUJDQLVDWLRQVPHHWWKHJURZLQJ
demands they will face in coming years. 
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2.6.2 Violation of the Non distribution 
Frumkin and Keating (2001) highlight that another concern associated with 
nonprofit compensation is that management may divert excess earnings from 
providing future services. The agency theory advocates that principals should 
provide agents incentives to encourage achievement and decrease perquisite 
behavior (Jensen and Meckling 1979, Fama 1980). However, basing the incentives 
on excess earning conflicts with the non-distribution requirement, since revenues 
and cost savings get converted into higher wages and benefits for employees 
instead of being used for activities that directly benefit the clients. As a result of 
the non-distribution constraint, nonprofit organisations decisions on how to 
recompense CEOs have conventionally been based on the difficult-to-measure 
idea of achieving the mission, rather than based on growth and revenues or 
earnings, an approach regarded as unsuitable for nonprofit organisations (Kertz 
1997, Frumkin and Andre-Clark 1999). The dilemma for nonprofit organisations is 
on designing compensation packages that can motivate the CEO to improve 
performance yet maintaining their tax- exemption status and focus on mission. For 
that reason, nonprofit organisations have sought to avoid performance-related pay 
for their employees.  
 
However, Frumkin and Keating (2001) note that, recently restricted incentive 
compensation have been introduced in the nonprofit sector. Compensation 
consultants argue that pay-for-performance results in enhanced employee activity 
and retention, which converts into improved revenues and effectiveness (Barbeito 
and Bowman, 1998). This perspective supposes that nonprofit organisations 
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operate comparably to business corporations. In the business sector, owner can 
generate better performance by awarding incentives to risk-bearing CEOs, and 
LQFHQWLYHV FDQ EH VWUXFWXUHG WR FDSLWDOLVH RQ WKH SULQFLSDO¶V HIIHFWLYHQHVV ,Q D
nonprofit organisation, the agent is the CEO, but there is no lawful residual 
claimant to serve as principal (although, in some organisations, boards function as 
an effective substitute). Furthermore, the relevant goal is difficult to define and 
related programmatic outputs are difficult to observe and measure (Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972, Frech lll and Ginsburg 1983). In such circumstances, it is not easy 
WR GHILQH PDQDJHU¶V SHUIRUPDQFH E\ OLQNLQJ SD\ ZLWK ILQDQFLDO UHVXOWV (Frumkin 
and Keating 2001). 
 
2.6.3 Scale and Complexity Limitations 
According to Frumkin and Keating (2001), the extent of restrictions inbuilt in 
nonprofit organisations posses some concerns in nonprofit. The limited finances 
and human resources in these organisations limit their ability to organise complex, 
large scale programmes as quickly and easily as business corporations. Besides a 
few highly regarded national charities, nonprofit organisations are regularly 
inadequately financed and short-staffed. In fact, they often run on extremely 
limited resources and tight budgets trying to accomplish their mission. 
Furthermore, small nonprofit, which make up much of their organisational 
population, have limited experience to deal with complex information technology 
and administration issues, and skills needed if they are to handle caseloads and 
complex administrative requirements (Johnson and Rudney, 1997). 
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 2.6.4 Availability of Capital 
Simple under capitalisation can be significant for nonprofit organisations, given 
that some government contracts often require the client to be served first or some 
documented outcome to be achieved before releasing part of the service fee. Thus 
if a contractor only receives payment months after assisting a client, it means 
finding ways of covering the up-front costs of delivering services, as it waits for 
payment to arrive. This can put substantial capital demands on nonprofit 
organisations (Frumkin, 2002). 
 
Frumkin (2002) notes that, while for-profit organisations have several tools at their 
disposal to raise capital, most nonprofit organisations do not have large revenue-
generating operations to support substantial capital outlays, apart from being under 
capitalised by charitable supporters. To worsen their plight, if the management in 
nonprofit organisations could increase operating funds through other means like 
loans, watchdog groups might well criticise these charities and condemn them of 
taking too much risk which exposes their organisation to financial stress. For-
profit organisations, if just starting, may approach venture capital investors and 
seek large amounts of funding and long-term commitment in exchange for stake in 
the firm. Once their business accomplishes a particular level of operation, it has a 
second chance to raise funds in the equity markets. Through initial public offering 
(IPOs) and routine stock offering, for-profit organisations can command resources 
on a substantial scale. With both venture and capital and equities, business sells 
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ownership stakes to outside parties. However, when they do not want to relinquish 
ownership, they can raise funds through the bond market. 
 
On the other hand, nonprofit organisations suffer a disadvantage in that they can 
not sell ownership stakes. Furthermore, because they are ownerless organisations, 
nonprofit organisations are not prepared to participate in equity markets. However, 
they can, to a limited extent use bonds to fund significant capital projects. This has 
only been confined to the major institutions like hospitals, universities and 
museums. Bonds have not been a popular way of finance because of their high 
transactions costs linked with assessing, underwriting and servicing them. 
Moreover, since many underwriters do not only consider real estate in making 
decisions, but dependable sources of funds as well, nonprofit organisations real 
challenge in convincing the lender community that their multiple revenue streams 
are reliable enough and their assets valuable enough to justify chief financial 
commitments. 
 
2.7 Assessing Nonprofit Performance 
The demonstration of efficiency and effectiveness has recently become a critical 
issue to nonprofit managers, funders, social entrepreneurs, regulators and 
policymakers in nonprofit organisations. While improving nonprofit performance 
is a fundamental goal, significant obstacles hinder progress toward this worthy 
objective (Abramson, 2003). Additional resources would help nonprofit enhance 
their performance, but nonprofit should also be able to achieve better results with 
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the resources they already have. Nonprofit leaders can take deliberate action to 
improve organisational performance. However, external factors that are hard for 
them to control may limit the progress they can make. The efficiency and 
effectiveness of nonprofit can be negatively affected by requirements imposed by 
government and private funders, for example. Moreover, as already been 
discussed, different stakeholders may have different expectations regarding 
nonprofit performance, making it difficult for nonprofits to satisfy any of the 
stakeholders. According to Bell-Rose (2002) the nonprofit does not enjoy the 
relatively straightforward market signal that the for-profit sector enjoys. Bell-Rose 
(2002) adds that, there are no accepted standards for capturing and detailing social 
values that are equivalent to the techniques used by for- profits in reporting profits 
and shareholder value. 
 
2.7.1 The Importance of Measuring Performance 
For any organisation, the most salient reason to measure performance is to 
improve effectiveness and to obtain information that will allow the organisation to 
drive its agenda forward. According to Hoff (2001:236)  
Self-assessment is about taking the pulse of your organisation²what is 
currently working well? What is not working well? What is hindering your 
progress? It should be designed to expose root causes of organisational 
problems or issues, so that appropriate and effective solutions can be 
implemented. Otherwise it may be used when doing something that has 
never been done before, thereby better informing you of the strengths you 
can apply to the effort and the deficiencies that might inhibit 
implementation of your new idea. 
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 Bell-Rose (2002) asserts that, without method of assessing impact, organisations 
may not know if they are achieving their missions. Therefore, they may be missing 
prospects of improving their programmes. Some researchers emphasise that the 
goal of performance measurement as a tool for increasing efficiency (Hatry 1999; 
Behn 2003; Halachmi 2002). Flynn and Hodgkinson (2002) suggest that, in the 
increasingly competitive world in which nonprofit operate, there are new demands 
for impact analysis. Foundations want to know whether the programmes they fund 
are being effective. Private donors seek to know how donations serve targeted 
clients. Thus, assessing performance could enable donors to appreciate the 
achievements of different organisations and, therefore, make them shift their 
dollars to the best performers (Cunningham and Ricks, 2004). Therefore, the 
transparency and accountability by the assessment of performance might increase 
overall donor confidence in the sector and thus attract more financial support to 
boost the scale and capacity of their activities. Board members ask for detailed 
information on organisational activities and performance. Performance 
measurement has also become more prominent among government agencies.  Over 
the past two decades and in particular under the conservative government, 
performance contracting quickly became the way local and national governments 
sought service delivery. This has led to new levels of both competition and 
collaboration among the three sectors which are; government, business and 
nonprofit although depending upon the approach of government (Weisbrod, 1997).  
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2.7.2 Challenges of measuring Performance in Nonprofit Organisations 
Many nonprofit organisations are apprehensive about the issue of measuring 
performance. Herman and Renz (1999) and Forbes (1998) addressed the 
challenges of measuring nonprofit organisational performance in more detail. 
There are several significant limitations to measuring performance in nonprofit. 
Cameron and Whetten (1983) indicate that many of the difficulties with 
understanding effectiveness arise because it is a social construct, with unknowable 
boundaries. Some of the major barriers relating to performance in nonprofit result 
from the differences between businesses and nonprofit as explained below. 
 
2.7.2.1 Different Missions  
Businesses and nonprofit organisations have different missions. Businesses exist to 
create wealth for shareholders (Speckbacher, 2003).  Therefore, the organisational 
mission and the measurement of performance can both be evidently expressed in 
fiscal terms (Moore, 2001).  Consequently, if a business is making profit it is 
UHJDUGHGDVEHLQJVXFFHVVIXO LQDFKLHYLQJ WKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VPLVVLRQEHFDXVH WKH
generation of income or lack of it is directly associated with performance. On 
contrary, nonprofit organisations revolve around wide-ranging and complex 
missions with diverse and complex components (Speckbacher, 2003). Taylor 
(2001) argues that nonprofits organisational performance is difficult to define and 
measure since it involves impact on individuals social aspects of life that are much 
more complex to measure in monetary terms. Since the accomplishment of the 
PLVVLRQ LV KDUGO\ HYHU OLQNHG WR WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V DELOLW\ WR JHQHUDWH UHYHnue, 
there are hardly any accepted performance measures in place.   
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The situation becomes complex because much nonprofit financial support comes 
from third parties who often have different agendas that may or may not be 
strongly linked to mission of the organisation, yet their support provides the 
financial backing for the organisation to function. While private sectors focus their 
DWWHQWLRQRQSURYLGLQJDVHUYLFHRUSURGXFW WKDWGLUHFWO\ERRVWV WKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V
revenue, nonprofit usually no relationship between the mission they exist to 
accomplish and the financial support that enables them to exist.  Nonprofits, then, 
have numerous bottom lines rather than one, and it further complicates the whole 
thing (Moore, 2000).  
 
2.7.2.2 Responding to Environmental Pressures  
 It is also worthy noting that the market-driven business culture promotes and 
rewards organisations which adapt and change with the times.  The organisations 
that change in response to changing markets achieve long term success.  The 
bottom-line mission of an organisation is to create shareholder wealth, and it can 
be achieved using a number of activities.  An organisation can change its activities 
radically without altering its mission (Moore, 2000). This contradicts the way 
nonprofit organisations operate.  Nonprofit that change their activities in response 
WR WKH H[WHUQDO HQYLURQPHQW FRXOG EH DFFXVHG RI ³PLVVLRQ GULIW´ 7KHUH LV a risk 
that if they were to change their mission in response to changes in social 
conditions or donor enthusiasm, they would be accused of caring more for their 
VXUYLYDOWKDQIRUWKHLUFDXVH´0RRUH:KLOH such a change for a for-
profit organisation could lead to increased profits and praise for innovativeness, in 
nonprofit organisations, this could ruin the integrity of the whole organisation.  
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2.7.2.3 Client Satisfaction  
Evaluating Customer satisfaction in nonprofits is another uphill task.  In the 
private sector, clients have different choices and their choice of where to spend 
their money can rationalise their satisfaction or lack thereof.  Whereas with 
nonprofits, customers have few or no options about where to look for a service, 
therefore, there is no market-like feedback method.  To combat this, (Letts, et al, 
1999; Lindenberg, 2001) suggest that nonprofits must deliberately put systems in 
place that give them feedback from their relatively immobilised service 
beneficiaries.  
 
2.7.2.4 Funding Structure  
The third party funding structure is also a serious threat to the measurement of 
performance in nonprofit sectors. For example, instead of concentrating on 
providing the services, nonprofits also are constantly occupied with efforts to 
sustain and develop financial sources, thereby making forecasting challenging 
(Wilensky and Hansen, 2001).  Moreover, if they garner for foundation funding, 
nonprofits face numerous obstacles that act as barriers to nonprofit developing as 
high-performance organisations. Foundations exert a powerful force in shaping the 
nonprofit organisations.  They do so because when they provide financial backing, 
they manipulate the directions and ideas related to research, assessment, and best 
practices that impact the nonprofit sector because those ideas are connected to the 
ILQDQFHV WKH\JLYH <HW³WKHELJSLFWXUHDW IRXQGDWLRQV rarely includes concerns 
DERXWRUJDQLVDWLRQDOFDSDFLW\DQGSHUIRUPDQFH´/HWWV5\DQDQG*URVVPDQ
169-170).  In fact, Letts, Ryan and Grossman (1999) believe that the grant-making 
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SURFHVV HQDEOHV PDQ\ IRXQGDWLRQV WR ³XQGHUPLQH WKH DELOLW\ RI QRQSURILt to 
GHYHORS WKH FDSDFLW\ IRU VXVWDLQHG KLJK SHUIRUPDQFH´   7KH IRFXV RI
many foundations is usually on developing and testing new ideas and new 
programmes, rather than investing to support broader capacity of the organisation 
that can sustain such programmes. 
 
Letts, Ryan, and Grossman (1999) show the variations in the venture capital 
approach used in setting up business organisations and nonprofit organisations to 
demonstrate the challenge facing a nonprofit organisation development. In for-
profit organisations, venture capitalists provide funding, a supportive environment 
to convert potentially worthwhile proposals into a successful organisation and 
liberty to discover the best methods for achieving it. However, foundations 
funding nonprofit organisations, rarely offer this kind of support and flexibility.  
According to (Letts, et al, 1999), Foundations deal with the risk of financing the 
nonprofit organisations E\ ³DVVXPLQJ DQ DUP¶V OHQJWK oversight role that will 
uncover poor management, rather than a partnering role that will actively develop 
FDSDEOHPDQDJHUV´/HWWVHWDO 1999: 180). The result is that most of the time and 
resources is spent in programme activity that yields a great list of activities as a 
result, though the results themselves might not reflect the achievement of the 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V goals. Foundations also customarily expect nonprofit to function 
with extremely tight budgets and the nonprofit organisation that allocates much of 
its budget directly to programme services and delivery and as little as possible for 
administration and general organisational operation is considered effective.  With 
this mindset coming from donors, it is no wonder, several organisations put little 
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to no importance on internally building capacity and organisational vigour.  
Although an increasing number of foundations seem to be fascinated with 
capacity-building, nonprofit organisations are still expected devote the bulk of 
their resources on programme delivery.   There is, however, a great expectation for 
nonprofit organisations to change the society in significant ways with little or no 
support. Whereas private sectors have the flexibility to create culture and capacity 
that support workers and organisational development so that they can successfully 
achieve their profit-driven missions, which as already been discussed, are easy to 
quantify and measure. The limited timelines for funding cycles given to foundation 
grant makers also hinders real capacity building (Letts, et al, 1999). 
 
2.7.2.5 Human Resource Challenges 
As far as the issue of human resources is concerned, nonprofit organisations 
encounter the challenges of recruiting and retaining a skilled workforce because 
their wages and compensation are less competitive than those of the business 
sector (McHargue, 2003; Letts, et al, 1999).  Furthermore, non-profits seem to 
have no clearly defined goals and strategies which make it difficulty for employees 
to work towards clear goals.  Therefore, Most of the nonprofit workers work 
without the rewards systems and achievement indicators like the workers in the for 
profit sector.  Furthermore, in nonprofit organisations there is no time to celebrate 
their accomplishments. Therefore, these issues contribute to the discouragement of 
nonprofit employees (Letts, et al, 1999).   
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The over-reliance by nonprofit organisations on crucial volunteer staffing, also 
generates exclusive human resources problems, thereby making long-term 
forecasting, organisational structure and planning more difficult (Wilensky and 
HanseQ   $GGLWLRQDOO\ VLQFH PDQ\ QRQSURILW ³YDOXH KLJKO\ SDUWLFLSDWRU\
ZRUNHU FXVWRPVDQGDWWUDFW ³MXVWGR LW´ LQGLYLGXDOVZLWK WKHLURZQGHILQLWLRQVRI
DFFRPSOLVKPHQWRUJDQLVDWLRQVFDQHQGXSZLWK ³WRRPXFK LQIRUPDWLRQ IURP WRR
PDQ\SHRSOH´.DSODQ001:358) and this further complicates the already difficult 
task of clearly defining organisational strategy, a key element of successful 
performance. 
 
2.7.2.6 Nonprofit Traditions 
Academics and practitioners are embracing the fact that nonprofit need to focus 
more on performance and building stronger organisations.  The challenge has been 
to find a model that truly works toward this end.  However, despite attempts to 
adopt models from the public and business sectors and none of them has been 
entirely suitable, although some were better than others. Drucker (1989) points out 
that the nonprofit sector seem to divert their attention to exceptional management 
as they mature, although this may contradict with the original values of the sector.  
In fact, Drucker FLWHGE\6SHFNEDFKHUSRVLWWKDW³7ZHQW\\HDUV
DJRPDQDJHPHQWZDVDGLUW\ZRUGIRUWKRVHLQYROYHGLQQRQSURILWRUJDQLVDWLRQV´
However, now, more attention has shifted to nonprofit management, but on some 
OHYHO EHLQJ ³EXVLQHVV-OLNH´ DOWKough contrary the values of the nonprofit sector. 
'DUW   PHQWLRQV FDVH VWXGLHV ³ZKHUH WKH ³EXVLQHVV-OLNH´ DOWHUDWLRQ RI
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service delivery inconsistently reframed and reprioritised the specific nonprofit 
YDOXHVRIWKHSURJUDPPHV´6RPHRIWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQV¶ORQJYDOXHGSULQFLSOHVZHUH
dropped in favour of others. As a result, although there is a need for performance 
measures, nonprofit organisations are afraid of losing their organisational values 
by embracing techniques from business sectors. Lindgren (2001) and Lindenberg 
 DOVR YRLFHG WKH VDPH DSSUHKHQVLRQ DERXW ³JRDO GLVSODFHPHQW´ ZKHQ
nonprofit organisations adapt performance measures from the business sector and 
apply it in their model.  Lindgren (2001) and Lindenberg (2001) recognise that 
when strict performance measures are applied to nonprofit, it potentially creates a 
disconnection with the principles that inspire the sector.  Lindenberg comments 
that if the nonprofit staff approach focus on impact and accountability to be 
successful, tKH\PD\HQGXSGHYRWLQJ³WRRPXFKDWWHQWLRQWRPDUNHWG\QDPLFVDQG
private and public sector techniques will devastate their value-based organisational 
FXOWXUH´Undeniably, the need for high-quality management is vital in 
nonprofit organisations, but complex since it requires the measuring 
accomplishment of a social mission which is sophisticated when compared to 
meeting clear financial objectives.  The goals of most nonprofits focus on 
VDWLVI\LQJ ZKDW DUH RIWHQ ³YDJXH DQG LPSUHFLVH FKDOOHQJLQJ KXPDQ LVVXHV´
(Wilensky and Hansen, 2001:224).  Additionally, despite talks about the necessity 
for improvement of these issues, the pervading nonprofit culture there are 
individuals who are highly motivated and passionate about the cause they work for 
and therefore, cannot easily embrace techniques from other sectors without 
suspicion (Wilensky and Hansen, 2001; Moore, 2000). 
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Herman and Renz (1997) suggested that performance in nonprofit organisations is 
socially constructed and it is determined by who is asked. Thus, Bell-Rose (2002) 
states that there is no standard method to measure social value creation. 
Furthermore, considering that nonprofit participate in a variety of things like 
³HQYLURQPHQWDOSURWHFWLRQWRKHDWKFDUHWRGLVDELOLW\ WKHDUWVDQGHYen economic 
GHYHORSPHQW´ PDNHV LW H[FHHGLQJO\ GLIILFXOW. People are usually inclined to 
measure their achievements. For example, an organisation that has full classrooms, 
may report on the number of students being served, and may not even consider the 
number of students who got jobs (Bell-Rose 2002). Similarly, Ostrower and Stone 
(2006) contend that assessments of performance must move beyond relying solely 
on perceptions of executives.  In general, concentrating on outcomes-indicators of 
authentic impact- will change the focus from the process to results, from how a 
programme functions to what it achieves. It is, therefore, increasingly vital for 
nonprofit to search for ways to stabilise mission, management, and performance, 
and it is imperative that nonprofit experts work together to address these 
challenges. 
 
2.8 Ways of Measuring Nonprofit Performance 
 Charities are not driven by generating revenues like businesses, but they do have 
various socially-based objectives. Therefore, measurement of performance in these 
organisations should not only focus on financially related objective, but should 
also be based on the achievements of the charity in accomplishing its strategic 
goals and eventually its mission (Sayer, 2003). According to Trussel and Bitner 
(2001) a search to complement the financial measures with non financial measures 
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has gained significant momentum over the past decade. Weisbrod (1997) provides 
a perceptive overview of the need for carefully developed evaluations of the 
nonprofit sector as a whole, of obstacles in the process, and of proposed 
approaches. The focus of his inquiry is the extent to which the growth of the 
nonprofit sector over the past three decades is economically efficient and 
desirable. Weisbrod cautions that when attempting to measure sectoral outputs and 
outcomes. The danger, he argues, stems from the fact that nonprofit organisations 
are more likely than for-profit firms to provide outputs that are difficult to value 
and hence measure. A flawed attempt to measure performance in nonprofit 
organisations would yield a systematic underestimation of nonprofits¶ VRFLDO
contributions. 
 
Although several normative studies have attempted to operationalise effectiveness 
measures (AAA 1989, AICPA 1972, Elkin and Molitor 1984, Gambino and 
Reardon 1981, Lohmann 1980), no such measures have, as yet, been widely 
accepted (AAA 1989, Gronbjerg 1993).  Herman and Renz, (1999) advance 
several theses about the effectiveness of nonprofit organisations. Regarding 
performance measurement, they argue that organisational effectiveness cannot be 
reducible to a single measure and that programme output indicators as measures of 
organisational effectiveness are limited and can be dangerous. Among other 
things, these authors recommend the development of conceptions and indicators of 
effectiveness that are appropriate for nonprofit organisations. This is because the 
lack of a set of accepted performance measures means that nonprofit organisations 
may follow a random walk as they compete to get resources to support their 
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missions. Flynn and Hodgkinson (2002) comment that, unless a useful 
methodology to describe and measure performance in the sector is developed, they 
will continue to function on philosophy about the increased value and their modern 
responsibilities and purposes. This shows that although the effort is demanding and 
complex, it is necessary, for the sector and its institutions to demonstrate their 
accomplishments and inherent worth in an era of greater accountability to the 
public. 
 
2.8.1 Models of Performance Measurement in Nonprofit Organisations       
The realisation that measuring performance in nonprofit organisations has such an 
indispensable role, in the UK public sector, the importance of measuring and 
reporting performance has strongly been articulated, and a number of guidance, 
much of it that could be read across to charities, is documented (Connolly and 
Hyndman, 2004). For example, charities in the UK must prepare annual reports 
and financial statements. The introduction to the 2000 Statement of Recommended 
Practice (SORP) highlights the importance of preparing the FKDULW\¶VDQQXDOUHSRUW
and financial statements when it VWDWHV WKDW ³WKH SXUSRVH RI SUHSDULQJ LV WR
GLVFKDUJH WKH WUXVWHHV¶ GXW\ RI SXEOLF DFFRXQWDELOLW\ DQG VWHZDUGVKLS´ Charity 
Commission, 2000). However, as much as financial disclosure and auditing have a 
place in nonprofit governance structure, researchers like Hyndman (1990); 
Parsons, (2003) and Falk (1992), advocate for other sorts of reporting that describe 
the non financial performance of the organisation which they believe to be  far 
more valuable than its financial performance. Herzlinger (1996) echoes the same 
views and suggests that nonprofit organisations should disclose non financial 
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quantitative measures of the quantity and quality of services provided, although he 
does not offer guidance about how organisations should select such measures. 
There is a general consensus from previous studies that no single performance 
measure can capture what constitutes performance in nonprofit (Jobome 2006 and 
Sowa et al 2004), but there is need for a range of measures in order to cope with 
the multidimensional nature of public service (Stewart and Walsh, 1994). 
Apparently,   researchers in the 1980s (Cameron, 1981, 1982; Connolly, Conlon, 
and Deutsch, 1980) advocated that the use of multidimensional approaches for 
measuring nonprofit effectiveness does not only reflect the role of the multiple 
constituencies of many nonprofit EXWKHOSVXVHUVWRDFFHVVERWKWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V
ability to acquire resources (that is, fundraising). This has resulted in many 
scholars producing a number of models exploring organisational effectiveness in 
nonprofit organisations (Sowa et al 2004; Herman and Renz, 1999). Nevertheless, 
Cameron and Whetten, (1983: 7) posit that none of these many models can, 
however, µFDSWXUHWKHWRWDOFRQVWUXFWVSDFHRUWKHWRWDOPHDQLQJRIHIIHFWLYHQHVV¶ 
Although there are many overlaps, there is none yet, that can claim to be a 
comprehensive set of criteria applicable to all voluntary organisations (Mistry, 
2007). 
2.8.1.1The Goal or Purposive-Rational Model 
The goal or purposive-rational model by researchers, such as (Etzioni, 1964; 
Pfeffer, 1982; Price, 1972 assume that organisations exist to accomplish both 
formally specified and implicit goals. Therefore, the goal or purposive-rational 
PRGHO¶VIRFXVLVRQWKHLQWHUQDORUJDQLVDWLRQDOIDFWRUVZKLFKIRFXVRQWKHH[WHQWWR
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which an organisation reaches its goals as the key criterion of effectiveness. 
However, some critics have questioned the effectiveness of this method. For 
example, Perrow (1996) noted that goals may be easily displaced and besides he 
questions ZKHWKHU µRIILFLDO¶ RU µRSHUDWLYH¶ JRDOV DUH WKH ones by which an 
organisation should be judged. Similarly, Mistry (2007) argues that, some goal in 
some organisations may be practically impossible to measure but they may be 
desired outcomes nonetheless, for example, increased independence, self-esteem, 
awareness of development issues. As a result, the RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VµVWDWHGJRDOV¶PD\
give an incomplete or distorted picture of its outputs and outcomes (Mistry, 2007). 
On the other hand, some organisations may set goals and objectives at a level at 
which they have reasonable expectations of achievement (Gill, et al., 2005). 
However, Cameron (1980, 1981) thinks there is still a possibility that 
organisations may be judged ineffective even when they have met their goals, or 
indeed be adjudged effective despite failing to meet the goals. 
 
2.8.1.2 The Systems Resource Model 
µ7KH V\VWHPV UHVRXUFH PRGHO¶ GHYHORSHG E\ 6HDVKRUH DQG <XFKWPDQ 
concentrates on the external factors which focus on how the organisation relates to 
its environment.  Seashore and Yuchtman (1967) cited in Sowa (2004: 713) define 
organisational effectiveness as ³WKH DELOLW\ WR H[SORLW LWV HQYLURQPHQW LQ WKH
DFTXLVLWLRQ RI VFDUFH DQG YDOXHG UHVRXUFHV WR VXVWDLQ LWV IXQFWLRQLQJ´ In other 
words, an effective organisation is one that has the ability to successfully acquire 
needed resources from its external environment in order to strengthen its position 
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and ensure its survival. However, Cameron (1980) notes the downside of this 
model and state that it can only be useful when there is a clear association between 
resources and the output of the organisation. 
 
2.8.1.3 The Multiple Constituency Model / The Participant Satisfaction Model 
Researchers like (Boschken, 1994; Connolly, Conlon and Deutsch, 1980; 
'¶$XQQR  .HHOH\  0LOHV  =DPPXWR  have utilised the 
multiple constituency model or the participant satisfaction model which was 
proposed as a viable alternative to goal and systems approaches (Connolly et al, 
1980; Zammuto, 1984). The model views organisational effectiveness as the 
organisDWLRQV¶ DELOLW\ WR VDWLVI\ the interests of one or more stakeholders linked 
with the organisation (Tsui, 1990). Herman and Renz (1997:187) consider the 
multiple constituency model to be a modification of the goal model, where 
µGLIIHULQJ VHWV RI VWDNHKROGHUV KDYH SUREDEO\ GLIIHUHQW JRDOV¶ WKH JUHDWHU WKH
number of constituencies, the wider the ranges of interpretations of effectiveness. 
However, critics of this model have identified a number of problems when 
attempting to assess individual preferences and values. For example, people may 
find it difficult to report accurately their cognitive preferences and besides, the 
preferences may change radically over time and can even be unrelated or 
negatively related to one another and to judgements of organisational effectiveness 
(Cameron and Whetten, 1983 and Herman and Renz, 1999). 
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2.8.1.4 A Spatial Model of Organisational Effectiveness  
Cameron (1978, 1981, and 1982) DGYRFDWHG IRU µthe multidimensional approach¶
in an endeavour to reconcile rational goal, the system resource, participant 
satisfaction and internal process models. Cameron (1981) argues that a unilateral 
view ignores the complexity of organisational effectiveness and that effectiveness 
models should capture multiple dimensions. The most meticulous and significant 
multidimensional approach is the Competing Values Approach (CVA) of Quinn 
and Rohrbaugh (1981; 1983). Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981, 1983) developed a 
spatial model of organisational effectiveness that endeavours to recognise the 
competing principles that surround the evaluation of organisational effectiveness, 
principles such as internal versus external focus and the equilibrium between the 
process and results. Later, Quinn (1988) demonstrated that control-flexibility and 
internal-external are the two of the subordinate continua that can adequately 
describe the organisational effectiveness construct. However, when put together 
they can be envisaged as four quadrants namely; human relations, open systems, 
rational goal, and internal process. Quinn (1988) asserts that, each of the quadrants 
represents a model in itself. In tKH ³+XPDQ 5HODWLRQV 0RGHO´ involvement, 
discussion, and openness are regarded as ways of boosting confidence and achieve 
GHGLFDWLRQ 7KH ³,QWHUQDO 3URFHVV 0RGHO´ EHOLHYHV WKDW VWDELOLW\ FRQWURO DQG
continuity can be achieved through internal processes such as measurements, 
GRFXPHQWDWLRQ DQG LQIRUPDWLRQ DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ +RZHYHU IURP WKH ³2SHQ
6\VWHPV 0RGHO´ YLHZ LQVLJKW QRYHOW\ DQG DGDSWDWLRQ DUH UHJDUGHG DV ZD\V RI
achieving external acknowledgment, support, acquisition, and development. 
)LQDOO\ WKH ³5DWLRQDO *RDO 0RGHO´ WULHV WR ILQG SURILW DQG HIILFLHQF\ WKURXJK
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direction and purpose. Quinn and Rohbaugh (1983), Rohrbaugh (1983), and Quinn 
(1988) noted that organisations were likely to experience tension among 
organisational effectiveness attributes. For example, all organisations need to be 
stable, flexible adaptable, control, permit some degree of freedom and 
independence; a need for logical formal structures and non-rational relaxed 
relationships. They concluded that an organisation is deemed effective when its 
manager is able to strike the correct balance between these vital attributes, as 
mandatory to the organisDWLRQ¶V objectives and situation. 
 
2.8.1.5 A Multidimensional and Integrated Model (MIMNOE) 
 
Having looked the above models, Sowa et al, (2004) considered the factors that 
should be assessed and how they interrelated. They ended up with a 
multidimensional and integrated model of nonprofit organisational effectiveness 
(MIMNOE) which they claim captures two prominent dimensions of 
organisational effectiveness that is, management effectiveness and programme 
effectiveness. According to Sowa et al, (2004), organisational effectiveness should 
not only constitute the mere outcomes of the programmes operated by the 
organisation or the services it provides, but should include the purpose of its 
management structures, how effective they are, and how effective they are on the 
most vital organisational resource, its employees. ³$Q RUJDQLVation that is well 
managed and operated but delivers poor programmes is not fully effective, just as 
an organisation that delivers well-run programmes but has an unhappy staff or 
poor overall organisational operations is not fully effective´ 6RZD HW DO 
715). Similarly, (Hasenfeld, 1983) acknowledges that, management structures are 
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especially prominent in nonprofit organisations because employees have a crucial 
role in translating organisational inputs into outputs. Letts et al (1999) also argue 
that, if the management is effective, it improves programme performance, as it 
provides the basis for the sustainability, development, and expansion of 
programmes. Therefore, in this case, it is evident that organisational effectiveness 
should consist of a component that measures the effectiveness of the programme 
outcomes or the services an organisation provides while    recognising the 
importance of effectiveness dimensions on management level. 
 
2.8.1 .6 The Balanced Scorecard 
Originally conceived by Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1996a, 1996b), Balanced 
Scorecard (BSC) has played a pivotal role in the charitable sector as these 
organisations have struggled to measure their performance. Many nonprofit 
organisations have been inspired and taken ideas of performance measurement 
from the BSC. Moore (2003) asserts that, the BSC has encouraged for-profit 
PDQDJHUV WR IRFXV EH\RQG WKHLU WUDGLWLRQDO GHSHQGHQFH RQ WKH ³ILQDQFLDO ERWWRP
OLQH´,WXUJHGWKHPQRWWRFRQFHQWUDWHRQWKHLUSDVWILQDQFLDOSHUIRUPDQFHEXWWR
also consider ways of sustaining that financial performance into the future. This 
has resulted in the development of a set of non-financial measures that help in 
tracking their achievement in executing the decided strategy. Thus, Trussel and 
Bitner (2001) say, 
We believe that the balanced scorecard is an ideal vehicle for establishing 
performance measures for the multiple constituencies of nonprofit 
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organisations. Further, the balanced scorecard establishes the link 
between organisational mission and the performance of individual 
constituencies.  
 
They add that the balanced scorecard is strategic management, as well as a 
performance management, system.  
The scorecard brings many of the seemingly diverse elements of an 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V DJHQGD-program orientation, financial equilibrium, 
responsive services, revenue generation, environmental awareness, 
and the like-into a single managerial report. Also, the scorecard 
forces administrators to consider all key performance indicators 
together. The balanced scorecard allows administrators to evaluate 
simultaneously the organisation from four important perspectives - 
the Financial Perspective, the Community Perspective, the Internal 
Process Perspective, and Innovation and Learning Perspective 
(Trussel and Bitner 2001: 5).  
 
This is a multi-attribute system for conceptualising and measuring performance 
was designed originally for business organisations but later adapted for nonprofit 
organisations (Kaplan, 2001, Niven, 2003). Originally, the assumption is that the 
fundamental purpose of a business is long-run profit maximisation. The success 
FULWHULDFDQEHHYDOXDWHGDQGJURXSHGDURXQGIRXU³SHUVSHFWLYHV´DFFRUGLQJWRWKH
³EDODQFHG VFRUHFDUG RI SHUIRUPDQFH DWWULEXWHV´  7KHVH DUH  7KH )LQDQFLDO
Perspective measuring different financial performance indicators of key interest to 
stakeholders; 2) The Customer Perspective which constitutes measures of 
customer satisfaction; 3) The Internal Business Perspective, measuring internal 
efficiency and quality; and 4) The Innovation and Learning Perspective attempting 
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to measure thHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VDELOLW\ WRDGMXVW WRFKDQJHVUHTXLUHGE\D WXUEXOHQW
environment. In the nonprofit sector, however, their mission statement becomes 
the main goal to be achieved through these perspectives instead of the profit 
VWDWHPHQW ³&XVWRPHUV´ VXEVWLWXWHV ³FOLHQWV´ RU ³XVHUV´ RI WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V
VHUYLFHV DQG WKH ³ILQDQFLDO SHUVSHFWLYH´ EHFRPHV WKDW RI WKH GRQRUV RU SRWHQWLDO
donors (Niven, 2003). The diagrammatic representation on figure 2.2 shows the 
adapted balanced scorecard suitable for the public and nonprofit sector. 
 
Fig 2.2: The Balanced Scorecard for the Public and Nonprofit Sectors 
 
 
(Adapted from Niven (2003: 2). 
 
It aligns corporate activities with intended outcomes with the organisational 
mission. Speckbacher (2003) concludes that the Balanced Scorecard may be the 
most appropriate tool for effectiveness evaluation in nonprofit. 
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The implementation of the BSC has had both successes and challenges in the 
voluntary sectors (Wisniewski and Dickson, 2001; Radnor and Lovell, 2003; 
Martin et al, 2003; Niven, 2003). The key challenge has been the financial 
perspective which covers the main performance criteria in businesses; yet in the 
public sector doing well on the financial aspects is not the main mission of the 
organisation. In fact, Gambles (1999:24) DVVHUWV WKDW µ«LQ LWV XVXDO IRUP WKH
scorecard LVFOHDUO\QRWVXLWDEOHIRUWKHYDVWPDMRULW\RIWKHSXEOLFVHFWRU¶.DSODQ
and Norton (2001:135) accept this criticism; saying that overarching mission 
should be placed at the top of their scorecard to reflect their long-term objectives. 
Kaplan and Norton (2001) also highlight that, the aim of the public sector 
scorecard was to have a generic version of the Balanced Scorecard for nonprofit 
organisations which reflect their values more directly, instead of adapting the 
architecture of the Balanced Scorecard each time the nonprofit organisations use it. 
Another main difference is that several for-profit organisations do not involve 
stakeholders, as this does not suit the way they do business. However, in nonprofit 
organisations stakeholder involvement and input is much more crucial, because the 
organisation and the services exist to benefit of service users and other 
stakeholders. Moullin, (2002: 167) suggest that, users need to be involved in 
developing a service to meet their needs and also users and carers should be 
LQYROYHG³LQGHFLVLRQVDERXWWKHLURZQKHDOWKDQGWKHFDUHWKH\JLYHRUUHFHLYH´ A 
number of measures of organisational effectiveness commonly used in nonprofit 
research studies bear some scrutiny as to whether they measure organisational 
effectiveness as correlates of board performance. Nobbie and Brudney (2003:575) 
identified the five most commonly used frameworks for measuring organisational 
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effectiveness as goal achievement, financial viability and resource acquisition, 
internal processes, CEO job satisfaction and CEO effectiveness.  
 
2.9 Other ways of Measuring Performance  
2.9.1 Benchmarking as a Performance Measure  
The significance of benchmarking to the assessment of charitable organisations 
has recently gained momentum (Letts et al, 1999). However, the concept of 
benchmarking has varied meanings depending on the organisations using it. 
Despite the wide-ranging definitions, Camp (1989) notes that, the definitions can 
be put in two categories, that is, those that are limited only to the measuring and 
comparing, and those that focus also on implementation of change and the 
monitoring of results. For example, while Neely (2002) defines benchmarking as a 
V\VWHP WKDW FRPSDUHV WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V SURFHVVHV DQG SUDFWLFHV ZLWK WKRVH RI
similar organisations,  Czarnecki  (1999) describes benchmarking as an approach 
that can be utilised to assess performance and identify performance gaps, as well 
as bring inventive ideas into organisational processes, thereby improving the  
management of the organisation. In this context, the former definition is referring 
to the measurement process alone while the latter highlights the decision-making 
component (Camp 1989). ,Q WKLV VWXG\ ³EHQFKPDUNLQJ LV VLPSO\ about making 
comparisons with others and then learning the lessons that those comparisons 
WKURZXS´(Murby, 2008:3)   
 
From the extant literature several kinds of benchmarking processes are depicted. 
However, Camp (1995) makes a distinction between four kinds of benchmarking 
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which are internal, competitive, functional, and generic. Neely (2002) describes 
them as: 
Internal Benchmarking: comparinJVLPLODURSHUDWLRQVZLWKLQRQH¶VRZQ 
organisation. 
Competitive Benchmarking: comparing with best practice of 
organisations in direct competition. 
Functional Benchmarking: comparing practices and methods with 
similar processes in the same function outsLGHRQH¶VLQGXVWU\ 
Generic Process Benchmarking: FRPSDULQJRQH¶VZRUNSURFHVVHVZLWK          
those organisations that have innovative, exemplar processes (Neely, 
2002: 220). 
 
Like any other approaches of measuring performance, benchmarking has got its 
challenges. Paton (2003) is among the few who have surveyed the challenges of 
benchmarking in assessing the nonprofit practices. In his findings, Paton (2003) 
found out that comparing performance with other organisations has been difficult 
overtime because there has been a tendency of changing measurement tools 
frequently, thus, making it hard to gather the same data over long periods. 
Furthermore, Neely (2002) highlights that the actual implementation of 
benchmarking depends on the network of connections created, the extent of mutual 
receptiveness of ideas, and the readiness to test these ideas in a new situation. 
Moreover, due to the uniqueness of nonprofit organisations, the practices that may 
bring success to one organisation might not work for the other (Paton, 2003). Also, 
Letts, Ryan and Grossman (1999) note that in order for improvements to take 
place, organisations need to invest in time and resources. This might probably be a 
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challenge to nonprofits that usually operate with limited resources. That probably 
explains why benchmarking is still not being utilised frequently, particularly, in 
the UK, despite the considerable enthusiasm (Paton, 2003). However, despite the 
challenges, the benefits of benchmarking cannot be overemphasised, and it could 
be a valuable mechanism for performance improvement in charities. 
 
2.9.2 Financial Viability and Resource Acquisition. 
Bradshaw HWDOXVHGµSHUFHQWDJHFKDQJHJURZWKLQWKHDQQXDOEXGJHW¶
DQGµVL]HRIDQ\GHILFLWLQFXUUHG¶RYHUWKHSDVWWKUHH\HDUV to gauge organisational 
HIIHFWLYHQHVV7KH\IRXQG³QRVLJQLILFDQWUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHDELOLW\WRREWDLQ
budget increases and the ability to avoid deficits; that common vision is negatively 
DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK EXGJHW JURZWK´ WKDW FHUWDLQ QHJDWLYH ERDUG Fharacteristics are 
DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK PDVVLYH EXGJHW GHILFLWV DQG WKDW ³ERDUGV WKDW HQJDJH LQ PRUH
strategic planning have smaller deficits´Bradshaw et al, 1992:242-3). Nobbie and 
%UXGQH\XVHGDQQXDOµUHYHQXHWRH[SHQGLWXUHUDWLRV¶DPHDVXUHRIVXUplus 
or deficit) to examine whether adoption of the policy governance model or 
practices recommended by the National Centre for Nonprofit Boards would 
improve their performance on these ratios over a five-year period. There were no 
significant differences between the first and second time periods. This suggests 
that board performance has no significant impact on this measure of organisational 
effectiveness. Ritchie and Kolodinsky (2003) identified 16 potential financial 
performance measurement ratios in 4 categories (fiscal performance, fundraising 
efficiency, public support and investment performance and concentration) that 
might be reasonably accessible as organisational effectiveness measures in 
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university fundraising foundations. They found that fiscal efficiency, public 
support and fiscal performance could be gauged by two measures in each category. 
While their analysis pertained more specifically to fundraising operations, they 
UHLQIRUFH*LOO¶VSHUVSHFWLYHDVDIRUPHUDJHQF\&(2SUDFWLWLRQHUWKat the 
ratios noted below are the most decisive measures for assessing financial 
performance. 
Gill (2005) suggests three measures of financial performance should be readily 
available for any nonprofit: 1) the ratio of administrative expenses to overall 
expenditures; 2) the annual surplus or deficit as a percentage of annual 
expenditures; and, 3) the cumulative surplus or deficit as a percentage of the 
annual budget. Most sectors have some accepted standard for the proportion of 
total expenses consumed by administrative overheads. These typically range from 
7 to 20 percent in service delivery agencies. For example, Revenue Canada 
guidelines for charities assert that no more than 20 percent of receipted fundraising 
revenues should be allocated to fundraising costs. Comparisons to other agencies 
and to past performance would provide some indication of relative efficiency. 
 
Whether planned and manageable, a deficit seems as weighty as the actual level of 
a deficit, provided that there is a longer-term strategy to recover from such a 
deficit. The ratio of cumulative deficit to the annual operating budget may be a 
EHWWHU LQGLFDWRU RI WKLV 6RPH DJHQFLHV LQ *LOO¶V H[SHULHQFH SXUSRVHO\ JHQHUDWH
GHILFLWV WR µH[SDQG WKHLU IXQGLQJHQYHORSH¶ VRPHWLPHVZLWK WKH WDFLW EOessing of 
IXQGHUVJRYHUQPHQWVLQSDUWLFXODU7KHµPDQDJHDELOLW\¶RIDGHILFLWGHSHQGVRQWKH
credit limitations on the agency and the prospects for recovery of deficit funded 
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expenditures. The adequacy of resources is pretty much a subjective judgment, 
except in nonprofit that may have a statutory mandate with an uncontrollable 
demand (e.g. hospitals and child welfare agencies). In such cases, annual deficits 
may be more a matter of funding inadequacy than organisational ineffectiveness 
per se. Growth in the budget may be a dubious measure of organisational 
effectiveness in times of funding constraints imposed from external sources. In 
fact, some of the most effective organisations studied by Gill (2001) were those 
that had sufficient resilience to adapt to such funding constraints and to reposition 
their mandate and operations as leaner, more viable and efficient organisations, 
less reliant on core government funding. 
 
2.9.3 CEO Job Satisfaction. 
According to Nobbie and Brudney (2002) CEO Job satisfaction may be viewed as 
a criterion of either board or organisational effectiveness. In fact, CEO Job 
satisfaction may be a correlate of boards that are either clear in their expectations 
RI PDQDJHPHQW RU VLPSO\ µDOORZ PDQDJHUV WR PDQDJH¶ 7KH HDUOLHU PD\ EH
interpreted as an evaluation of board proficiency, while the latter may suggest 
UHQXQFLDWLRQRIDFFRXQWDELOLW\IRUGLUHFWLRQDQGRYHUVLJKW´*LOOHWDO 
 
2.9.4 CEO Effectiveness 
Nobbie and Brudney (2003:585) hypothesized (based on the Carver contention 
WKDW&(2DQGRUJDQLVDWLRQDOSHUIRUPDQFHZHUHRQHDQGWKHVDPH«DFRQWHQWLRQ
not without detractors) that the high-board effectiveness in implementing policy 
governance behaviours would correlate with high ratings of the CEO by board 
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chairs. They asked boaUG FKDLUV WR UDWH &(2V ³LQ WHUPV RI WKHLU DELOLW\ WR ZRUN
WRZDUGWKHJRDOVRIWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQZLWKRXWYLRODWLQJWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VSROLFLHV´
While the correlations were in the right direction, they were not statistically 
significant. This measure was perhaps not sufficiently robust or multidimensional 
and suffered from the sole-source influence. 
 
2.9.5 Charities Rating Services 
As noted in Murray (2001), numerous assessment methods have been developed 
help donors and the public judge on the performance of a variety of charities. 
Some of them report on public accessibility of audit reports, different aspects of a 
FKDULW\¶V ILQDQFHV KRZ IXQG UDLVLQJ LV FRQGXFWHG DQG SROLFLHV IRU LWV ERDUG RI
directors like conflict of interest policies. However, the problem is that, as these 
rating services attempt to compare organisations built around wide ranging and 
dissimilar missions, the standards do not consider outcomes. The assumption is 
that organisations are likely to be effective in attaining their goals if they meet 
their process standard despite the lack of published research that supports these 
assumptions (Murray, 2001). As already been alluded to, those to be affected by an 
assessment system must be involved in developing it, otherwise it will not succeed 
(Mark et al, 2000, Cutt and Murray, 2000, Sonnichsen, 2000). 
 
It seems nonprofit organisations still have a colossal challenge before they find a 
suitable an evaluation system that can reveal complete picture of how effective the 
organisation is. Although some see no point in trying, the fact that organisations 
continue to make decisions based on untested suppositions and idiosyncratic 
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perceptions of performance should justify the need to continue with the search. 
However, it is valuable to note that a main drawback of most performance 
measurement frameworks, such as the Performance Prism and the Balanced 
Scorecard, is inadequate emphasis on management of risk. Similarly Pickford 
VWDWHVWKDWµLIULVNLVWREHFRQWUROOHGLWPXVWILUVWEHPHDVXUHG¶,QRWKHU
words, all organisations should take the risk into account in determining strategy; 
otherwise it will be difficult to evaluate how they affect their objectives. 
 
2.10 Pay for Performance in Nonprofit  
As mentioned earlier, one of the problems of studying nonprofit organisations is 
their myriad of different potential missions. As already been alluded to, pay-for-
performance in the nonprofit organisations is a critical issue due to the lack of 
consensus how to measure performance and risk of violating the non-distribution 
constraints. With profit firms, the goal of true measure of performance is 
increasing shareholder value, which many authors (for example, Jensen and 
Murphy 1990) measure with firm market value (firm size). The literature on CEO 
pa\ DQG ILUP SHUIRUPDQFH SURYLGHV VHYHUDO PHDVXUHV WR WHVW WKH WRS PDQDJHU¶V
performance, among which are stock returns and change in market worth or size of 
the firm. Since nonprofit are not owned by shareholders, there is no stock price or 
value of the nonprofit in the normal sense. Thus, Lazear 1995) posits that 
³«GHVLJQLQJ LQFHQWLYH FRPSHQVDWLRQ SODQV LQ IRU-profit firms is difficult, but it 
may even be more difficult to measure the performance of CEOs in nonprofit 
because these organisations are likely to be striving to create something much 
different from returns to shareholders. A classic example of how difficult it is to 
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measure performance for managers in the nonprofit sector is the case of a manager 
of a nursing home (Weisbrod and Schlesinger 1986). A manager could be paid 
based on the profits he or she accrues but this gives him or her incentives to 
provide lower-quality care to the residents. 
 
As a result, Zingheim, Schuster, and Thomsen (2005) note that nonprofit 
organisations such as charities, social welfare organisations, hospitals, and nursing 
homes have been slower to embrace the need to more closely align the rewards of 
the senior executive team with the organisDWLRQ¶V SHUIRUPDQFH WKDQ IRU-profit 
organisations. They posit that, the main concerns of the nonprofit are usually the 
visibility and potential adverse publicity regarding excessive compensation 
packages paid to their executives. However, Zingheim, Schuster, and Thomsen 
(2005) have highlighted that, apart from aligning executive performance and 
maintaining a positive public image. 
 
Many studies have examined the linkage between the executive compensation 
levels and company financial performance drawing on the agency theory. Some 
have found a connection between excutive pay and profitability (Agarwal, 1981), 
though many other studies have concluded that firm performance is not a key 
driver of CEO compensation (Benston, 1985; Deckop, 1987; Jensen and Murphy, 
1990; Kerr and Bettis, 1987; Murphy 1985; Redling, 1981). However, according 
to Preston (1989) the pay for performance link seems strongest for nonprofit 
operating in highly competitive markets. In a study on hospitals, Hallock et al 
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DILQG WKDWDVFRPSHWLWLRQ LQ WKHKHDOWKFDUHPDUNHW LQFUHDVHVH[HFXWLYHV¶
compensation is more tightly tied to profitability. Oster (1998) documents a 
positive relationship between compensation and size of organisation that varies by 
industry, and the relationship is strongest for foundations and hospitals 
organisations that most closely compete with for-profit institutions for employees. 
$OWKRXJK2VWHU¶VZRUNLV WUHPHQGRXVO\LQIRUPDWLYH LW LVKRZHYHUEDVHG
on limited samples and is only cross-sectional (Hallock 2002) and did not consider 
changes within organisations using organisation-specific effects. 
 
Hallock (2002) further had some investigations to find out if there might be other 
measures of performance. He points out that another potential choice is the ratio of 
expenses spent on programme services, a measure that most nonprofits seem to 
concentrate. Frumkin and Keating (2002) state that, in the nonprofit total 
programme expenses include costs of the programme but exclude administrative 
and fundraising expenses. In a cross sectional study, (Hallock 2002) finds that, the 
higher pay is associated with high levels of expenses going to programme services. 
This is consistent with the findings of Frumkin and Keating (2002) who find that, 
D&(2¶VWRWDOUHPXQHUDWLRQURVHE\DQGIRUHYHU\WKRXVDQGGROODUVRI
fixed assets or programme expenses, respectively.  Frumkin and Keating thus, 
believe that the way the organisation uses its resources is another criterion of 
assessing managerial performance. For the reason, since a culture of service 
governs the nonprofit sector, a few organisations accept the wasting of resources. 
³)UXJDOLW\LVDYLUWXHLQQRQSURILW´)UXPNLQDQG.HDWLQJ&RVWFXWWLQJ
in nonprofit is often an organisational requisite, especially when resources are 
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scarce or when the services to be provided to the clients are exceptionally critical. 
Some nonprofit managers believe they maximise their ability to implement their 
mission if they reduce administrative expenses. Even donors and nonprofits 
regulators interpret low ratios of administrative to total expenses as assign that a 
nonprofit is operating effectively and focused on its mission. 
 
Both Oster and Hallock find that characteristics of the organisation may affect 
salaries. As already been indicated, Oster (1998) finds that increased reliance on 
donations limits executive compensation while Hallock (2002) finds that donors 
seem to steer away from nonprofit hospitals that are competing with for-profit 
hospitals. In hospitals with increasing competitive pressures and compensation 
tightly linked to performance, donor contributions are lower. Hallock (2002) also 
notes that, while success in fundraising may be a valuable metric by which to 
evaluate managers of nonprofit, another possible measure of performance could be 
a combination of government grants and direct and indirect support from the 
public. In his investigations, he finds that the higher the fundraising, the higher the 
pay of the manager. Frumkin and Keating (2002) echo the same sentiments when 
they highlight that the ability to raise a large amount of money is also often 
regarded as a sign that the organisation is successful. The common sense is that 
donors reward organisations that are doing excellent job and penalise those that are 
not by withholding donations. Thus, Frumkin and Keating contend that, 
fundraising results provide an easily measured metric as a proxy of mission 
accomplishment as it can be followed year to year. Therefore, executive 
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FRPSHQVDWLRQGHWHUPLQHGE\WKH&(2¶VSHUIRUPDQFHVXFFHVVIXOIXQGUDLVLQJWKXV
becomes a critical factor of any verdict about managerial success or failure.  
 
Frumkin and Keating (2002) note that, the availability of surplus funds, and the 
amount of monitoring directed towards the organisation also determines 
compensation in nonprofit organisations. Unrestricted funds within the 
RUJDQLVDWLRQVSURYLGHQRQSURILWERDUGVZLWKWKHIOH[LELOLW\RIXVLQJ³IUHHFDVK´IRU
nonessential and non- budget stuff, like increased wages and benefits for the 
management. Nonprofit organisations get the funds from at least 3 restricted 
sources. First, they may be engaged in trading and earn revenues that are not 
monitored by funders. Nonprofit that receive large amounts of earned income from 
charging of fees or trading usually have the flexibility on where they can allocate 
resources than charities that only rely on donations or other funding sources. Users 
and clients usually not concerned about the underlying financial practices of the 
nonprofit organisation and they rarely evaluate or scrutinise financial statements. 
Their focus is usually on convenience and cost of the services offered. If the 
paying clients are satisfied and if the fee income generates surpluses, it will result 
in nonprofit having substantial judgment in making operating and compensation 
decision. 
 
Second, nonprofit may have levels of liquidity that allow them some flexibility in 
spending (Frumkin and Keating 2002). Nonprofit often receive unanticipated 
funds in the form of unrestricted donations. These donations are usually small and 
come from a wide range of supporters. Contrary to restricted grants, these 
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donations are not scrutinised. These unpredicted finances regularly kept in the 
form of liquid assets and can be utilised to rationalise pay rises. Finally, some 
organisations may have endowments and they use interest from these funds to 
finance the general budget or some restricted functions. Endowment decrease 
pressure on the management to increase funding through annual appeals and 
reduce the monitoring and oversight that can be triggered by new donations. Thus, 
organisations with endowments have flexible cash available in comparison to 
organisations operating without the cushion and protection that endowment 
SURYLGH)UXPNLQDQG.HDWLQJWKXVSRVLWWKDWDOWKRXJKGLVWULEXWLQJ³H[FHVV
HDUQLQJV´ OHJDOO\ LQIULQJHV Whe non-distribution constraint, therefore paying the 
&(2VIUHHFDVKIORZVFDQEHUHJDUGHGDVEUHDNLQJ³WKHVSLULW´RIFRQWDFW 
 
2.10.1 Why Reward Executive Performance? 
According to Zingheim, Schuster, and Thomsen (2005) many organisations claim 
WR ³SD\ IRU SHUIRUPDQFH´ +RZHYHU ZKHUH WHQXUH GHWHUPLQHV FRPSHQVDWLRQ
instead of performance; organisations that reward for performance always 
outperform those that reward for service only. Zingheim, Schuster, and Thomsen 
(2005) view the logic for creating a high-performance culture as powerful. Thus, 
they have highlighted the reasons for paying for performance, in addition to 
complying with intermediate sanctions as to; reinforce the organisatiRQ¶VPLVVLRQ
vision, and goals, aOLJQ WKH H[HFXWLYH¶V VXFFHVV ZLWK WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V VXFFHVV
enable the organisation to attract and retain executive talent, provide a vehicle to 
discuss the organisDWLRQ¶V JRDOV and progress in achieving goals (Zingheim, 
Schuster, and Thomsen 2005: 2). Behn (2003) and others suggest that public sector 
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managers measure performance because it assists them address explicit 
administrative concerns, among them to evaluate and improve. Webb and Blandin 
 FLWH 3UHQGHUJDVW¶V  VHPLQDO ZRUN RQ LQFHQWLYHV DQG FRPSHQVDWLRQ
which considers how pay-for-performance schemes affect employee behaviour, 
and whether organisational outcomes improve with such schemes. Prendergast 
reports that pay for performance does not seem to improve organisational 
performance unless the organisation has the capability to assess output or prove 
that work effort affects output.  She also finds that multitasking in complex jobs 
may cause CEOs to focus on activities that are directly rewarded (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1990, Baker, 1992). This may cause misalignment between the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VDQGWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VJRDOV 
 
2.11 Summary  
From the review of the extant literature, it is clear that past empirical efforts in 
respect of executive pay, governance and performance have been concentrated on 
for-profit organisations with relatively little attention being given to nonprofit 
organisations. This raises a question whether existing theories on governance are 
equally applicable to charities. For example, do existing governance variables 
influence the executive compensation in charities and if so what are they? The 
second issue emanating from the review of the literature is: what measures 
performance and how do we operationalise performance? This is against the 
backdrop that, researchers such as (Sowa et al, 2004; Rainey and Steinbauer, 1999; 
Goodman et al., 1977) have point measuring performance in charities is 
controversial because of multiple stakeholders. Moreover, performance in 
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nonprofit organisations are becoming important given the government, 
philanthropic funders, clients and the public demand that these organisations 
demonstrate effectiveness. There is therefore a need to shed more lights on how 
the UK charities measure performance and provide a synthesis on what constitute 
performance.  
 
Apart from the difficulty of measuring performance, the literature gives little 
indication whether governance and board structure variables used in for-profit 
organisations are applicable to non profit organisations. Yet in the UK, there have 
been progressive moves towards greater quality checks and performance 
measurement (Mordaunt, Cornforth and Otto, 2004). The UK regulators have 
sought to improve the quality of charity reporting through successive revisions of 
the charity Statement of Recommendation Practice (SORP). For instance, the 
current revised SORP, 2005 places more emphasis on governance, accountability 
and performance. This raises an important issue regarding the effects of the 
nonprofit boards on organisational performance. According to Andrés-Alonso, 
Cruz, Romero- Merino (2006), no convincing answers have emerged so far, and 
our understanding of board effects on performance is fairly scant. In the context of 
nonprofit organisations, the lack of such link and the paucity of research in respect 
of board characteristics, composition and their effects have been identified as a 
gap that needs to be filled to enhance our understanding of governance and 
nonprofit organisational performance.  
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It is important to point out that this chapter underpins chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this 
dissertation. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction: 
 
The focus of this study embraces four research questions. First, what are the main 
determinants of CEO compensation in the UK Charities? Second, what 
performance measures are used in the UK Charities? Third, what are the factors 
that influence performance in UK charities? However, to successfully achieve the 
objectives of this study, it necessary to decide suitable research approach, and to 
collect appropriate set of data and to follow proper analytical procedures. This 
chapter addresses the issues concerning the methodological choices, taking into 
account the research problem and the goals of this study which are detailed in 
chapter one. The chapter also presents a discussion on research philosophy 
including a debate around the various philosophical perspectives and a statement 
on the research paradigm stance adopted in this study. Next, the chapter outlines 
the research design with a particular emphasis on the measurement approach, 
followed by a description of the process of data collection, and also focussing on 
sample choices and characteristics on which the quantitative component of this 
investigation is based. The chapter finalises with an explanation of the quantitative 
aspect of the study detailing decisions regarding the implementation of the 
interviews.  
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3.2 Research Paradigms and Methodology: 
According to Collis and Hussey (2003) every educational research is inevitably 
underpinned by a choice of a research paradigm stance, with implications on both 
the approach to the research process and the ways in which the data is collected 
and analysed. Creed et al (2004) describe paradigm as  
«DWHUPXVHGWRUHIHUWRDVHWRUFOXVWHU of commonly-held beliefs or values 
within the research or scientific community about a field of study. The beliefs 
are seen as shaping or dictating how scientists and researcher should 
proceed in carrying out research in their field. (Creed, et al 2004:10) 
In other words, choice of the research paradigm dictates the approach to the 
research process and the methods of collecting and analysing the data. Easterby-
Smith et al (1991) provide three reasons to explain the relevance of philosophical 
paradigms within research, 
1. accurately defining a philosophical position helps the researcher to clarify 
the design and the overall configuration of his/her research. 
2. knowledge of philosophy enables the researcher to ascertain approaches 
which would be most appropriate within a particular research study, and 
3. considering such issues can potentially aid a researcher in creating a new 
and/or adapting an existing research design, according to the constrains of 
different subject knowledge structures. 
 
Easterby-Smith et al, (1991), also highlights that there are two basic philosophies 
of research that exist, namely, positivism and phenomenology. Positivism views 
reality as external and objective, with the role of research cast as making reliable 
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and valid observations of this reality in order to test fundamental laws 
hypothesised from existing theory (Easterby-Smith et al 1991).  Whereas, in 
FRQWUDVW³3KHQRPHQRORJ\LVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKKXPDQLVWLFUHVHDUFKXsing qualitative 
methodologies, that is, DSSURDFKHVWKDWSODFHVSHFLDOHPSKDVLVRQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶V
views and personal experiencHV´ 'HVFRPEH 2003:97). Its credentials as an 
alternative to positivism are further reinforced by the fact that phenomenological 
UHVHDUFK JHQHUDOO\ GHDOV ZLWK SHRSOH¶V SHUFHSWLRQV RU PHDQLQJV DWWLWXGHV DQG
beliefs; feelings and emotions. Thus, Descombe (2FRPPHQWV³,QGLUHFW
contrast to positivism, phenomenology is seen as an approach that emphasises: 
x subjectivity (rather than objectivity); 
x description (more than analysis); 
x interpretation (more than measurement); 
Easterby-Smith et al (1991) outline the key elements of these two polar extremes. 
This is depicted in the Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 ± Key features of the positivist and phenomenological perspectives 
 Positive paradigm Phenomenological paradigm 
Basic beliefs The world is external and 
objective 
 
Observer is independent 
 
 
Science is value free 
The world is socially constructed 
and subjective  
 
Observer is part of what is 
observed 
 
Science is driven by human 
interests 
 
Researcher 
should 
Focus on facts 
 
Look for causality and 
fundamental law 
 
Reduce phenomena to 
simplest elements 
 
Formulate a hypothesis and 
test them 
Focus on meaning 
 
Try to understand what is 
happening 
 
 
Look at the totality of each 
situation 
 
 
Develop ideas through induction 
from data 
Preferred 
methods 
include: 
Operationalising concepts 
so they can be measured 
 
Taking large samples 
Using multiple methods to 
establish different views of 
phenomena 
 
Small samples investigated in-
depth or over time 
 
Adapted from Easterby- Smith et al., 1991 
 
From the above summary, it is essential to note that each theoretical perspective is 
independently prohibitive and by focusing on one particular category, research is 
restricted within that band. This may not be the case as the research subject area 
may call for a combination of perspectives, thus skimming the advantages of all 
the approaches into a specific research design. A number of authors like Easterby-
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Smith et al, (1991), Alvesson and Wilmott, (1996), highlight the point when they 
posit that the transition from one perspective to the other is gradual promoter of 
any one position because it may attempt to incorporate insights from other 
perspectives into research design. Many studies have combined positivist and 
phenomenological approaches to management research. In support of combined 
approaches, Grey and )UHQFK  GHVFULEH WKH QHHG IRU µGLDOHFWLF SOXUDOLVP¶
DQGWKDWWKH\VKRXOGQRORQJHUEHWKHµSUHWHQFHRILQGLVSXWDEOHDQGXQSUREOHPDWLF
WHFKQLTXHV¶6WHLHU VHHV WKHQHHG IRU µPHWKRGRORJLFDOSOXUDOLVP¶ WKDWZLOO
avoid a µRQHULJKWZD\¶V\QGURPHIURPHLWKHU WUDGLWLRQ Therefore, while distinct 
positivist and phenomenological approaches exist they do not necessarily have to 
be viewed as mutually exclusive. This thesis is no exception. Both positivist and 
phenomenological philosophies underpin this piece of research.  
 
3.3 Choice of Methodology  
Closely allied to the two philosophical paradigms is the choice between 
quantitative and qualitative research methodologies (Creswell, 1994).  Quantitative 
research allows the researcher to familiarise oneself with the problem or concept to 
be studied, and then generate hypotheses to be tested (Golafshani, 2003). 
³&RQFHSWV YDULDEOHV DQG K\SRWKHVHV DUH FKRVHQ EHIRUH WKH VWXG\ EHJLQV DQG
UHPDLQIL[HGWKURXJKRXWWKHVWXG\´&UHVZHOO94:7). According to Bogdan and 
Biklen, (1998), the emphasis in this paradigm is, (1) based on facts and causes of 
behaviour (2) the information can be quantified and summarised, (3) the 
mathematical procedure is the custom for scrutinising the numeric data and (4) the 
ultimate result is expressed in numerical terminologies (Charles, 1995). As 
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Descombe (2003) puts it, quantitative methods inherently measure phenomena so 
WKDW WKH\ FDQ EH WUDQVIRUPHG LQWR QXPEHUV DQG ³RQFH WKH SKHQRPHQD KDYH EHHQ
quantified, they lend themselves to analysis through statistical procedures ± 
procedures which are very powerful but utterly dependent on receiving numerical 
data as the input," (Descombe, 2003:232). Therefore, the researcher attempted to 
draw up the boundaries of phenomena into quantifiable or common groupings that 
can be useful to all of the subjects or wide and comparable situations (Winter, 
 $V D UHVXOW WKH UHVHDUFKHU
V WHFKQLTXHV LQFOXGH ³WKH XVH RI VWDQGDUGLVHG
measures so that the varying perspectives and experiences of people can be fit into 
a limited number of predetermined response categories to which number are 
assigned" (Patton, 2001:14).  
 
On the other hand, the qualitative researcher does not attempt to manipulate the 
phenomenon of interest but employs a naturalistic approach that seeks to 
comprehend phenomena in context-specific situations, thereby allowing the 
"phenomenon of interest unfold naturally" (Patton, 2001: 39). Strauss and Corbin 
(1990:17) thus, describe qualitative research, as "any kind of research that 
produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means 
of quantification". Contrary to quantitative researchers who try to find underlying 
determination, prediction, and generality of results, qualitative researchers instead, 
look for clarification, understanding, and extrapolation to related circumstances 
+RHSIODQGDOVRGHSHQGVRQ³WUDQVIRUPLQJLQIRUPDWLRQIURPREVHUYDWLRQV
UHSRUWV DQG UHFRUGLQJV LQWR GDWD LQ WKH IRUP RI  WKH ZULWWHQ ZRUG QRW QXPEHUV´ 
(Descombe, 2003:232). While Descombe (2003) says, quantitative data can be 
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analysed easily because of the statistical procedures, Burgess (1982) argues that 
qualitative methodology provides the researcher with an opportunity to probe a 
small number of samples in-depth to uncover new clues, open up new dimensions 
of a problem, and secure vivid, accurate and inclusive accounts that are based on 
personal experience.  
  
As a result, methods like interviews and observations dominate in the naturalist 
paradigm and complementary in the positive paradigm, where survey is prominent 
(Golafshani, 2003). Table 3.2 below compares these two research techniques, 
 
Table 3.2 ± Qualitative versus Quantitative Research 
 Qualitative Research Quantitative Research 
Objective To obtain a qualitative 
understanding of underlying 
reasons and motivations 
To quantify the data and 
generalise the results from 
the sample to the 
population of interest 
Sample Small number of non-
representative cases 
Large number of 
representative cases  
Data collection Unstructured Structured 
Data analysis Non-statistical Statistical 
Outcome Develop an initial understanding Recommend a final course 
of action 
 
Note: Adapted from Malhotra, 1993. 
 
Descombe (2003) also gives the following distinctions between qualitative and 
quantitative research methods. 
x Qualitative research tends to be associated with description while 
quantitative research is associated with analysis. 
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x Qualitative research tends to be associated with small scale studies and 
quantitative is associated with large-scale studies. 
 
x  Qualitative research tends to be associated with a holistic perspective  
studies and quantitative research is associated with specific focus 
 
x Qualitative research tends to be associated with researcher involvement 
and quantitative research is associated with research detachment. 
 
x Qualitative research tends to be associated with an emergent research 
design and quantitative is associated with a predetermined research design. 
 
Aspects of executive compensation and performance in charities have been 
investigated previously using the quantitative methodology. For example, 
researchers such as Jobome (2006), Brickley and Horn (2002) and Hallock (2002), 
have employed the quantitative survey methods in the positivist tradition. The 
emphasis on quantitative methodology within the executive compensation and 
performance in non-profit organisations literature is predictable given the 
characteristics of the methodology. Large samples surveys allow the researcher to 
establish the relationship between the number of independent variables and to 
generalise the results (Creswell, 1994). 
 
Morgan and Smircich (1980) observed that the appropriateness of the research 
approach to be adopted depends on the aims and the nature of the social 
phenomena to be explored.  In this thesis, both qualitative and quantitative 
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methods are engaged. According to Patton, (1990) qualitative and quantitative 
approaches are complementary strategies for research, and not mutual exclusive. 
This research study opted for a combination of research techniques for numerous 
reasons.  Many researches (see, for example, Maggars-Rapport 2000, Coll and 
Chapman 2000 and Hammersley et al 2003) suggest that combing qualitative and 
quantitative research (triangulating) tend to produce more valid and reliable 
results. In other words, triangulating permits the researcher to detect varying 
perspectives and gain a more holistic picture. Secondly, the multi-methods 
approach offers either collaborative findings or opportunity for question by 
comparing the data derived from the differing methods.  
 
3.4 Primary Data Collecting 
Primary data collection constituted the main purpose of the field study. The 
following sections discuss the research design and the sample choice the 
procedures for collecting the primary data. However, secondary data like financial 
statements were also collected from charities reports on the websites of the 
organisations involved.  
 
3.4.1 Chosen Research Design 
According to Churchill, (1987) a research design is, 
µVimply the framework or plan for a study used as a guide in collecting and 
DQDO\VLQJGDWD,WLVWKHEOXHSULQWWKDWLVIROORZHGLQFRPSOHWLQJDVWXG\¶ 
 
Sproull (1988) supports this statement by describing research design as, 
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µD SODQ IRU FRQGXFWLQJ UHVHDUFh which usually includes specification of the 
HOHPHQWVWREHH[DPLQHGDQGSURFHGXUHVWREHXVHG¶ 
 
There are various types of research design. The five principal research strategies 
employed in social science research are, experiments, surveys, archival analysis, 
histories and case studies.  According Yin, (1989; 1994) three criteria must be 
followed when choosing an appropriate research design, namely,  
1. The type of research question posed. 
2. The extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural events. 
3. The extent of focus on modern in contrast to past events. 
According to Muijs (2004) the most popular (quantitative) research design in 
social sciences is survey research. Angus and Katona (1953:16) posit that, "It is 
this capacity for wide application and broad coverage which gives the survey 
WHFKQLTXH LWV JUHDW XVHIXOQHVV´ Survey research designs are concerned with 
description, explanation and exploration. Survey research methods can be grouped 
into two classifications, cross-sectional and longitudinal. In cross-sectional 
surveys, data is collected from a sample drawn from big population at that 
particular time.  Longitudinal surveys collect data at different points in time; 
changes in descriptions and explanations are reported. Primary longitudinal 
designs are trend studies, cohort studies and panel studies. Survey research designs 
FDQDSSHDULQYDULRXVIRUPV7KHVHDUHµVHOI- FRPSOHWLRQ¶TXHVWLRQQDLUHVSRVWDORU
web-based and email forms), and interviews (telephone or face-to-face) Descombe 
(2003). Both methods have advantages. Interviews are generally characterised 
with more reliability of information, high response rates and more flexible as their 
strengths. Glastonbury and MacKean (1991:228) say, "Interviewing offers the 
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flexibility to react to the respondent's situation, probe for more detail, seek more 
reflective replies and ask questions which are complex or personally intrusive".  
However, interviews have weaknesses which include being relatively expensive, 
potentially susceptible to the iQWHUYLHZHU¶V ELDV DQG WDNLQJ D ORQJHU WLPH
Descombe (2003) posits that mail questionnaires lessen prejudice. There is 
standardized question presentation and no middle-man bias. The researcher's own 
views will not manipulate the respondent to respond to questions in a particular 
way. There are no verbal or visual hints to influence the respondent. Gilbert (1993) 
also highlights that questionnaires are less invasive than telephone or face-to-face 
surveys. The respondent chooses when to complete the questionnaire. Mail 
questionnaires can also cover a wide geographical area; can provide an anonymous 
setting for threatening and embarrassing topics. However, response rate can be low 
and also nonresponse bias. Mail questionnaires require limited length and 
complexity of questions, and there is little control over who actually completes the 
questionnaire (Barabba, 1990 and Kervin, 1992). 
 
Survey design and interviews were the options considered for this research. Data 
was gathered via a cross- sectional survey using the web-based and the email 
questionnaire as well as semi structured interview techniques on a sample of large 
UK charities. The combination of approaches makes it possible to triangulate, 
thereby taking advantage of the strengths of each method to compensate the 
weaknesses of other methods. Mathison (1988: 13) elaborates this by saying:  
Triangulation has raised an important methodological issue in 
naturalistic and qualitative approaches to evaluation [in order to]  control 
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bias and establishing valid propositions because traditional scientific 
techniques are incompatible with this alternate epistemology.  
 
This also contributes to improve both reliability and validity of findings 
(Deshpande 1983; Lodorfos and Boateng, 2006). The same view is highlighted by 
Golafshani, (2003) who posits that triangulation is fundamentally an approach for 
improving the validity and reliability of research or assessment of results. This is 
significant based on the assumption that any bias inherent in a method is 
neutralised when used in conjunction with other methods (Boateng, 2000).  Also, 
the utilisation of a multi-method approach enables the research activities to reach a 
level of authority. As such data was collected in two phases, that is, qualitative and 
quantitative phases as detailed below. An effort was made to collect data from 
charities with an annual turnover of £1million and over. This is because such 
charities are legally required to comply with the SORP regulations and 
recommendations on accounting and financial reporting by the SORP committee 
of the Charity Commission, which is the regulatory body for charities in England 
and Wales (NCVO, 2006). Due to the selection criteria, the results are more 
generaliseable to large charities. 
 
3.5 Questionnaire Design 
According to Descombe (2003), questionnaires are at their most productive when 
used with large of numbers in many locations. This research was concerned with 
charities across the UK, therefore, so much dispersed and making use of 
questionnaire appropriate for this study. The design of the questionnaire is heavily 
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influenced by the recommendations of Dillman (1978) and Oppenheim (1992) 
who both have presented comprehensive reviews of the literature on questionnaire 
design. Therefore, the layout consisted of a series of sections each relating to a 
particular aspect of the study. While designing the questionnaire due importance 
was given to: 
x Wording of the questionnaire 
x Content and purpose of the questionnaire 
x Appropriateness of the questions to the research aim and objectives 
x Appearance of the questionnaire 
The questions generated were based on the aims of the study and from the 
literature review.  
 
3.5.1 Web-based questionnaire  
For the purpose of this study, web-based questionnaire was preferred over postal 
paper questionnaire. Dillman (2000) describes a web-based questionnaire as a 
compilation of data using a self-administered electronic series of questions on the 
web. The major advantage of web-based is that it is relatively cheap. "There is no 
other method of collecting survey data that offers so much potential for so little 
cost as Web surveys" Zanutto, (2001:7). Zanutto, (2001: 7-8) describes some of 
the benefits of web surveys as:  
a quicker response rate; easier to send reminders to participants; easier to 
process data, since responses could be downloaded to a spreadsheet, data 
analysis package, or a database; dynamic error checking capability; option 
of putting questions in random order; the ability to make complex skip 
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pattern questions easier to follow; the inclusion of pop-up instructions for 
selected questions; and, the use of drop-GRZQER[HV´ 
 
Also, Dillman (2000) posits more advantages when he says; 
With Web-based surveys, the manager has control over the physical 
appearance and can create attractive and inviting forms. Web-based 
surveys can include radio buttons and drop-down lists that permit only one 
choice for the response. Check boxes allow multiple answers. Text boxes 
can be one line with a limited number of characters, or they may permit 
unlimited text entry (Dillman, 2000:352). 
 
These are possibilities that cannot be included in paper surveys. However, Web-
based surveys are not without problems. The browsers and different monitors may 
present the questionnaires differently causing respondents to receive the different 
visual stimulus. Respondents may lack computer expertise which can cause 
mistakes or non-response (Zanutto 2001). Sampling of email addresses is difficult 
as there are no directories and finally, the choice not to respond is likely to be 
prompt (Dillman 2000). However, in this study, the email addresses of the CEOs 
were obtained from The Charity commission website, which is the registrar of 
charities in England and Wales and contains the data on the personal 
characteristics of chief executives.  
 
The questions incorporated in the questionnaire are two types: questions of a 
factual nature and attitudinal questions designed to measure the attitudes, 
perception and opinions of the respondents. An issue in trying to capture the 
attitudes of the respondents is the level of scale measurement to apply. Among the 
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scaling techniques used in the surveys, the semantic differential scale and the 
Likert are the most widely used techniques. Holmes (1974) points out that 5-point 
scale are generally most effective and easier to comprehend from the respondent 
point of view because by using only two or three options it means measuring only 
direction rather than strength of opinion too. Johns (2010:6) echoes the same view 
when he says;  
One simple way of illustrating the problems with long scales is that 
labelling the response options becomes extremely difficult. Typically, for 
sevenǦpoint scales, RSWLRQV ODEHOOHG µVOLJKWO\ DJUHHGLVDJUHH¶ DUH
introduced either side of the neutral point. Much beyond that, though, the 
shades of agreement become as hard for survey designers to express as 
they are for respondents to distinguish. 
 
Taking into considerations such factors as the type of information needed and the 
characteristics of the respondents, using a Likert like 5 ± point scale was chosen 
for the study.  $FRS\RIWKHVWXG\¶VTXHVWLRQQDLUHLVSURYLGHGLQ$SSHQGL[ 
 
3.5.2 Sample Choice and Characteristics 
The research population of interest was obtained from two online sources. The 
first one is CharitiesDirect.com, which is the essential online for the UK charity 
information service for professionals working within UK charities, UK charity 
advisors and the general public. The website contains a list of all registered UK 
charities in alphabetic order as well as 500 top UK charities in order. The Charity 
commission website which is established by law as the watchdog and registrar of 
charities in England and Wales was also utilised. The data on the personal 
characteristics of chief executives were obtained mainly from this website.  
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The sample chosen represents a cross representative selection of UK charities as 
they were drawn from different sub sectors. The sub sectors included Health, 
Education, Overseas aid, Social services, Arts and culture, Media. It is however; 
worthy noting that charities registered with the charity commission excludes 
exempt charities such as certain museums and universities (Kreander et al 2006). 
However, these particular charities have also been omitted in this study. 
The characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 3.3. The size of the 
organisation is classified according to the number of employees with small 
constituting 57 percent and medium/large being around 42 percent.  
 
Table 3.3: Characteristics of the sample 
 Frequency  Percent   Frequency Percent 
Size of organisation    CEO's qualifications   
Small:  < 250 employees 60 57.1  Up to degree level 56 53.3 
Medium/Large  > 250 
employees 
45 42.9  Higher degree 34 32.4 
 
   Professional 
qualification 
15 4.3 
 
      
Sector of the 
organisation 
   &(2¶VWHQXUHLQWKH
organisation 
  
Health 16 15.2  1-5 years 29 27.6 
Art& Culture 19 18.1  6-10 years 32 30.5 
Social services & relief 21 20  over 10 years 44 41.9 
Education 21 20     
Religious 12 11.4  &(2¶VDJH   
Others 16 15.2  25-44 27 25.8 
 
   45-54 37 35.2 
 
   55 & over 41 39.1 
 
      
Total 105 100  Total 105 100 
 
 
Notes: Others stand for organisations offering more than one service   
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The sample distribution based on industry classifications is as follows: the most 
frequent sector of operation education, social services and relief (20% each). This 
followed by art and culture 18 percent with health and other sectors forming 15 
percent each. Regarding the CEO characteristics, CEOs with Bachelor degree form 
over half of the sample, higher degree (32%) and professional qualification (4%). 
In terms of the age group of the CEOs, over 55 years constitutes about 39%; 45 -
54 (35%) and 25-44 (25%). Regarding the tenure, CEOs with tenure over 10 years 
constitutes about 41%; 6-10 (30%) with 1-5 years (27%). 
                               
Survey samples may be classified into two types: probability and non-probability 
samples (purposive samples). A probability sample is where all members of the 
population have an equal chance of being chosen. It is only when this specification 
is not met, and the selection process involves personal judgement that the sample 
then becomes classified as a non-probability sample (Descombe 2003). Thus, 
  non-probability sampling has been used for this survey because an attempt was 
made to choose from the large UK companies with turnover of £1m and over. 
Such companies are likely to have compensation policies and follow 
recommendations laid down by Charity commission.  
 
3.5.3 Pilot Study  
A pilot study was undertaken to pre-test the mail questionnaire. Firstly, the 
questionnaire was subjected to critical review by 4 UK academics and 3 managers 
of large charities.  Some useful feedback was given on some aspects of the 
questionnaire. Common comments included the length of the questionnaire, 
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several statements being used to ask about the same thing, difficulty of some 
questions and clarity of some words. Revisions were made in light of the various 
suggestions made by these academics and managers. The survey was then pre-
tested with 8 organisations. The organisations were representative of the 
population being subjected to the survey. The rationale for the pre- test was to 
evaluate the clarity and reaction to the use of electronic survey. None of the 
contacted organisations cited problems with screen configurations, though, later, in 
the actual survey four respondents had such problems. Only minor changes such as 
grammatical and typing errors were required to the questionnaire after this stage.  
 
3.5.4 Mail-out procedures  
7KHTXHVWLRQQDLUHZDVSUHSDUHGXVLQJWKHµFUHDWHVXUYH\ZL]DUG¶IURPIUHHRQOLQH
survey. The respondents were invited by email to the survey site. On the email was 
the cover letter on which a URL or web address was embedded for respondents to 
click. In order to improve the response rate, Solomon, (2001) recommendations 
were considered. Solomon (2001) stated that personalised email cover letters, 
reminders by email, pre-notification of the purpose of the study, uncomplicated 
formats, and explicit design proved to increase response rates for Web-based 
surveys. The deliberate effort was made to personalise the cover letter, simpler 
formats and plain designs were employed and follow up reminders were made by 
email as a way of trying to maximise the response rate.  
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3.5.5 Covering letter 
On the covering letter, sufficient background information about the research was 
provided. The purpose of the research and how the information will be used was 
explained. The covering letter had The Nottingham University logo to indicate the 
auspices under which the research was undertaken. The contents of the letter also 
included the importance attached to the opinion of the respondent and a suggested 
deadline for returning the questionnaire. Finally, an expression of thanks, to the 
respondents, for the time taken to complete the questionnaire was made. In 
exchange for their participation in the survey and to provide inspiration and 
accurate responses, the participants were guaranteed of anonymity and a 
summation of the report findings. (See appendix 2 and 3 for the cover letter and 
reminder cover letter samples). 
 
3.5.6 Anonymity/Confidentiality 
 For confidentiality purposes, the respondents were assured that they and their 
organisations were not going to be identified in any way at any stage of the 
analysis, nor in the publication of the results. Thus, instead of using company 
names, codes were to be used. A promise of anonymity and strict confidentiality 
was assured at the beginning of the questionnaires, and also stressed in the 
covering letter to signify the importance the researcher attached to the issue of 
anonymity and confidentiality of the respondents. The purpose of such assurance 
was to encourage participation, provide motivation and candid responses.  
Furthermore, anonymity and confidentiality of participants are essential to ethical 
research practice in social research (Crow and Wiles, 2008). 
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3.5.7 Instructions to the respondents 
$FFRUGLQJ WR %U\PDQ  ³PLVWDNHV WKDW RFFXU FDQ LQYDOLGDWH D ZKROH
questionnaire, so it is worth being meticulously careful in giving instructions on 
KRZ WR GR WKHVH DQVZHUV´ $ considerable effort was therefore, made to give 
specific instructions for each question. For instance, where the style of the 
questionnaire varies, the respondents were instructed to put a tick in the 
appropriate box, circle the relevant number or delete as appropriate. 
 
3.5.8 Response rate 
A breakdown of response rate and reasons for non-response are shown in table 3.4 
below. Dillman et al. (2001) acknowledges that since 1990 response rates have 
been on decline for all types of surveys. This has been proven in this survey.  It is 
apparent from table 3.4 that 105 charities completed usable questionnaires 
representing a response rate of only 21%. The most common reasons highlighted 
for non-completion were that; some charities had purely voluntary trustees and no 
paid staff and some cited their company policy of not participating in surveys.  
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Table: 3.4 
Response Rate and Reasons for non- participation 
Description No. of 
Charities 
Percentage  
Charities contacted 500 100 
Total usable replies 105 21 
Charities replies but unable or unwilling to 
participate  
245 49 
Reasons for non participation   
       Lack of time  26  5.2 
       Policy not to answer Questionnaires  18  3.6 
       Provided websites and suggested accounts could 
be 
       checked there           
 12  2.4 
       Unable to view data    4  0.8 
       Not resourced to deal with such requests   24  4.8 
       Undisclosed reasons 161 32.2 
No replies 150 30 
   
 
3.5.9 Non-response Bias 
From 10th of November to 25th of January 2008 questionnaires and cover letters 
were mailed to 500 charities. By the end of May, a total of 63 usable completed 
questionnaires were returned. To enhance the response rate further, reminders 
were sent to the charities that had not responded from the 3rd of June to the 27th 
July 2008. All non-respondents were identified because of the use of special 
coding system on the questionnaire. This helped avoid unnecessary mailing to 
those who had already responded. A total of 42 usable completed questionnaires 
were returned, as a result. Because of the differences between the first leg of 
response and the second leg of response, a test was conducted to test for response 
bias. The procedure used by Armstrong and Overton (1977) was used to test the 
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response bias in this study. This procedure tests the non- response bias by 
implementing a t-test comparing early and late response rate along a number of 
key descriptive variables. The results of the sample t-test the null hypothesis that 
there is no difference between early respondent and late respondents along the 
variables: sector of the charity, number of employees and the size of the board are 
shown on table 3.6. The t-statistics with the associated probabilities gave no 
grounds for rejecting the null hypothesis.  Thus, the results indicate no evidence of 
non-response bias between the early and late respondents along the chosen 
dimensions.  
 
Table: 3.5  
 
Comparison of Early and Late Respondent 
 
Variables Early 
Respondent 
Late Respondent   
  SD  SD t-value Prob. 
Sector of the firm  1.57  1.75 0.38 0.93 
Number of employees  0.50  0.50 0.47 0.69 
Size of the board  1.08  0.91 0.40 0.79 
 
 
3.6 Validity and Reliability of the Instrument 
When doing a research, researchers need to evaluate and verify that their studies 
are feasible. Schwab (1980) asserts that validity and reliability of the instruments 
are the two fundamental concepts that influence the overall acceptability of the 
UHVHDUFK RXWFRPH 7KLV LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK 3DWWRQ ¶V YLHZV WKDW DQ\
researcher should be concerned about two factors namely, validity and reliability 
when designing a study, scrutinising the results and evaluating the quality of the 
UHVHDUFK7KLVFRUUHVSRQGVWRWKHTXHVWLRQWKDW³+RZFDQDQLQTXLUHUSHUVXDGHKLV
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or her audiences that the research findings of an inquiry are worth paying attention 
to?" (Lincoln and Guba, 1985:290). In quantitative research credibility relies on 
LQVWUXPHQW FRQVWUXFWLRQ ZKHUHDV LQ TXDOLWDWLYH UHVHDUFK ³WKH UHVHDUFKHU LV WKH
instrument" (Patton, 2001:14).  Joppe (2000:1) defines reliability as:  
«7KH H[WHnt to which results are consistent over time and an 
accurate representation of the total population under study is referred to 
as reliability and if the results of a study can be reproduced under a 
similar methodology, then the research instrument is considered to be 
reliable.  
 
In other words, this citation embodies the notion of replicability or repeatability of 
results or observations Golafshani, (2003:598) cites Kirk and Miller (1986: 41-42) 
who recognised three types of reliability stated in quantitative research, which 
correspond to: ³(1) the degree to which a measurement, given repeatedly, remains 
the same (2) the stability of a measurement over time; and (3) the similarity of 
measurements within a given time period´  Joppe (2000:1) provides the following 
explanation of what validity is:  
Validity determines whether the research truly measures that which it was 
intended to measure or how truthful the research results are. In other 
ZRUGV GRHV WKH UHVHDUFK LQVWUXPHQW DOORZ \RX WR KLW WKH EXOO¶V H\H Rf 
your research object? Researchers generally determine the validity by 
asking a series of questions, and will often look for the answers in the 
research of others.  
Similarly, (Zikmund, 2003) simply defines validity as the ability of a scale 
or measuring instrument to measure what it is intended to measure. Content 
or face validity is the most common variant concept of validity, although 
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there are some like criterion and construct validity (Uddin and Boateng, 
2007). The evaluation of content validity characteristically involves a 
SUHDUUDQJHG UHYLHZ RI WKH VXUYH\¶V FRQWHQW WR HQVXUH WKDW LW FRQVLVWV RI
everything it should and excludes anything it does not (Boateng, 2000). 
:DLQHUDQG%UDXQGHVFULEHWKHYDOLGLW\DV³FRQVWUXFWYDOLGLW\´7KH
construct is the preliminary idea, concept, query or supposition that 
determines the type of data is to be gathered and how to gather it 
(Golafshani, 2003). While the definition of reliability is concerned about 
whether the outcome is replicable, validity looks at the accuracy of the 
measurement and also, if they are measuring what they are anticipated to 
measure. 
 
Fried (2005) posits that reliability can be measured by test-retest method, split-half 
PHWKRG DQG WKH &URQEDFK¶V DOSKD PHWKRG This study IRFXVHV RQ WKH ³Lnternal 
FRQVLVWHQF\´ZKLFKUHIHUVWRZKHWKHU participants are responding to the different 
items of a questionnaire in a consistent manner in a single trial. The most 
sophisticated and widely applied index of internal consistency is ³&URQEDFK¶V
DOSKD´ 7KLs examines the average inter-item correlation of the items in a 
questionnaire (Cortina, 1993). If all items are measuring the same thing (without 
any error) alpha will be equal to one. Otherwise, if there is no shared variance in 
the items, then these are VXSSRVHGWRUHIOHFWRQO\³HUURU´UHVXOWLQJLQDOSKDEHLQJ
equal to zero (Hinton, 2004). The reporting and correct interpretation of 
&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDLVHVVHQWLDOIRUMXGJLQJWKHLQWHUQDOFRQVLVWHQF\ of the developed 
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outcome measures. Lack of reliability is a serious drawback of an outcome 
measure as it indicates errors in measurements (Powell, 1999). 
 
The reliability for the constructs used in the questionnaire of the study used was 
tested, and the &URQEDFK¶VDOSKDYDOXHVZHUHZHOODERYHWKHVXJJHVWHGWKUHVhold.  
Field (2005) has stated that a value of 0.70 to .080 is acceptable. However, Kline 
(1999) has indicated that in some situations a value lower than 0.70 is acceptable. 
Nunnally (1978) and Robinson et al. (1991) suggest that the alpha value of 0.60 as 
D WKUHVKROG 7KH &URQEDFK¶V DOSKD IRU WKH FRQVWUXFWV DUH UHSRUWHG LQ HDFK RI WKH
relevant chapters as well as appendix 5. 
In order to assess content validity, an extensive literature review has been done to 
develop the items in the questionnaire. Furthermore, to give the final shape to the 
data collection instrument, the questionnaire instrument was piloted in two stages, 
which involved consultation with academics from related and unrelated fields and 
also with top management of UK charities. Furthermore, as already been eluded 
to, a triangulation of both survey questionnaire and interviews to collect data were 
utilised to enhance the validity and reliability of data (Descombe, 2003 and Cohen 
et al, 2005).  
 
3.7 The Qualitative Phase of the Investigation 
The literature review has raised concerns about performance measures that have so 
far been employed by nonprofit organisations researchers, for example, Frumkim 
and Keating, (2001); Brickely and Van Horn, (2002) and Hallock, (2002). Having 
considered the uniqueness of each charity, performance measures used in these 
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organisations may not be fully captured using quantitative standardised 
questionnaires or surveys but qualitative approach. As Lodorfos and Boateng 
(2006) put it, a qualitative method is preferred when an in-depth understanding is 
desired. The qualitative aspect has been employed to generate further facts, 
opinions, and insights (Yin, 1984), and get a more comprehensive picture of 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶H[SHULHQFHVRIWKH performance measures that are used in charities. In 
short, the general goal of the qualitative phase of this research is to gain a better 
understanding of performance measures used in charities.  
  
3.7.1 Interview Technique 
Frey and Oishi (1995:01) define an interview technique as "a purposeful 
conversation in which one person asks prepared questions (interviewer) and 
another answers them (respondent)". This is a way of gathering information on a 
particular subject or a topic to be investigated. Interviews can be either structured 
(closed interview style), semi structured or unstructured (open interview style). 
Nichols (1991:131) defines Open-ended or unstructured interviews as "an informal 
interview, not structured by a standard list of questions. Fieldworkers are free to 
deal with the topics of interest in any order and to phrase their questions as they 
think best."  
In this case, a broad range of questions are asked in any order in accordance to 
how the interview proceeds (Breakwell, Hammond and Fife-Schaw 1995). 
Wimmer and Dominick (1997) posit that open-ended questions grant the 
interviewer, if necessary, the opportunity to probe deeper into the original 
responses of the respondent to obtain a more comprehensive response to the 
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question. The quality of the data therefore, depends entirely on the interviewer 
who must evaluate how much probing is necessary. Nichols (1991) defines Closed 
or structured interviews however, as a social survey where a series of likely 
responses to each question is known beforehand because possible answers are 
frequently listed on the form and the interviewer merely indicates the suitable 
answer in each case. The method is standardised and interviewees can choose from 
a list of prearranged answers. Therefore, there is a lack of flexibility, due to the 
predetermined question order and that there are also uniform (Wimmer and 
Dominick 1997). Although this has advantages in that the information is easily 
FRPSDUDEOH DQG TXDQWLILDEOH WKHUH LV ³OLWWOH URRP IRU XQDQWLFLSDWHG GLVFRYHULHV´
due to the lack of flexibility in this approach" (Breakwell, Hammond and Fife-
Schaw 1995:231). Furthermore, sometimes people may feel that the designated 
answers do not fit with their responses. 
 
The semi structured interview is one of the most regularly used qualitative 
methods. Borgatti (1998) describes an interview as an instrumental tool to get to 
the root of the issue, through expanding questions and get more information. The 
interviewer has a script that contains a set of questions to guide the interaction 
(Almeida et al, 1999). Although the original script of the interview ensures the 
consistency of subject across the whole sample, the difference is caused by the 
probing that is done by the interviewer as a result of responses given by the 
interviewee (Honey 1987). For the purpose of this study, the semi-structured 
interviews were chosen as the appropriate means of data collection. Just like other 
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methods in a research, interviews have both advantages and disadvantages. Table 
3.7 summarises some of the advantages and disadvantages. 
 
Table 3.6 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Interviews 
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
x It is easier for questioning to be 
guided points can be clarified 
more easily when necessary 
than in mailed questionnaire. 
x Respondents can qualify and 
clarify responses  
x Interviewees may also provide 
incredibly detailed responses in 
an effort to figure out the 
intention of the survey. 
x It is an extremely time-
consuming method: it requires 
more time to collect and 
analyse data.  
x Training is sometimes 
necessary in order curtail to 
possible biases in the 
interview:  
x The technique relies on the 
UHVSRQGHQW¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWR
give accurate and complete 
responses. 
Adapted from Frey and Oishi 1995; Breakwell, Hammond and Fife-Schaw, 
1995; Wimmer and Dominick 1997. 
 
3.7.2 Interview Questions Design 
Dilman (1978) presented a comprehensive review of literature on questionnaire 
design and this influenced the design of the questions for the interview for this 
study. The interview questions created were based on the aims of the study and 
literature review and were about what measures performance in the UK charities. 
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Since Lincoln and Guba, (1985); Shah and Corley, (2006) regard the protection of 
LQIRUPDQWV¶ FRQILGHQWLDOLW\ DV RQH RI WKH HOHPHQWV QHHGHG WR HQVXUH WKH
trustworthiness of qualitative research, the interviewees were assured of 
confidentiality. 
 
3.7.3 Pre-testing Interview Questions  
The pre-testing of the interview questions was conducted two phases. The first 
phase involved comments from two UK leading academics that are experts in 
executive compensations and performance in nonprofit organisations. The reason 
of the pre-test was to obtain feedback on aspects such as the content of the 
questions, the clarity of the questions, length of questions, questions, relevance 
and irrelevance of questions and whether any key issues have been overlooked 
(Webb, 2000 and Remenyi, Williams, Money and Swarts 1998). The suggestions 
from the academics were given due attention and the questions were revised and 
changed accordingly before being subjected to the second phase of pre-testing.   
The second phase of the pre-test involved 3 charities. The researcher conducted 
the pre-test through personal interviews with respondents from these charities. The 
feedback was however, positive feedback and there were remarkably few 
comments, such as the clarity of the questions, which were taken into 
consideration in the construction of the final version of the interview script.  
 
3.7.4 Interview Procedure  
According to Kvale, (1996) and Kvortnik, (2003) it is necessary to establish 
rapport with the interviewee before the interview by giving them information 
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about the interviewer, the purpose of the interview, and the relevance of his/her 
participation in the study. Consequently, the researcher introduced herself and 
explained the purpose and the importance of the study before the actual interview. 
Some easy and non controversial questions (for example, in which sector of 
industry is your charity involved? what are the main activities of your charity?) 
were included as opening questions following Churchill (1999) and Malhotra 
(2004) recommendations and potentially sensitive and controversial questions, 
(e.g.  What measures performance in the organisation?), were placed later as 
Rubin and Rubin (1995) suggest that, that is when the interviewer will have built 
an atmosphere of empathy and trust with the respondent. The length of interviews 
varied from 45 minutes to 60 minutes. The participants, particularly from face to 
face interviews did not agree that the interviews be recorded by digital recorder. 
This was however, not surprising since Kvortnik, (2003) and Vieira, (2005) 
suggest that interviewees sometimes experience some discomfort and, in some 
cases, risks in participating in the research. The semi-structured interview 
technique (Minichiello et al., 1995) was used. An interview script involving the 
same open-ended questions was employed for all interviews. The researcher took 
notes and included all the details discussed and any corresponding views 
expressed by the interviewees and impressions of the researcher without delay. 
 
3.7.5 Sample Characteristics and Response 
The data for this study were collected via semi structured interviews with senior 
managers from large UK charities. Between September and November 2007, 14 
open and semi-structured interviews ± 85.7 percent telephone and 14.3 percent 
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face to face, with senior managers who were key decision makers of charities.  An 
evaluation of the job titles of the respondents showed that: 41 percent of the 
respondents were CEOs; 43 percent were finance managers; and 16 percent were 
event managers. It is likely that these respondents are involved in strategic 
decision making in their respective Charities. Secondary data like financial 
statements were also collected from charities reports on their websites and 
previous research in the subject area.  
 
 The characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 3.7. The size of the 
organisation is classified according to the number of employees with 
medium/large constituting 57 percent and the small being around 42 percent. The 
sample distribution based on industry classifications is as follows: the most 
frequent sector of operation Art and culture (28%). This is followed by Health and 
Religious sectors with around (21 percent each) and Social services & relief and 
Education sectors form 14 percent each.  
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Table 3.7: Characteristics of the Sample for Interviews 
 
 
Charity  Coding 
Colour  
Sector   Frequency  Percent 
CH 1 Blue Religious Size of organisation   
CH 2 Red Health Small:  < 250 
employees 
6 42.9 
CH 3 Blue Religious Medium/Large  > 250 
employees 
8 57.1 
CH 4 Green Art & culture    
CH 5 Orange Education    
CH 6 Blue Religious Sector of the 
organisation 
  
CH 7 Green Art & culture Health 3 21.4 
CH 8 Red Health Art& Culture 4 28.6 
CH 9 Yellow Social services & 
relief 
Social services & relief 2 14.3 
CH 10 Orange Education Education 2 14.3 
CH 11 Red Health Religious 3 21.4 
CH 12 Yellow Social services & 
relief 
Total 14 100 
CH 13 Green Art & culture    
CH 14 Green Art & culture    
Notes: For reasons of confidentiality, the charities and the interviewees are coded so as to 
guarantee anonymity of the participants involved. CH stands for Charity and colour codes are for 
the sector of the charity.  
 
3.8 Data Analysis 
The study consists of several but related analysis as well as a discussion of the 
results and their implications. Several analytical techniques are used. As already 
mentioned, the independent t- test was used to test the non response bias of the 
responses collected frRPWKHVXUYH\DQG&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDKDVEHHQXVHGWRDVVHVV
the reliability of the measurement of the scale used in the questionnaire. 
Descriptive statistical tools were also used to describe the general characteristics 
of sampled charities. The study also conducted factor analysis using varimax 
rotation to find out a parsimonious set of distinct, financial and non-financial 
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performance measures utilised in charities. The Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS) for Windows (version 17) was utilised to analyse data, and is 
reported in Chapters four to seven. Details of hypotheses development together 
with detailed descriptions of each analytical component used to support those 
hypotheses are contained in appropriate chapters.  
 
3.9 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the research paradigm stance.  This was followed by 
the outline of the research design, the preparation of the survey as well as the 
interviews, and the pre-testing of the questionnaire. The chapter also discussed 
issues related to procedures of data collection, sampling issues, decisions 
regarding the distribution of the questionnaires, the presentation of the sample 
characteristics, validity and reliability of the data and finalised with data analysis 
procedures. Secondary data like financial statements were also collected from 
charities reports on the websites of the organisations involved. Primary data 
collection, which constitutes the main purpose of the field of the study, was 
gathered via a cross-sectional survey using a questionnaire and semi structured 
interviews with senior managers from large UK charities. A listing of these 
charities was obtained from two online sources, CharitiesDirect.com and Charity 
commission website which are established by law as the regulator and registrar of 
charities in England and Wales. From the survey, 105 usable questionnaires were 
received after one reminder, representing a response rate of 21%. 14 charities 
participated in the interviews. As the questions were strategic in nature, upper 
level managers who were key decision makers of charities were targeted. 
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Therefore, the data from both questionnaire and interviews represent the 
perceptions of managers in charities. The study has used appropriate statistical 
tests to find out the levels of significance of results.  
 
After discussing and justifying the methodological choices for this research, the 
next chapter examines the determinants of executive compensation in UK 
charities.  
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Chapter 4 
Determinants of Executive Compensation: An Examination of the 
UK Charities 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The issue of executive compensation has produced a vast amount of literature in 
the past three decades. The interests stem from the recognition that the 
compensation of executives is a key motivation factor which in turn influences, to 
a large degree, the overall direction of the organisation (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1989 and Hoskisson, Hitt, Turk, and Tyler, 1989). However, what is striking about 
the research on executive compensation is the disproportionate concentration on 
for-profit organisations compared to nonprofit making organisations (see Gomez-
Mejia and Balkin, 1992; Sanders, 2001; Benson and Hornsby, 2002; Vafeas, 2003; 
Caranikas-Walker et al, 2008). Given the massive differences between the nature, 
purpose, financial structure and ownership of profit and nonprofit organisations, 
one would expect an equal devotion of empirical efforts to nonprofit organisations. 
In fact, Mason (1996) argues that, nonprofit often operate in non-competitive 
environments, benefit from tax exemption and charitable contributions, therefore; 
paying managers high levels of pay that rival those in business for profits would be 
highly controversial. It would not only undermine public trust but may lead to the 
tendency for funds to be diverted to pay compensations at the expenses of 
IXOILOOLQJWKHLURUJDQLVDWLRQV¶PLVVLRQV)UXPNLQDQG.HDWLQJ, 2001). 
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 Another salient point is that, high levels of compensation defeat the basis of the 
formation of these organisations. For example, researchers such as Hansmann, 
(1980); and Jobome (2006) assert that, any attempt to increase pay levels in these 
organisations should consider the specific organisational and motivational issues 
which have been the bedrock and other pertinent characteristics such as altruism 
associated with managers working for such organisations. On the other hand, it 
may be argued that given the difficulty in attracting the right calibre personnel to 
nonprofit making organisations, these organisations must be prepared to spend 
uncompromisingly to attract and retain top capable and skilled human resources 
(Pappas, 1995; Drucker, 1992). This debate is against the backdrop that, who and 
what determines the CEOs pay in charities remains largely unexplained (Akpeti, 
2001). Researchers such as Gray and Benson, 2003; and Brickley et al, 2004 
support the above assertion by pointing out that empirical studies focusing on 
executive pay determinants in US nonprofit have only recently emerged. Jobome 
(2006) re-echoes similar views and points out that the evidence on executive pay 
and performance in the UK nonprofit organisations is scarce. This study attempts 
to extend the few prior studies on the determinants of executive pay in the UK 
charities. We pursue this goal by submitting the key constructs previously 
identified in the literature to a rigorous test via a survey of the opinions of CEOs of 
the UK large charities instead of just using secondary, thereby providing a strong 
conceptualisation of executive compensation in nonprofit organisations. 
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 4.2 Hypotheses Development  
4.2.1 The Sector of the Organisation 
 Research evidence on executive compensation suggests that executive pay levels 
vary by industry. For example, Joskow, Rose, and Shepard (1993) show that CEOs 
in regulated industries earn less than those in unregulated industries. This is 
FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK +DOORFN¶V ILQGLQJV WKDW VDODULHV DUH highest in medical research, 
general and rehabilitative health industries, and lowest in religious and housing 
and shelter industries. Oster (1998); Twombly and Gantz (2001) find that hospitals 
give their executive directors the highest compensation packages followed by the 
higher education while social services give the smallest. This is because nonprofit 
hospitals and health related institutions particularly in the USA engage in 
relatively substantial competition for employees with for-profit institutions, while 
social service and religious organisations do not (Preston, 1989). However, in the 
UK; there seem to be no such direct competition between UK business firms and 
the charities; therefore, Oster (1998); Twombly and Gantz (2001)¶VILQGLQJV may 
not be directly applicable to the UK charities. In the UK, Jobome, (2006) found 
that charities operating in the health sector paid their CEOs more and he attributed 
it to the fact that these organisations are relatively more able to generate resources 
for their causes due to their direct relevance to public health and also that their 
RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶ ZRUN WHQGV WR be heavily supported by legacies (Framjee, 2004). 
This renders support to the resource- based explanation.  
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In the stewardship construct however, the manager will make decisions in the best 
interest of the organisation, putting collectivist options above self-servicing 
options. Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, (1997) argue that, senior executives 
act as stewards for the organisation and in the best interests of the principals. If 
this is the case, then an organisational sector should have no significant effect on 
CEO pay as managers have a commitment to organisational goals. It is therefore, 
expected that CEO pay would not be driven by the sector. In the light of the above, 
this study hypothesises that:   
Hypothesis 1: Executive compensation will not be influenced by sector of the 
organisation. 
 
4.2.2 Organisational Size 
Economic theory also provides a rationale for the pay-for-size association. Roberts 
(1959) argued that individuals get paid according to their marginal productivity 
WKHLULPSDFWRQWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VWRWDORXWSXW(YHQDVPDOO percentage gain, in 
an extremely large organisation, would justify a substantial pay differential for the 
WRS H[HFXWLYHV 6LQFH H[HFXWLYHV¶ LPSDFW LQFUHDVHV ZLWK WKH VL]H RI WKH
organisation, one would expect to find the high correlations between compensation 
and size reported in the literature.  
 
Researchers such as Meyer and Rowan, (1977); Scott, (1995); Zucker, (1988) 
support this line of reasoning and suggest that organisational size provides 
legitimacy for high executive pay. Frumkin (2002) also suggests that, large 
organisations typically can acquire more exposure, have higher reputation, and are 
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regarded as more effective because of the scale of their activities. As a result, 
managers can and do receive large compensation packages in larger firms because 
they are generally judged as worthy and entitled to earn more. While a number of 
studies has rendered support for the positive relation between organisation size and 
CEO pay, (see Eldenburg and Krishna, 2003; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; 
Chalmers et al, 2006; Magnan et al, 1995; Kuskiut, 1989; Deckop, 1988: Jones, 
Kato 1996), studies such as Boyd, (1994); Lambert et al (1991) have rendered 
support for the weak relation between CEO compensation and firm size measured 
by sales.  
However, it should be pointed out these studies were in the context of for-profit 
organisations. The only study in the UK that has examined the size and pay 
association is that of Jobome (2006). Given the conflicting views in respect of 
size-pay association, further studies appear warranted. The study, therefore, 
hypothesises that:  
Hypothesis 2: Organisational size will positively impact on executive 
compensation in the UK charities. 
 
&(2¶V&KDUDFWHULVWLFVDQG([HFXWLYH3ay 
Prior studies have suggested the relationship between executive compensation and 
CEO characteristics (see O¶Neill, 1997; Frey 1997; Jegen, 2001 and Jobome, 
2006). These studies use three broad theoretical perspectives, namely, human 
capital theory, the stewardship view and resources based view to explain the link 
between executive compensation and CEO characteristics. We explore below these 
theoretical perspectives and their links with CEO pay.  
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4.3.1 Human Capital Theory 
The human capital of the executive may have a significant effect on the levels of 
compensation. It is thus argued that, better educated and more experienced 
executives perform better and consequently it leads their organisations to high 
performance levels. However, highly qualified CEOs may demand a premium in 
the labour market because they have more employment opportunities elsewhere 
(Gray and Benson, 2003). Human capital theory suggests that CEOs have a crucial 
task in the achievement of the organisation by improving performance, growth, 
prosperity and market positioning. Therefore, CEO pay should be designed to 
acknowledge the individual contribution of a CEO as a wealth creator, for the 
loyalty to the organisation, and the demands of the job, as well as the relative 
ZRUWKLQWKHODERXUPDUNHW2¶1HLOO2¶1HLOOand Lob, 1999). In this context, 
CEOs reward package should reflect the need to attract and retain these key 
decision-PDNHUV2¶1HLOO+HQGHUVRQ+LOOHWDO 
 
4.3.2 Stewardship View 
The stewardship theory perceives the executive manager to be far from being an 
opportunistic shirker, but the one who in essence wants to perform a worthwhile 
job, to be a trustworthy steward of the company resources. Davis et al (1997) 
delineate characteristics which distinguish the stewardship theory from agency; 
these include among other things, trust, actors with a focus on self-actualisation, 
serving the collective goal of the organisation (no conflict of interest assumed), 
intrinsically motivated, and having high-value commitment and a long-term 
orientation (Oslon, 2005). The stewardship view recognises intrinsic motivation 
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and argues that nonprofit managers tend to have a high level of altruism and that 
increasing pay levels in the nonprofit sector could lead to monetary incentives 
crowding out altruism and attracting the wrong managers. For example, Third 
Sector, (2003) argues that the charity chief executives should be motivated by their 
cause and be prepared to be paid little or nothing at all. In practical terms, this 
PLJKWPHDQNHHSLQJWKHVHFWRU¶VPDQDJHULDOSD\ORZUelative to public). This line 
of reasoning is consistent with Frey and Jegen (2001); Jegers and Lapsley (2003) 
who both caution about the effects of transference of the business sector practices 
to this sector and the possibility of monetary incentives crowding out intrinsic 
motivation in order to attract the right manager (Hansmann, 1980). Simply put, 
stewardship theory recognises intrinsic motivation and it predicts a weak 
relationship between tenure and pay (Jobome, 2006). Thus, the adoption of 
constraining devices such as corporate governance codes and agency-prescribed 
small boards should have no significant effect on CEO pay. Therefore, neither 
financial performance nor governance restraints should be related to CEO pay in 
this stewardship model (Jobome 2006). 
 
 4.3.3 Resources Based View 
The resource based view highlights WKDWWKHJURZWKLQWKHVHFWRU¶VUROHhas led to 
greater expectation for high quality professional service and competition for 
skilled workers. There is therefore, a need for the sector to adopt its monetary 
incentives and compensation (Jobome 2006). In fact, (Third Sector, 2004) cites the 
level of pay as the biggest issue behind staff turnover, and this may partly explain 
why 75% of charities experience difficulties in filling some vacancies. This should 
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be regarded as a critical matter, mainly in a progressively ever changing 
HQYLURQPHQW FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ JOREDOLVDWLRQ FRPSHWLWLRQ DQG LQWULFDF\ 2¶1HLOO
and Clarke, 1990). Against this backdrop, the study argues that charities should set 
high monetary incentives for executives. Using resource-based arguments, better 
qualified and experienced CEOs would be paid more, because they provide better 
human resource for the organisation, in which case CEO qualifications, experience 
and age would exhibit positive relationships with pay. In the light of the above 
discussions, the study hypothesises that: 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relatLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ&(2¶VTXDOLILFDWLRQVDQG
pay. 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relatLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ&(2¶Vexperience and 
pay. 
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relatLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ&(2¶VWHQXUHDQGSD\ 
 
4.4 CEO Duality and Executive Pay 
CEO duality, the practice of one person serving as both the CEO and chairperson 
of the board of directors, has been the subject of debate and numerous studies for 
the last two decades (e.g. Dalton et al, 1998; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Millstein, 
1992; Pound, 1992; Pi and Timme, 1993; Brickley, et al, 1997). Managerial power 
theorists and advocates of board reforms believe that the dual position of the CEO 
will result in them having considerable informal stature and heightened formal 
authority over the board (Harrison et al, 1988; Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Crystal, 
1991 and Vance, 1983), thereby limiting their ability to monitor setting of the 
&(2¶V SD\ &RQVHTXHQWO\ VWXGLHV IRU H[DPSOH Cyert, Kang and Kumar, 2002; 
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Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999) found that CEO pay is 20±40 percent higher 
if the CEO is the chairman of the board. Apparently, the above evidence indicates 
that managerial power affects pay arrangements in the way predicted by the 
managerial power approach, thereby supporting the agency view. As a result, in 
the UK, this has prompted several reports aiming to correct this corporate 
governance problem. The recent (2003) version of the Code combines the Cadbury 
and Greenbury reports on corporate governance, the Turnbull Report on Internal 
Control (revised and republished as the Turnbull Guidance in 2005), the Smith 
Guidance on Audit Committees and elements of the Higgs Report which have 
helped focus attention on the importance of corporate governance issues. Their 
recommendations included adopting a clear division of responsibilities between 
the chairman, who is in charge of the board, and CEO of an organisation, whose 
main concern should be running the business. Thus, it implies that these two roles 
cannot be fulfilled by the same person (The Combined Code 2003). Core et al 
(1999) suggest that firms facing greater agency problems are more likely to have 
higher-paid CEOs, indicative of large managerial power and entrenchment. 
Therefore, organisations that adopt governance mechanisms which curtail 
managerial power and agency problems should also pay their CEOs less.  
 
On the contrary, a conflicting theoretical perspective regarding the benefits and 
costs of CEO duality supports the stewardship theory, and seem to suggest that 
CEO duality provides an integrated strategic leadership at the top of the firm, 
which helps ensure the presence of strong leadership (Boyd, 1995). In addition, it 
might also be both a structural and psychological empowerment of the CEO, 
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which encourages the CEO to better serve the firm and its shareholders (e.g., 
Davis et al, 1997). As far as charities are concerned, Jobome (2006) noted that 
they do not have many of the governance mechanisms that for-profit firms rely 
upon (e.g. prescriptive corporate governance codes, shareholder pressure, takeover 
market, creditor pressure). Nevertheless, they keep management pay low relative 
to other sectors, contrary to the classic agency treatise, because CEOs in charities 
do not seem to take advantage of their position, but they behave altruistically and 
are intrinsically motivated.  Given the altruism and intrinsic motivation nature of 
the sector (Jobome 2006 and Frey 1997), this study therefore, hypothesises that:  
Hypothesis 6: There is no relatLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ&(2¶VGXDOLW\DQGH[HFXWLYHSD\ 
  
4.5 Data Analysis  
To examine the hypothesised relationship, correlation coefficients were computed 
first, and we further employed multiple regression analysis to test the hypotheses 
discussed above.  
 
 
4.6 Dependent Variable CEOPAY 
 
The dependent variable the CEOPAY was operationalised as the log of the base 
salaries only (over a 12 month period). The measures of CEO pay widely used in 
the literature include total remuneration, salary only, salary plus benefits, and 
bonuses. This study uses total CEO remuneration (base salary), mainly because, 
unlike in the U.S., pay components such as benefits and bonuses are not publicly 
reported separately. Base salary represents a fixed element of total compensation, 
while bonuses are determined by some performance measures (Gomez-Mejia, 
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1994). Moreover, bonuses are a small fraction of charities CEO remuneration in 
the UK.  
 
4.7 Measurement of Independent Variables 
An explanation of each independent variable is given below. 
 
4.7.1 Organisational Characteristics 
The variables used to measure organisational characteristics are: the size of the 
organisation (SIZE) and the sector in which the organisation operates or the nature 
of the organisation (SECTOR). 
 
4.7.2 SIZE (Size of the Firm) 
In this study, the number of employees denotes the size of the organisation. A 
simple rationale behind this is that, previous executive pay literature measures firm 
size by such variables as market value, book value of assets, and number of 
employees (Murphy, 1985; Finkelstein and Hambrick,1989; Kostiuk, 1990); 
Lambert, Larker, and Weigelt 1991). In this study, size was classified according to 
the international accounting standards, which states that organisations with up to 
250 employees are small organisations and those with over 250 employees, are 
therefore, classified as large in this study. 
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Table 4.1 
Size of Organisation 
SIZE Code Frequency Percent % 
Small organisation:  up to 250 employees 0 60 57.1 
Large organisation: more than 250  
employees 
1 45 42.9 
Total  105 100 
 
4.7.3 SECTOR (Sector of the Firm) 
The SECTOR value has been coded ordinally as follows: Health (1), Art and 
culture (2), Social services and relief (includes overseas aid) (3), Education (4), 
Religious (5) and Others denote the following charities: media, museum, sports & 
recreation and environmental charities (6).   
 
Table 4.2 
Sector of the Organisation 
SECTOR Code  Frequency Percent 
Health 1 16 15.2 
Art & Culture 2 19 18.1 
 Social services  & relief                                         3 21 20 
Education 4 21 20 
Religious 5 12 11.4 
Others 6 16 15.2 
Total  105 100 
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4.7.4 CEO Characteristics 
The proxies comprise the educational qualification of the CEOs (QUAL), their 
overall experience (EXP) ± which is proxies for, the age of the executive and 
(TENURE) ± how long the CEO has been in post as chief executive in that 
organisation. 
  
4.7.5 QUAL (CEO Qualifications) 
The QUAL value has been coded ordinally as follows: Up to degree level (1), 
Masters/PhD degree (2) and Professional qualification (3) as shown on the table 
below. 
 
Table 4.3 
&(2¶V4XDOLILFDWLRQV 
QUAL Code  Frequency Percent % 
Up to degree level 1 56 53.3 
Masters/PhD degree 2 34 32.4 
Professional qualification 3 15   4.3 
Total   105 100 
 
 
4.7.6 TENURE &(2¶V7HQXUH 
The TENURE value has been coded ordinally as follows: 0 to 5 years (1), 6 to 10 
years (2) and Over 10 years (3) as shown on the table 4.5.  
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Table 4.4 
&(2¶V7HQXUHLQWKH2rganisation 
TENURE 
(in years) 
Code  Frequency Percent % 
0-5 1 29 27.6 
6-10 2 32 30.5 
Over 10 3 44 41.9 
Total  105 100 
 
4.7.7 EXP &(2¶VDJH 
Experience is proxied by the age of the participating CEOs, and it is recorded 
within the ranges shown in Table 4.6. Old age does not necessarily mean longer 
experience as CEO, but it might have some impact on greater human capital 
accumulation (Jobome, 2006). It is apparent that almost 80% of CEOs who 
participated are 45 years and over, which might be explained by the fact that CEOs 
generally need more experience. 
 
Table 4.5 
&(2¶V([SHULHQFH 
AGE  Code  Frequency Percent % 
25-44 1 27 25.8 
45-54 2 37 35.2 
55 & over 3 41 39.1 
Total  105 100 
 
4.7.8 DUAL (CEO duality) 
Based on prior literature, (e.g. Boyd, 1995; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Core et al, 
1999; Brick et al, 2006). CEO duality was coded as a dummy variable. A CEO 
 143 
 
who also served as the chairperson of the board was coded as 1; otherwise coded 
as 0.  
Table 4.6 
CEO Duality 
SIZE Code Frequency Percent % 
CEO also chair 1 40 38.1 
Otherwise 0 65 61.9 
Total  105 100 
 
The discussion of the dependent and independent variables suggest the following 
model. The model provides an inclusive indication of the determinants of CEO 
compensation, which includes CEO characteristics (CEO qualification, experience 
and tenure) and Firm characteristics (Sector and size of the firm) and CEO duality 
as depicted by the following equation: 
 
CEOPAY   Į  ȕ1SIZE + ȕ1SECTOR+ ȕ2QUAL + ȕ3TENURE + ȕ4EXPt 
+ȕ5DUAL+ e 
 
 
4.8 Results and Discussion 
 
Table 4.7 reports correlation of the independent variables and the dependent 
variable in this study. Bivariate relationships shown in the Table indicate a 
correlation of the following independent variables namely, size; CEO tenure, CEO 
qualification, DQG &(2¶V SD\  +RZHYHU QR VLJQLILcant correlation appears in 
respect of the sector; CEO duality; CEO tenure and CEO pay. 
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                                                                  Table 4.7   
                                                           
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
µ***¶µ¶µ¶means significant at 0.01, 0.05    and 0.1 levels respectively 
 
The study conducted multiple regression to predict the determinants of executive 
compensation. Table 4.8 shows that the F-value was significant (p < 0.01) and that 
the regression explained 45% of the determinants of executive compensation. The 
Table indicates support for the following independent variables: size (p<0.01); 
CEO qualifications (p< 0.01) and CEO tenure (p<0.05) rendering support for 
hypothesis 2; 3 and 5. From the examination of Table 4.9, we can conclude that 
size has a strong, positive impact on executive pay providing a support for 
previous work, (for example, Rosen, 1982; Agarwal 1981; and Frumkin and 
Keating 2001) which suggests the size of their organisation determines executive 
compensation. To further analyse the magnitude of size effect compared with other 
independent variables, the study found that size has the largest effect on executive 
pay. This finding supports the study by Werner, Katz and Gomez-Mejia (2000) 
concluded size accounts for about 40 percent in the variation of executive pay.  
Variables SD SECTOR SIZE QUAL TENURE EXPER  DUAL 
SECTOR .337 1000      
SIZE .497 .092 1000     
CEO QUALIFICATION .727 -.198* .547*** 1000    
CEO TENURE .825 .069 .037 -.082 1000   
CEO EXPERIENCE .797 .134 .218 .008 .161* 1000  
DUAL 1.41 -.033 .515*** .520*** -.094 .023 1000 
CEOPAY .053 .030 .625*** .538*** .162* .148 .452 
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Table 4.8      
Multiple Regression Results 
Variables Beta  t- value 
(Constant) 
 -1.025    
Organisational characteristics 
  
Sector of the organisation 
.038 .496 
Size of organisation 
.394 4.056*** 
CEO characteristics 
  
CEO experience 
.024 .313 
CEO qualifications 
.282 2.933*** 
CEO Tenure 
 
CEO Duality 
.175 
.119 
2.363** 
1.317 
R Square  
Adjusted Square 
F-value 
Number of cases 
0.485 
                              0.453   
                      15.369*** 
                                 105    
 
 
Notes: Beta denotes Standardised regression coefficient of the variable in the model  
Significance Level: µ***¶µ¶µ¶means significant at p< 0.01, p< 0.05; and p< 0.1 
 levels respectively   
 
The finding that organisation size impacts on executive pay appears not surprising 
in that firm size is perceived as a proxy for organisational complexity (Agarwal, 
1981) and management of complex organisations places greater demands on the 
executive by virtue of the scope of its activities compared with smaller and simpler 
organisations. Hence executives may be rewarded for taking up difficult and 
complex jobs (Hallock, 2002). The results indicated that the sector of operation 
had no impact on executive pay, thereby supporting the first hypothesis.  
 
The result also suggests positive and significant relationship between the CEO 
qualification and &(2¶V pay (p<0.01) and renders support to hypothesis 3. This 
finding is consistent with extant research, which acknowledged that, better 
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educated CEOs lead to better organisational performance. This result supports the 
human capital theory argument, which views increased wage variation as a 
function of better education in that highly qualified and trained executives tend to 
perform well leading to higher organisation performance (Barkema and Gomez-
Mejia, 1998 and Leonard, 1990). The results also show that tenure of the CEO has 
a positive significant impact on CEO pay (p<0.05). Jobome (2006) also found 
similar results and the positive effect seem to be credible in a resource-based 
interpretation where tenure is regarded as increasing CEO proficiency on the job. 
 
The finding that CEO¶V H[SHULHQFH (proxied by CEO¶s age) has no significant 
impact on CEOs pay appears surprising in that it was expected that experience 
should be positively associated with CEO pay, however; this appears not to be the 
case. However, the results support the stewardship view that the compensation of 
altruistic managers should not be determined by their experience (Jobome, 2006). 
In sum, the three human capital measures used in this study, namely, qualification, 
tenure and experience appear to indicate no clear and unequivocal relationship 
between human capital and executive compensation in the UK charities.  
 
The findings also indicated that there was no relationship between duality and 
executive pay, rendering support to hypothesis 6. However, the result regarding 
CEO duality is not surprising and it renders support to the fundamental premise of 
stewardship theory, which maintains that CEOs in charities are good stewards of 
the organisations who are altruistic and trustworthy and can therefore, be trusted 
not to indulge in pay excesses (Jobome 2006). 
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4.9 Summary and Conclusion 
 
There has been substantial research on the determinants of CEO compensation in 
the context of profit-making organisations, yet relatively very little research exists 
on this subject on not-for profit making organisations. This study makes a 
contribution in this direction, by examining the determinants of CEO pay in the 
UK charities, which have witnessed a substantial growth since the assumption of 
power by the labour government over a decade ago. The findings suggest that 
three factors play a significant role in determining executive compensation in the 
UK charities. They are size of the organisation, the qualifications and tenure of the 
CEO. A fundamental conclusion emanating from this study indicates that 
organisation size accounts for single most crucial determinant for CEO pay in the 
UK charities compared with variables such as qualification, experience, tenure and 
CEOs duality. The results may be explained by the fact that organisation size 
represents complexity which involves a more demanding tasks, and management 
of such difficult tasks to achieve overall goals of the organisation. This requires 
people with the right education and training to meet the challenging tasks. An 
alternative explanation as to why size is the most decisive factor is the prestige 
associated with running of large organisations. The implication of this result is self 
evident indicating that size is a single decisive factor influencing CEO pay for the 
UK charities. Another conclusion to be drawn from this study is that human capital 
variables, such as  CEO qualifications and tenure  have a positive and significant 
influence on the executive compensation, CEO experience appears to have no 
significant  influence of executive pay. Another conclusion from this study is the 
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insignificance of the sector of the charity to executive pay.  Although the findings 
are at variance with the conclusions drawn by Oster (1998); Twombly and Gantz 
(2001) and Jobome (2006) that sectoral affiliation and operating in a health sector 
has a positive impact on executive pay, they support the altruistic nature of the 
sector (Frey, 1997). However, this study suggests that a better understanding of the 
relationship between the sector of firms and executive pay of charities may be 
required.  
  The results also indicated that CEO duality had no significant impact on 
executive pay. A fundamental conclusion emanating from this study indicates that 
dual leadership structures are not significantly associated with executive pay in 
charities; all of which are consistent with a pattern of the intrinsic motivation of 
charities managers. 
 
The next chapter examines the performance measures used in the UK charities. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Measures of Performance used in the UK charities 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The subject of organisational performance is a decisive yet elusive one because of 
the dilemma of how to measure performance. Different parties can assign different 
meanings to performance, and meanings can vary from customer to customer and 
from citizen to citizen (Stewart and Walsh, 1994). Researchers such as Oster, 
(1998); Speckbacher, (2003) and Hallock, (2002) argue that it is because nonprofit 
organisations are built around wide-ranging and complex missions with varied and 
diverse constituents. Belle-Rose (2002) encapsulates the above into the following 
statement:  
When one considers that nonprofit organisations activities involved in 
everything from the environmental protection, health issues, education, arts 
and economic development, it is easy to understand the difficulty. There are 
no universal bottom lines (Bell-Rose, 2002: 273). 
 
 It is well documented in the extant literature that it is difficult to define and 
operationalise what performance is (see Stewart and Walsh, 1994; Boateng and 
*ODLVWHU³7KHGLOHPPDRISHUIRUPDQFHPDQDJHPHQWLQWKHSXEOLFGRPDin 
therefore, is to secure effective performance when the meaning to be given to it 
can never be perfectly defined, and the criteria by which judgement can never be 
ILQDOO\ HVWDEOLVKHG´ 6WHZDUW DQG :DOVK  'HVSLWH WKH SUREOHPV
associated with measuring performance, Likierman, (1993) pointed out that 
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performance measures allow the charitable sector to justify its existence. To 
&RQQROO\DQG+\QGPDQ³8QOHVVSHUIRUPDQFHPHDVXUHVDUHLQSODFHLW LV
difficult for the charitable sector as a whole or for individual charities in particular 
to counter criticism for poor management and iQHIIHFWLYHQHVV´. Measuring 
performance in charitable sectors is very important to the stakeholders who often 
provide resources for such organisations to function, without demanding the 
payment of cash dividends, compared to profit making organisations. Despite the 
importance of performance measures in charities sector, the Strategy Unit report 
(2002) points out that there has been inadequate attention all over the charitable 
and non-for-profit sector on measuring and improving performance. Against this 
backdrop, it is necessary to examine measures of performance and provide an all-
inclusive picture of the key components of measures of performance in charities. 
This chapter attempts to examine measures of performance used in the UK 
charities using both interviews and survey approaches. The main research question 
of this study is: 
What measures performance in the UK charities? 
The next and final section of this chapter discusses the analytical techniques and 
the findings.  
 
5.2 Data Analysis  
To address the above research question both interview and the survey were carried 
out to obtain in-depth information regarding what measures performance in the 
UK charities. For the qualitative data from the interviews, the responses were 
classified, summarised and organised into sets of meaningful categories. The 
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researcher analysed the responses from 14 respondents and coded the responses. A 
coding system applied to each response was based on a scale of 1±3, e.g. 1 = 
Significant; 2 = Moderate and 3 = not significant (see table 5.3). For example, 
some key phrases, such as ³YHU\ LQIOXHQWLDO´ ³YHU\ LPSRUWDQW´ ³D VLJQLILFDQW
measure´³definitely´³VXEVWDQWLDO´ZHUH categorised as evidence of rating their 
SHUFHSWLRQV DV ³VLJQLILFDQFH´ ZKLOH UHVSRQGHQWV̓ comments VXFK DV ³to some 
extent´ ³VKRXOG EH´ ³LQ VRPH FDVHV´ ³SOD\ FHUWDLQ UROHV´ DUH JURXSHG DV 
³PRGHUDWH´ +RZHYHUSKUDVHVOLNH³QRWUHDOO\´³ZHGRQRWXVHWKDW´RU³LWLVQRW
DSSOLFDEOH´ZHUHJURXSHGDV³QRWVLJQLILFDQW´  Table 5.1 shows the frequency of 
performance measures used in the UK charities. 
 
Table 5.1 
Frequency of Performance Measures used in UK charities 
 
Performance Measure Significant 
No           Percentage 
Moderate 
No   
percentage 
Not Significant 
No          
percentage 
Revenue growth (4)           28.6% (5)            35.7% (5)            35.7% 
Programme Spending (12)          85.7% (0)              0% (2)            14.3% 
High level of fundraising     (8)            57.1% (2)           14.3% (4)           28.6% 
Adequate working capital     (6)            42.9% (6)           42.9% (2)            14.3% 
Quality of Product/Service    (9 )           64.3% (3)           21.4% (2)            14.3% 
Customer Satisfaction       (7)           50%   (5)           35.7% (2)            14.3% 
Community involvement (2)           14.3% (5)           35.7% (7)              50%   
Efficiency (7)            50%   (4)           28.6% (3)            21.4% 
Employee Satisfaction rates (4)          28.6%  (6)           42.9% (4)           28.6% 
Donor Sustainability                  (6)          42.9% (5)           35.7% (3)            21.4% 
&RPSHWLWRUV¶SHUIRUPDQFH (7)          50%   (5)           35.7% (2)            14.3% 
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The interview results indicate that an overwhelming majority, that is (12) about 
86% of the respondents regard µprogramme spending¶ as the most important 
performance measure. This is followed by µQuality of service¶ with (9) over 64%; 
µfundraising¶ 8 (57.1%) while (7) 50% of the participants suggest that µefficiency¶ 
and µcustomer satisfaction¶ and µFRPSHWLWRUV¶ SHUIRUPDQFH¶ are also key 
performance measures, (6), about 43% of the respondents used µdonor 
sustainability¶ and µadequate working capital¶ as important performance measures 
and (4) 28.6% used µemployee satisfaction rates¶ and µrevenue growth¶ as 
performance measures. Only (2) 14.3% used µcommunity involvement¶ as a 
criterion to measure performance.    
For the survey, the respondents were questioned about their opinions on different 
performance measures used by charities in the UK. Respondents assessed 23 
performance measures perceived to be crucial to performance objectives of the 
charitable organisations on a 5 point Likert-type scale (1 = ³QRWDWDOOLPSRUWDQW´
= ³YHU\ LPSRUWDQW´ Cronbach¶s Alpha for each of the factors ranged from 0.928 
to 0.933 which is well above the threshold of 0.70 suggested by Hair et al, 1998. 
(Please see Appendix 5). The performance measures used by the UK charities 
were tested by considering differences in means of the relative importance of the 
measures. Given the fairly large sample size, it was reasonable to assume that the 
sample is from a normal distribution and therefore Friedman two-way Anova test 
was therefore implemented.  
 
Table 5.2 shows the rank order of factors used to measure performance in the UK 
charities, based on a mean measure of the importance of 23 factors. Scores are 
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significantly different on the Friedman two-way Anova test (p < 0.001). For the 23 
performance measures, the median value of 3 is exceeded by 15 criteria being the 
most important ones. However, it is important to point out all the measures were 
statistically significant (p<0.01).  
  
Table 5.2: Relative Importance of Performance Measures in UK Charities 
Rank Performance Measures  Mean SD 
1 Programme spending 4.95 0.50 
2 Quality of product/service 3.90 0.83 
3 Customer satisfaction  3.80 1.01 
=4 High level of fundraising 3.70 0.90 
=4 Accountability 3.70 0.94 
6 Output 3.59 0.94 
7 Efficiency. 3.54 0.94 
8 &RPSHWLWRUV¶SHUIRUPDQFH 3.51 0.96 
9 Board involvement           3.46 0.92 
10 Revenue growth                   3.43 0.98 
11 Diversification of revenue sources 3.39 0.81 
12 Donor sustainability 3.33 1.01 
13 Percentage of earned income 3.18 0.83 
14 Adequate working capital 3.13 0.90 
15 Employee satisfaction 3.01 0.90 
16 Investments performance 2.98 0.89 
17 Employee turnover rates               2.97 0.90 
18 Improve skills (number of people trained) 2.95 0.95 
19 Community involvement 2.87 1.01 
20 Job Creation 2.78 0.92 
21 Technology competency ratings 2.58 0.97 
22 Percentage of board members as donors      2.32 1.00 
23 Board meeting attendance 2.30 0.92 
Notes:  N= 105;  
The mean is the average RQDVFDOHRI µQRWimportant DWDOO¶WR µYHU\important¶ 
SD = Standard Deviation 
Scores are significantly different on the Friedman two-way Anova test ( p < 0.001). 
 
The highest ranked performance measures are: programme spending (4.95), 
quality of product/service (3.90), customer satisfaction (3.80), high level of 
fundraising (3.70), accountability (3.70), Output (3.59), efficiency (3.54), 
FRPSHWLWRUV¶ SHUIRUPDQFH  board involvement (3.46), revenue growth 
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(3.43), diversification of revenue sources (3.39), donor sustainability (3.33), 
percentage income earned (3.18), adequate working capital (3.13) and employee 
satisfaction (3.01). It is clear from the Table that, most of the performance 
measures found from the survey correlated with the interview results confirming 
the measures are important for measuring performance in the UK charities. The 
findings in Tables largely conform to most important measures of performance 
identified in the literature. All the measures were perceived to be significant in 
measuring performance in the UK charities. The measures include both internal 
and external measures; financial and non-financial measures. 
 
5.3 Discussion of Results 
It is also apparent from the table that the three highest ranked performance 
measures which are programme spending, quality of product/service, customer 
satisfaction, high level of fundraising, accountability, Output and efficiency are 
concerned with the effective provision of services which are directly linked to the 
main purpose and objectives of the charity. It is therefore, not surprising that the 
performance measures that are ranked high are mainly concerned about the 
VHFWRU¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHVRFLDOZHOO-being of its beneficiary and client groups. 
 
The results suggest that programme spending and quality of product/service are 
ranked as important performance measures in charities using both survey and 
interview approaches. The finding suggests that the charity is spending its 
resources on activities directly linked to the achievement of the organisational 
mission, thus making it a credible performance measure. Other researchers, for 
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example, Baber et al, (2002); Gold, (1993); Hardman, (1993); Schuman, (1993); 
Smith; (1993) also pointed out that the ratio of programme expense to income (or 
the percentage of programme expense to total expenditure) is a performance 
measure used in charities.  The above was also emphasised by the interviewees. 
Asked why programme spending is regarded as a significant performance measure 
one participanW VDLG ³2IFRXUVH LW LVE\VSHQGLQJRQDFWLYLWLHV WKDWKHOSDFKLHYH
the mission of the organisation; we clearly demonstrate our commitment to the 
cause of this organisation. Therefore, we have trust from the external agencies that 
our other decisions are not self-VHHNLQJ´ 6DUJHDQW¶V  REVHUYDWLRQ WKDW DV
competition for funds has heightened among charities, donors regard organisations 
which spend a large proportion of their donations on the fundamental programmes 
are considered as better performers. The interviewees from a religious charity 
FRQFXUDQGSRLQWHGRXWWKDW³:HE\DOOPHDQVWU\WRHQVXUHWhat we spend a large 
chunk of donations from our donors to the main cause of our mission, and by so 
doing we assure them we are being faithful stewards RI WKH PRQH\ WKH\ JLYH´
*ODVHU¶V  S confirms these findings in his study and reports that the 
YDULDEOH ³DGHTXDWH DPRXQW VSHQW SHU SURJUDPPH´ ZDV FLWHG DV WKH VHFRQG PRVW
vital factor in a decision to donate.   
 
Another valuable measure of performance used by the UK charities is quality of 
service. Most charities shared and recognised this view as key to their success in 
attracting and keeping both customers and donors. In explaining the relevance of 
quality of service as a performance measure, one interviewee said,  
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There is now a tendency by most of the public organisations to measure 
performance by outputs, which is the amount of µDFWLYLWLHV¶ IRU LQVWDQFH 
number of people served or a pupil attendance at school. While these just 
tell us something has happened, they do not show whether it successfully 
achieved its intended goal, or whether the clients had a satisfactory 
experience. 
 
This is consistent with the views by Belle- Rose (2002) who cautions that, where 
the measure for performance is outputs, nonprofit managers may be tempted to 
target clients they can reach easily and with the lowest individual cost instead of 
the neediest clients with the highest cost per individual. Although the former 
strategy may prove to be profitable, the latter may produce high social returns. The 
extant literature also provides some support for quality of service as a significant 
performance measure in the UK charities. For example, The 8.¶V 4XDOLW\ 
Standards Task Group (QSTG) has seen the adoption and implementation of 
quality systems by the voluntary sector as a better way of demonstrating to 
stakeholders their organisational effectiveness and the standard of their services 
(Cairns, et al 2005; Barclay and Abdy, 2001; Johnson et al, 1998). As a result, in 
most of the UK, the voluntary and community sector adopted the quality system as 
a result of increasing pressure from funders and governmental purchasers of 
services. However, for other nonprofit organisations, it was a proactive action 
taken in anticipation of future pressure and to maintain integrity and authenticity 
as well as to demonstrate how accountable they are to a diversity of stakeholders. 
(Cairns et al, 2005). However, despite the perceived benefits of quality of service 
as a measure, it is not surprising that still some charities are finding it challenging 
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to implement the idea.  )RU LQVWDQFH RQH UHVSRQGHQW FRPPHQWHG ³:HOO
measuring quality is not as easy as it sounds. The problem is different aspects of 
quality matter to different people at different times, so to reconcile that is no easy 
task. Our main concern is to develop reasonable measures that approximate what 
we are trying to achieve´.  
 
The results also suggest that customer satisfaction is among top ranked measures 
of performance. This finding is consistent with the observation made by Chrisman, 
Hoy, and Robinson (1987); Chrisman and Katrishen (1994) who pointed out that 
customer satisfaction is a primary indication of organisational effectiveness. Most 
of the respondents highlight the importance of knowing the needs and expectations 
of the customers, because meeting them, would not only lead to more satisfied 
customers, but, essentially, resulted in the provision of services more efficiently 
and effectively.  
 
Another intriguing finding is the level of fund raising. About 60 percent of the 
respondents views high level of fundraising as a key performance measure used by 
UK charities. This finding appears consistent with the views of (Frumkin and 
Keating 2001); they suggest that, as a proxy for mission fulfilment, fundraising 
results provide a simple measurement metric that is straightforward to follow 
yearly. The ability to raise huge funds is also often regarded as an indication of the 
effectiveness of the organisation. Most interviewees agree that raising vast 
amounts of funds give them the flexibility to spend on the programmes required to 
fulfil their mission. It is, however, worth noting that some interviewees who 
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suggest that fundraising is not a significant performance measure at all but for 
decidedly different reasons. One participant gave the following response: 
We have a stable funding base already, and we do not rely on the funds we 
raise to survive. We therefore, do not measure our performance by how 
much fund we raise, but the issue rather, is on how we spend the funds that 
we have by the end of the each year.    
Yet DQRWKHUUHVSRQGHQWVDLG ³$VPXFKDVZHXVHWKHIXQGVZHUDLVHWRDFKLHYH
our goals, we, however, do not regard fundraising as a measure of effectiveness, 
but rather DVDPHDQVDFKLHYHHIIHFWLYHQHVV´ 
The study finds efficiency as an important measure of performance. In this study, 
WKH WHUP µHIILFLHQF\¶ was not used as a ratio of outputs to inputs, but as a 
perception of smoothly, coordinated working practices and effectively organised 
processes (Mistry, 2007). Most interviewees suggest that being efficient means; 
short waiting time by clients, VZLIW UHVSRQVH WR OHWWHUVDQGTXHULHVVWDII¶Vproper 
preparation and communication skills as well as the regularity of feedback after 
receiving services. Another director said their clients made reference to the same 
internal processes, when describing how the quality of service delivery and these 
elements fed into the fostering of a sterling reputation, which enhanced satisfaction 
on the part of the recipient. Another interviewee said;  
We used to get lots of complains from our customers for lack of efficiency. 
The reason was we were short of staff due to limited financial resources. 
Now that we know how much that means to our clients, and we strive to 
raise more funds as well as getting volunteers to fill in the gaps, so we can 
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FXWRXUFOLHQWV¶ZDLWLQJ WLPHV. So we measure how well we are doing by 
the efficiency of our staff.  
It is also apparent from table 5.2 WKDWFRPSHWLWRUV¶ performance (benchmarking) is 
also a relevant performance measure in charities. Gamble, (2008) defines 
benchmarking as a way of µFRPSDULQJ SHUIRUPDQFH DQG practice to learn and 
LPSURYH¶ It was not surprising that 50 percent of interviewees agreed that they 
used benchmarking as a measure of performance. This is consistent with Gamble, 
¶V VXUYH\ ILQGLQJV RI 8. FKDULWLHV ZKLFK UHSRUWHG WKDW the use of 
benchmarking as a performance measure within the sector is still minimal, after 
only a quarter of his survey respondents asserted that they were using it for 
performance improvement. In this study, some of the directors interviewed 
highlighted they benchmark themselves with similar organisations  in areas like 
personnel staffing, retention, composition of the employees including diversity 
issues, appraisal and salary strategy, governance processes, to mention a few, 
some of which have also been highlighted by Gamble, (2008). One CEO 
commented that benchmarking is increasingly becoming a critical performance 
measure as it helped the organisations to have the reassurance about what they are 
doing well, as well as helping in determining course of action and in setting 
pragmatic goals, and gaining insights into ethical practice.  
 
It is hardly surprising that most interviews chose donor as a crucial measure of 
performance in the UK charities. According to Krishnan, Yetman and Yetman 
(2006) donors have an implicit contract with nonprofit organisations in that donors 
provide funding in exchange for better services for recipients. Accounting 
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information can assist donors monitor and evaluate whether the nonprofit 
organisations is using their contributions efficiently and effectively to achieve the 
organisational mission. Therefore, if a charity can sustain its donors, it indicates 
WKDW WKHGRQRUV¶ DSSURYDORIXVHRI WKHLUGRQDWLRQV Given the fact that Sargeant 
and Jay, (2004) observe that due to economic recession, giving in nonprofit 
organisations has decreased, yet competition has increased, and donor audiences 
and expectations have changed. Therefore, organisations need to work extremely 
hard to solicit and maintain the levels of support. This study assumes that charities 
will do their utmost to continue to appeal to their donors. 
 
The few charities that cited that they used revenue growth as performance 
measures explained that they did other trading activities within their organisations 
to raise funds, instead of wholly relying on fundraising and donations. Therefore, 
revenue growth was tremendously vital to them. Also, community involvement 
was not used by many as a performance measure. However, those who used it 
stated that they relied more on volunteers, therefore, the more they got people 
from the community to volunteer the more they got the assurance that their 
services were appealing to the community. It is, however, worth noting that 
exceedingly few studies have previous used these as measures of performance.  
In sum, as expected, the results indicated that charities in the UK use both 
financial and non financial measures of performance thereby supporting views by 
researchers like Jobome 2006; Cameron, 1981, 1982; Connolly, Conlon, and 
Deutsch, 1980; Stewart and Walsh, 1994 and Sowa et al 2004). They advocated 
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that a range of measures is most suited in nonprofit organisations to cope with the 
multidimensional nature of public service. It was, however, surprising that 
µOHDUQLQJLQQRYDWLRQ¶RQHRIWKHPHDVXUHVGHSLFWHGRQWKH%6&ZDVQRWSRSXODUO\
used as a measure of performance. All the interviewed charities did not consider 
the aspects of learning and innovation as pertinent performance measures.  
 
The performance measures used by the UK integrates both financial and non-
financial measures as encapsulated in management models such as balanced 
scorecard (BSC) developed by Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1993, 1996a, 1996b). 
This study classified the performance measures using all the four components of 
the balanced scorecard thereby confirming that BSC who was originally developed 
for profit-making organisations are also applicable for non-profit making 
organisations. In addition, benchmarking was found to be an important 
performance for charities in the UK. The finding that BSC constitutes an important 
performance measure is significant in that BSC provides a more holistic approach 
to organisational performance. It thus extends the usual essence of performance 
measurement in finance and accounting literature beyond financial performance, 
thereby providing a combination of financial and non financial measures that 
subject administration and employees operations on accomplishing the 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V mission and values. Benchmarking is regarded pivotal particularly 
in nonprofit organisations because researchers (e.g. %HOLYHDX2¶5HLOO\DQG:DGH
 2¶5HLOO\ 0DLQ DQG &U\VWal, 1988) purport that performance strategies in 
nonprofit organisations are based on a process of social comparison or 
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benchmarking against rival firms. It also supports the social comparison and equity 
theory.  
 
The results in respect of performance measures are therefore summarised as 
follows in the framework below. Overall, the measures include internal and 
external, financial and non-financial measures. 
 
Figure 5.1 Framework for Performance Measurement in charities 
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5.4 Summary and Conclusions 
As the measurement of performance continues to plague empirical work in 
nonprofit organisations, this study has sought to shed light on the performance 
measures used by the UK charities. Furthermore, this study also extends the 
quantitative studies that have attempted to provide an in-depth knowledge on 
performance measures in the UK charities by the use of interviews. The findings 
suggest that four of the five performance measures categories used in this study 
which are, financial performance indicators, the measures of customer satisfaction; 
the internal business and benchmarking are widely used in UK charities. However, 
Learning and innovation is also valuable measure of performance in the UK 
charities. The conclusion emanating from the study is that, although benchmarking 
does not appear on the BSC, the results have shown that it is a significant 
performance measure in charities. Another important conclusion emanating from 
this study indicates that the performance measures directly linked to charity's main 
purpose or objectives such as programme activities, efficiency, customer 
satisfaction quality of service and fundraising ranked in the top. It is, however, 
apparent that most organisations seem to be conscious of how stakeholders are 
likely to judge performance in their organisation, and this influences them to a 
certain extent to choose their performance measures to suit WKH VWDNHKROGHUV¶ 
expectations (sometimes unknowingly).  
The implication here is that, the financial measures of performance that have 
traditionally dominated previous study need to be complemented with non 
financial measures, when it comes to measuring performance in nonprofit 
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organisations.  It is also evident that the same performance measures cannot be 
generalised across the charities because of their wide ranging and complex 
missions with varied and diverse constituents (Oster, 1998; Speckbacher, 2003; 
Hallock, 2002). Although the approach taken in this study has not provided 
decisive answers to this issue, it has illuminated new avenues for academics and 
practitioners to investigate this crucial and enduring subject. 
The next examines WKHPDQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQRQ the impact of board structure and 
governance on performance measures identified in this chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
0DQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWion on the Factors Influencing Performance in 
the UK Charities  
 
6.1 Introduction: 
 
The connection between governance structure of a firm, executive compensation 
and performance has been extensively studied over the past two decades. 
However, the bulk of these studies are in the context of profit making firms with 
relatively little attention being given to the nonprofit sector and charities (Bensen 
and Hornsby, 2002; Gomez-Mejia and Balkan, 1992; Unite, Sullivan, Brookman, 
Majadillas and Taningco, 2008). The disproportionate concentration of studies on 
profit making firms stems from the fact that agency problem appears to be more 
severe for these firms due to the economic relationship between executive pay and 
performance, ownership structure and the goal of maximising the wealth of 
shareholders as reflected in share prices (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Unite et al, 
2008). For example, Jensen and Murphy (1990) pointed out that, with profit 
making firms, the goal of true measure of performance is increasing shareholder 
value i.e. measuring firm market value of the firm.  
 
By contrast, Voluntary sector or charities are built around wide ranging and 
complex missions with varied and diverse constituents (Oster, 1998; Speckbacher, 
2003; Hallock, 2002). As a result, it is argued that organisational performance of 
nonprofit making organisations is not reducible to a single performance measure 
(Herman and Renz, 1999; Jobome, 2006). Frumkin and Keating (2001) echo 
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similar views and put forward the three main reasons why performance 
measurement in nonprofit organisations may be difficult. 
³First, there is no owner with an equity stake in nonprofit within the 
organisation demanding or requiring measurement. Second, there are no 
bottom lines of profitability or easily quantifiable outcomes that can be 
used as a benchmark, only the far more ambiguous notion of mission 
accomplishment. Third, the diffuse nature of ownership and stake holding 
in the nonprofit sector raises the additional problem of building an 
accountability system that is consistent and meaningful across the sector 
(Frumkin and Keating 2001:9).  
Yet prior studies in respect of performance of nonprofit organisations (See 
Frumkin and Keating, 2001 and 2004; Hallock, 2002; Brickley and Van Horn, 
2002) have used only financial measures to analyse performance although these 
organisations may be striving to create something much different from returns to 
shareholders. For example, Weisbrod and Schlesinger (1986) suggested that the 
use of profit-based performance measures as opposed to the quality of care, to 
measure the performance of a manager of a nursing home may be an incentive to 
provide lower quality of care to the residents. This raises a question of how 
performance is measured in charitable organisations. 
 
Another important motivation for this study is that prior studies have shown that 
well-performing boards usually coincide with well-performing organisations 
(Herman and Renz, 2000). However, while the link between board effectiveness 
and corporate performance has been explained through agency theory and resource-
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based theory, their applicability to charities remains unclear (Coombes et al., 2011). 
Ostrower and Stone (2006) point out that the lack of studies linking board 
characteristics with the performance of non-profit organisations has been identified 
as a research gap that needs to be filled. To understand the role of non-profit boards 
and their link to performance, the study utilises three theoretical perspectives, 
namely, agency, stewardship and resource-based theories, to examine the 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHERDUG¶VFKDUDFWHULVWLFVDQGWKHRUJDQisDWLRQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFH
for a group of UK charities.  
 
The researcher in this study believes that a more promising line of measuring 
performance in nonprofit making organisations should include the use both 
financial and non-financial measures of performance. The performance measure 
which integrate both financial and non-financial measures is encapsulated in 
management models such as balanced scorecard (BSC) developed by Kaplan and 
Norton (1992, 1996). This study departs from previous studies by using balance 
scorecard to assess the performance of the UK charities. This is significant in that 
BSC provides a more holistic approach to organisational performance, and thus, 
extends the conventional focus of performance measurement in finance and 
accounting literature beyond financial performance. It therefore, provides a blend 
of financial and non financial measures that focus management and staff activity 
RQDFKLHYLQJWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V mission and values.  
 
A number of researchers such as Niven, 2003; Trussel and Bitner, 2001 have 
suggested that BSC can be used for nonprofit organisations because it explicitly 
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captures non financial performance measures. The BSC views organisational 
performance from four perspectives which encompasses i) financial - measuring 
various financial performance indicators of primary interest to shareholders; ii) the 
customer - comprising measures of customer satisfaction; iii) the internal business 
process which measures internal efficiency and quality; and iv) the learning and 
growth ZKLFK DWWHPSWV WR PHDVXUH WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V capability to acclimatise to 
changes required by a turbulent environment. This study uses all the four 
components of the balanced scorecard. The study extends the performance 
measures by adding benchmarking which is an important performance metric for 
charities. This study asks WKH RSLQLRQV RI &KDULWLHV¶ PDQDJHUV whether board 
characteristics and CEO pay impact the performance of the UK charities.  
 
The rest of the chapter is structured along the following lines. The next section 
presents hypotheses of the study. Following that is the findings of the study. The 
last section provides a summary of the conclusion of the study. 
 
 
6.2 Hypotheses Development:  
6.2.1 Board Size and Organisational Performance:  
A number of studies have suggested that large boards are better for corporate 
performance because they bring into the organisation a range of expertise to help 
make better decisions, and make it harder for a powerful CEO to dominate 
(Kyereboah-Coleman and Nicholas Biekpe, 2005; Haleblian and Finkelstein 
1993). The view is consistent with the resource dependency theory which suggests 
that companies are better off with large boards in that large board membership are 
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likely to provide the firm with greater expertise and access to resources (Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). The positive impact of board size on performance has a support 
from researchers such as Mak and Li, 2001; Adams and Mehran, 2005. A meta-
analysis based on 131 studies by Dalton and Dalton (2005) reported that large 
boards have significant correlation with higher firm performance. On the other 
hand, researchers such as Jensen, 1993; and Lipton and Lorsch 1992) suggest that 
large boards are difficult, costly to co-ordinate and in some cases may inflict 
managerial conflicts thereby exerting negative effect on performance. Lipton and 
Lorch (1992) further argue that, agency problems may increase, when boards have 
several members, as some directors may follow along as free-riders and hence 
poor performance. For example, Yermack, (1996) found small boards to be more 
effective in large US corporations. Mak and Yuanto, 2003; Sanda et al, 2003 
obtained similar findings indicating that, firm performance is positively related 
with small, as opposed to large boards. Jensen (1993: 865) points out that, ³When 
boards get beyond seven or eight people they are less likely to function effectively 
and are easier for the CEO to coQWURO´ and rendering support for small board-
performance relationship. These findings are in the context of profit making 
organisation.  
 
In the context of NPOs, DeFond, Haan and Hu, 2000, and Fich, 2005, argue that 
size may not be important when it comes to performance but rather that it is the 
expertise of the board members that matters. In a recent study, Andres-Alonso et 
al. (2010) find no direct relationship between board size and a foundation¶V
efficiency. This study argues WKDW132¶VERDUGVSHUIRUPFomplex sets of activities 
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aside from the monitoring role due to the diverse nature of the stakeholders 
associated with these organisations. Large boards are beneficial because they bring 
in resources through networking, fundraising and providing expertise for decision 
making. However, large boards may lead to co-ordination problems because of the 
lack of resources in NPOs. Despite these arguments, there is no conclusive 
HYLGHQFH UHJDUGLQJ KRZ ERDUG VL]H LQIOXHQFHV DQ RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V HIILFLHQF\ 
(Andres-Alonso et al., 2010). On the balance, the study expects that the size of the 
board exerts a positive influence on an NPOs performance. The study therefore 
hypothesises the following: 
H1: The board size is positively related to the performance of the UK charities 
 
 
6.2.2 Board Independents and Organisational Performance: 
Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010) suggest that an increase in the number of 
outsiders on the board is viewed with scepticism. It has been acknowledged, at 
least theoretically, that the effectiveness of outside directors is limited by their 
inferior information regarding company activities as compared to corporate 
insiders. In addition, the contention that outside directors cannot effectively 
monitor and control agency problems has been central to corporate finance 
research for decades (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993). Another important 
argument put forward by the critics of outside directors is that outside directors 
may ³owe their position to management" and thus may not be as independent as 
assumed (Hart, 1995). For example, according to the Higgs Report (2003), a high 
level of informality surrounds the process of appointing outside directors. 
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According to the report, almost half of the non-executive directors surveyed for 
the report were recruited to their role through personal contacts or friendships; 
only 4% had a formal interview, and only 1% obtained the job through answering 
an advertisement. Among the studies which investigated the relationship between 
the proportion of outside directors on the corporate board and firm performance, 
Yermack (1996) reports a significant negative correlation between the proportion 
of independent directors and the contemporaneous Tobin's q. Forsberg (1989) 
found no relationship between the proportion of outside directors and various 
performance measures. However, Pearce and Zahra, 1992, and Millstein and 
MacAvoy, 1998, document a positive correlation between the proportion of 
outside GLUHFWRUV DQG WKH ILUP¶V ILQDQFLDO SHUIRUPDQFH 'DOWRQ 'DLO\ (OOVWUDQG
and Johnson (1998) cover the area well in their meta-analysis study, which 
included 159 studies covering 40,160 companies over more than 40 years. They 
concluded that empirical work in this area does not provide consistent guidance on 
the relationship between company performance and board independence. Despite 
the empirical controversy surrounding the relationship between board composition 
and performance, no study has explicitly investigated the relationship in the 
context of UK charities, and most studies have concentrated on for-profit 
organisations. Following the arguments advanced for profit making organisations, 
the study hypothesises the following: 
H2: %RDUG LQGHSHQGHQFH LV SRVLWLYHO\ UHODWHG WR WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V RYHUDOO 
performance. 
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6.2.3 Gender and Organisational Performance:  
There has been an increasing focus on the gender as board members of firms 
during the past decade. It is argued that board diversity is potentially positively 
related to firm performance (Smith et al 2006). This view is consistent with Higgs 
(2003) in the UK in which it is argued that diversity could improve board 
effectiveness and recommends that firms should appoint more female professional 
as directors to their boards. While men continue to occupy most seats on the 
corporate board (Catalyst, 1998), researchers propose numerous reasons for 
LQFOXGLQJ ZRPHQ RQ DQ RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V ERDUG RI GLUHFWRUV )RU H[DPSOH DV
advocated by the resource dependency theory, increased variety of board members 
may bring a greater wealth of expertise, knowledge and information for the board 
WRXVHLQWKHLURSHUDWLRQVWRUHSUHVHQWVKDUHKROGHUV¶LQWHUHVWVDQGLPSURYLQJILUP
performance (Burgess and Tharenou, 2002; Hillman, Canella and Harris, 2002). 
Catalyst (2004) and Adler (2001) find positive cRUUHODWLRQV EHWZHHQ µIHPDOH-
IULHQGO\¶ 86)RUWXQH ILUPV DQG WKHSHUIRUPDQFHRI WKHVH ILUPV&DUWHU HW DO
(2003) also find a significantly positive effect of the proportion of women and 
minorities on boards of directors and organisational worth after controlling for a 
number of other factors which may influence organisational worth. 
 
On the other hand, a number of researchers such as Kochan et al (2003) find no 
positive association between gender diversity in management and organisational 
performance for US corporations. Specifically, Bradshaw, Murray and Wolpin 
(1992) investigated the increased percentage of women on the board and found no 
association between women on the board and performance. Henrekson (2000) 
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found that women on the board seem to under-perform in the study of firm 
performance of Swedish firms. Siciliano (1996) also found a negative association 
between a higher percentage of women on the board and the level of donations 
received by the organisation, but the ability of the organisation to fulfil the 
organisation mission was enhanced by equal representation of both sexes on the 
board. The findings from previous researches seem to provide no conclusive 
support for the major contentions of the resource dependency theory (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989; Dalton, Daily, Crete, and Roengpitya, 2003).  
 
The above mixed results are in the context of profit-making organisations, but 
considering that this study focuses on charities, gender diversity should have no 
significant impact on performance, given altruistic ethos of nonprofit 
organisations, which is consistent with the stewardship view. Therefore, the study 
hypothesises the following: 
H3: There is no relationship between the gender of directors on the board and the 
performance of the UK charities. 
 
 
6.2.4 CEO Duality and Organisational Performance: 
The relationship between CEO duality and firm performance has been widely 
researched, primarily in for-profit organisations, but the empirical results have 
been mixed (Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Rhoades et al., 2001; Kang and 
Zardkoohi, 2005; Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma, 1985). At one end of the 
spectrum, it is argued that CEO duality leads to the concentration of power in the 
hands of one person; WKHUHE\ UHQGHULQJ WKH ERDUG¶V PRQLWRULQJ UROH LQHIIHFWLYH
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(Mallette and Fowler, 1992). The argument that duality restricts board 
independence and diminishes the possibility that the board can properly implement 
its oversight and governance roles has been supported by a number of authors such 
as Fizel and Louie, 1990, and Dobnynski, 1991. This argument is consistent with 
agency theory because duality promotes CEO entrenchment by reducing board 
monitoring and effectiveness. Fama and Jensen (1983) reinforce this point and 
assert that duality is an indication that decision management and control have not 
been separated, making it difficult for insecure directors to be honest when 
evaluating firm performance. This lack of honesty, in turn, leads to long-term 
organisational drift (Carver, 1990).  
On the other hand, researchers such as Stoeberl and Sherony, 1985, and Anderson 
and Anthony, 1986, argue that duality leads to superior firm performance as it 
allows precise leadership for the purposes of strategy formulation and 
implementation, which should result in better organisational performance. 
)LQNHOVWHLQ DQG '¶$YHQL  point out that that duality removes any internal 
DQG H[WHUQDO DPELJXLW\ UHJDUGLQJ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU WKH ILUP¶V SURFHVVHV DQG
outcomes. The study therefore hypothesised the following:   
H 4: CEO duality is positively related to the performance of the UK charities. 
 
6.2.5 CEO Pay and Performance:  
To implement strategic human resources management and create a competitive 
advantage for human resources, it is necessary to conceptualise and implement an 
appropriate compensation system (Milkovich and Newman, 1996). CEOs, just like 
any other salaried personnel in a firm, can be motivated to accomplish specific 
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performance objectives through the use of compensation systems (Gomez-Mejia, 
1994; Roussel and Trepo, 1996). If compensation in non-profit organisations is 
perceived to be low, high-level expertise is more likely to move to a for-profit firm 
for the obvious reason that undercapitalised NPOs can rarely offer a salary 
comparable to what large for-profit corporations can pay (Goddeeris, 1988). As a 
result this may have negative implications for performance. 
On the other hand, Mason (1996) argues that NPOs often operate in non-
competitive environments, benefitting from tax exemption and charitable 
contributions; it would be highly controversial if they were able to pay managers 
salaries that rival those in for-profit businesses. It would not only undermine 
public trust but could also lead to a tendency to divert funds to pay compensation 
at the expense of fulfilling WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶ PLVVLRQ )UXPNLQ DQG .HDWLQJ, 
2001). High levels of compensation defeat the principles upon which these 
organisations are based. For example, researchers such as Hansmann (1980) and 
Jobome (2006) contend that before any attempt to increase pay levels in these 
organisations, the specific organisational and motivational issues which have been 
the bedrock of the organisation and other important characteristics, such as 
altruism, that are associated with the managers working for such organisations 
must be considered. For the above reasons, the study expects that CEOs working 
for charities are likely to be motivated by altruism. The following is therefore 
hypothesised:  
H5: CEO pay is negatively related to the performance of the UK charities 
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6.3 Data Analysis: 
To examine the hypothesised relationship, correlation coefficients were computed 
first, and then multiple regression analysis was further employed to assess the 
relationship between board characteristics, executive compensation and firm 
performance.  
 
 6.4 Dependable Variables: 
Table 6.1 shows how the dependent variables were measured. The dependent 
variables are composed of 23 performance measures identified as important to the 
performance objectives of charities. An attempt was made to produce a 
parsimonious set of distinct, non-overlapping financial and non-financial 
performance measures by means of exploratory factor analysis. The analysis 
yielded the following five factors: The Financial Perspective, measuring various 
financial performance indicators; The Customer Perspective, comprising measures 
of customer/user satisfaction; The Internal Business, which measures internal 
efficiency and quality; The Innovation and Learning Perspective, which attempts 
WRPHDVXUH WKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VDELlity to adapt to changes required by a changing 
environment and Benchmarking, which is the process of comparing the 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V RSHUDWLRQV and performances to those of similar organisations 
(Trussel and Bitner, 2001). Overall, the factors explained 71.6 percent of the 
performance measures. In terms of the overall performance measure, the study 
used a composite index (an arithmetic average score) consistent with the measures 
used by Boateng and Glaister, 2002. Cronbach¶V Alpha for each of the factors 
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ranged from 0.928 to 0.933, which is well above the threshold of 0.70 suggested 
by Hair et al., 1998. Five fundamental factors resulted from the factor analysis and 
are summarised in Table 6.1. 
 
 
Table 6.1  
Factor Analysis on performance measures  
Factors  Factor 
Loads 
Eigen values % of Variance 
Explained 
Cumulative 
% 
&URQEDFK¶V 
Alpha 
1. Financial Perspective                   
 
8.313 36.143 36.143 0.931 
Revenue growth 0.82  
  
0.934 
Percentage of earned income 0.72  
  
0.932 
Diversification of revenue sources 0.62  
  
0.932 
Cost efficiencies 0.53  
  
0.932 
High level of fundraising     0.84  
  
0.933 
Adequate working capital     0.88  
  
0.930 
2.Customer Perspective  3.431 14.917 51.059 0.928 
Quality of Product/Service    0.90    0.932 
Customer Satisfaction       0.70    0.930 
Accountability 0.81    0.930 
Community involvement 0.55    0.930 
Percentage of board members as 
donors      
0.75    0.932 
3. The internal Business   2.570 11.174 62.233 0.928 
Employee Satisfaction rates 0.57    0.928 
Output 0.82    0.929 
Donor Sustainability                          0.83    0.931 
Board involvement           0.76    0.930 
Board meeting attendance 0.67    0.931 
Labour  turnover rates               0.62  
  
0.929 
4. Innovation & Learning   1.143 4.970 67.203 0.929 
Technology competency ratings 0.82  
  
0.931 
Improve skills (number of people 
trained) 
0.56  
  
0.930 
5. Benchmarking  1.030 4.479 71.682 0.930 
&RPSHWLWRUV¶performance     0.64 
   
0.931 
&RPSHWLWRUV¶Investments 
performance 
0.68 
   
0.932 
Principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation. 
K-M-O Measure of Sampling Adequacy = 0.830 
Bartlett Test of Sphericity = 1692.300 (p <0.01). 
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The manner in which the independent variables are measured is shown in Table 
6.2. 
 
 
 
Table: 6.2 
 
Measurement of Independent Variables 
 
 
Variable  Measurement  
`Board Size (SIZBD) 
 
We measured board size by the number of directors on the 
board of trustees. Small board (1- 8 members). 
Big board (over 8 members (Jensen , 1993; Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992) 
 
Board Independence 
(BINDR) 
 
Gender 
 
 
Represented by the percentage of outside directors ( non-
officers of the charity) 
 
Female = 1, Male =2 
&(2¶V'XDOLW\ 
(DUALITY) 
 
 
CEOPAY  
 
Size of Charity 
 
 
SECTOR 
A dummy variable to indicate whether CEO is also the board 
chairman = 0; otherwise =1 (Lomsch and MacIver, 1989; 
Fizel and Louie, 1990) 
 
 &(2¶VDQQXDO base salary only over 12 months. 
 
Number of employees; Up to 250 = Small; Above 250 = 
Large. 
 
 Measured according to the proportion of sectoral distribution: 
1=Health; 2= Social services & relief; 3= Education; 4= 
Religious charities; 5=Art & Culture; 6= Others 
 
 
6.5 Control variables: 
 The study controls for the size and the sector of the organisations, as prior 
literature suggest size and VHFWRUV KDYH D SRVLWLYH LQIOXHQFH RQ WKH ILUP¶V
performance (see Frumkin, 2002; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). 
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6.6 Results and Discussion: 
 
Table 6.3 shows a summary of the means and standard deviations as well as the 
correlation matrix for the independent and the dependent variables. Correlations 
between the variables are low with the exception of CEO duality, which produced 
the highest at 0.574. As a check, we carried out variance inflation factor tests. All 
of the condition indices are below 10, indicating that there are no serious problems 
with multicollinearity (Hair et.al., 1998). Bivariate relationships shown in Table 
6.3 indicate support for the following independent variables: board size (p< 0.01); 
board independence (p< 0.05); and sector (p<0.05). However, CEO pay is 
negatively correlated at p< 0.01.  
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Table 6.3:   
       
Summary Statistics and Pearson Correlation Matrix of Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
Variables MEAN SD A B C D E F G H I J K L M 
A. SIZBD 
 
.7429 .43916 1000             
B. GENDER 
 
1.4381 .49853 -.227** 1.000            
C. CEOPAY 
 
.5238 .50138 .289*** -.162* 1.000           
D. DUALITY 
 
3.1619 1.41506 .222** -.129 .574*** 1.000          
E. BINDR 
 
2.9238 1.19049 .164* -.057 .113 .184* 1.000         
F. SECTOR 
 
5.6000         3.3729 .138 .031 -.061 -.033 .131 1.000        
G. SIZE  
 
.4286 .4725 .377*** .260*** .404** .515** .121 .092 1.000       
H. FINANCE  
 
3.3810 .71377 .223** 
 
.049 
 
-.282** -.084 .268** -.003 -.203*** 
 
1.000      
I. CUSTOMER 
 
3.3071 .69964 .158 .003 -.158 -.104 .080 .058 -.043 -.161*** .1.000     
J. INTBUS  
 
3.4254 .69721 .235** .030 -.189* .0130 -.145 .182* .074 .-.096** .451*** .1.000    
K. LEARN 
 
2.7667 .83513 .202** -.226** .0188 .145 .122 .185 .028 .058 .116 .494*** .1.000   
L. BENMK 
 
2.9952 .71217 .104 074*** .195*** .173* .227** .175* 169* .227*** .461*** .456*** .447*** .1.000  
M.OVERALL 4.898 .26121 .121*** .215 .028*** .059 .147** .185** -376 -.489*** .401*** .512*** .154*** .238** .1.000 
                
Notes: No. of cases: 105 
 µ¶µ¶µ¶means significant at 0.01, 0.05    and 0.1 levels respectively.
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Table: 6.4 
Regression results: 0DQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRQ Factors Influencing 
Performance 
 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Overall 
Constant  2.755 
(9.508***) 
3.142 
(13.747***) 
2.969 
(9.215***) 
2.639 
(6.827***) 
1.950 
(5.850***) 
2.975 
(10.877)*** 
  SIZBD 0.365 
(3.763***) 
0.214 
(2.110**) 
0.311 
(3.094***) 
0.157 
(1.499) 
0.009 
(0.085) 
0.411 
(4.261)*** 
 BINDR 0.286  
(3.217***) 
0.077 
(0.783) 
0.182 
(1.910*) 
0.145 
(1.486) 
0.234 
(2.411**) 
0.267 
3.016*** 
 GENDER 0.062 
(0.576) 
- 0.061 
(0.636) 
0.201 
(2.022**) 
0.121 
(1.228) 
0.065 
(0.720) 
 DUALITY     0.037 
(0.341)- 
0.052 
(0.436) 
0.110 
(0.966) 
   0.097  
(0.864) 
0.050 
(0.421) 
0.055 
(0.534) 
 CEOPAY    -0.306    
(-2.549***)- 
-0.199 
(-1.661*) 
-0.227) 
(1.961**) 
 -0.049 
(-0.344)   - 
0.148 
(1.436*) 
-0.279 
(-2.268)*** 
Control            -       -   
   SIZE    -0.147 
(-1.211)- 
0.073 
(0.509) 
   -    -0.121 
(-1.019) 
0.025 
(0.175) 
-0.109 
(-0.878) 
SECTOR   0.089 
(-0.994)  - 
      - -0.012 
(-0.423) 
- 0.148 
(1.513) 
-0.161 
-1.830)* 
F-statistic 5.874*** 2.281*  3.256*** 2.409** 2.714*** 9.054*** 
R2 0.265 0.087 0.166 0.108 0.143 0.385 
Adjusted R2 0.220 0.050 0.115 0.073 0.101 0.348 
Notes: N=105 
Notes: Beta denotes the standardised regression coefficient of the variable in the model; t-values 
are in Parenthesis; Significance Level: µ p< 0.01; **p< 0.05; and *p< 0.1 levels respectively 
 
Multiple regressions were conducted to examine the relationship between the 
board characteristics, CEO pay and performance of charities. Table 6.4 shows that 
the F-values for all of the performance measures in the models were highly 
significant. The regression procedure suggests that four factors, namely, board 
size, board independence, CEO pay and sector of operations, have statistically 
significant influences on the overall performance of the UK charities.  These 
factors explained approximately 34% of variations in overall performance. The 
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results suggest that board size and board independence have positive and 
significant influence on performance. However, CEO pay and the sector of 
operations have a statistically negative influence on performance. The results 
support hypotheses 1, 2, and 4. In terms of individual performance measures, the 
size of the board has a positive and significant influence in respect to financial, 
customer, internal business and overall performance. The result that board size 
improves financial performance is consistent with the conclusion drawn by Dalton 
and Dalton, 2005, and Dalton et al., 1998, that larger boards are associated with 
improved financial performance. In addition, this study finds that board size is 
associated with customer satisfaction and internal business, suggesting that larger 
boards bring in the management resources necessary to improve networking, 
public communication, and the expertise to manage the broad set of complex 
responsibilities charities face. The results, therefore, are consistent with the 
resource-based theory which sees board management as a unique resource that 
explains the differences in organisational performance (Barney 1991; Barney et 
al., 2001).  
The results also indicate that board independence has an influence on financial 
performance, internal business, benchmarking and overall performance. The 
results may be explained by the fact that the board of directors perform a service 
task and are expected to bring different types of resources to the firm (Daily and 
Dalton, 1994; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Among the services provided by the 
board are external legitimacy and networking (Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona, 2009). 
In the context of charitable organisations, outside directors may be important for 
networking and external legitimacy because they bring in new capabilities, broader 
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professional profiles and other skills needed to facilitate better decision making 
UHJDUGLQJ WKH ILUPV¶ DFWLYLWLHV; all of these qualities have positive effects on 
performance and thereby rendering support for resource-based theory. However, 
the result opposes the view because outside trustees serve voluntarily and without 
compensation, outsiders may lack the specific knowledge, time and effort needed 
for such a role. This difference may be due to the perception that serving in a 
charity is a service to the community or for public good, and therefore managers 
are motivated by these ideals. Moreover, the nature of the UK charities, such as 
schools and hospitals, may also explain the results. For example, outsiders serving 
on the board of trustees for a school may be an alumni or have children that 
attended that school; that connection, in itself, provides motivation to put in time 
and effort to improve performance. The positive association between board 
independence and internal business suggests that outside directors play an 
important monitoring role, thereby rendering support for the applicability of 
agency theory to NPOs. The positive relationship between CEO duality and the 
performance measures in the model (although not significant) is consistent with 
the fundamental premise of stewardship theory, which suggests that the CEO in an 
NPO is highly altruistic and, if empowered, is more likely to produce better 
performance for the firm. The results for the relationship between CEO pay and 
performance suggest that CEO pay has a negative and significant influence on all 
of the performance measures in the model (with the exception of benchmarking), 
which is consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 4. On the contrary, 
benchmarking has a positive, but not significant, relationship with CEO pay. This 
relationship is not surprising, as it supports the social comparison and equity 
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theory. It also is consistent with the conclusion drawn by 2¶5HLOO\ 0DLQ DQG
Crystal, 1988, who indicate that CEO compensation strategies in non-profit 
organisations are based on a process of social comparison or benchmarking against 
inside employees and rival firms. The results suggest that managers working for 
charities, while motivated by the nature of services and altruism, would also like 
their performance to be benchmarked and rewarded accordingly. The results also 
show that the gender of the CEO appears to have a positive, but not significant, 
impact on WKH&(2¶VSHUIRUPDQFH (with the exception of innovation and learning), 
thereby rendering support to hypotheses 3. The results are surprising, given the 
vast amount of literature which indicates that female directors bring distinctive and 
YDOXDEOH UHVRXUFHV WR ERDUG¶V WKDW HQKDQFH GHFLVLRQ-making (see Brammer, 
Millington and Pavelin, 2009).  
 
 
6.7 Summary and Conclusion:  
 
The goal of this chapter was to examine the influences of board characteristics on 
the performance of the UK charities. The results indicate that that board size and 
board independence have a positive and significant influence on performance. 
However, CEO pay and the sector of operation have a negative and statistically 
influence on performance. On the theoretical front, this study elucidates the 
complexity of governance and performance issues in charitable organisations. The 
results appear to support the stewardship perspective, relative to agency theory, in 
explaining the CEO pay and duality influences on performance. In the case of 
board size and outside directors, this study reinforces the value of resource-based 
theory. Since 1997, the UK government has increased its commitment to fund and 
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develop the capacity of charities to accomplish their missions and play their 
rightful role in UK communities, but resource constraints remain a key issue 
facing charities in a dynamic and changing environment.  This study has 
highlighted boards as a key management resource which can make a difference in 
the performance of UK charities. The results therefore support the contention 
made by Coombes et al., 2011, that resource-based theory can be generalised 
beyond the for-profit context. The results also indicated that WKH &(2¶V JHQGHU
appears to have no significant influence on overall performance.  
 
An important conclusion of this study indicates that business-type corporate 
governance mechanisms are not significantly associated with performance in 
charities, thereby supporting the belief that charities managers are intrinsically 
motivated and altruistic. The implication is that policy makers in these 
organisations should use approaches that explicitly recognise the altruistic and 
stewardship ethos of the voluntary sector in their hiring decisions. Managerial 
recruitment and retention issues should focus more on intrinsic incentives to attract 
managers with a significant level of altruistic motivation. Another interesting 
conclusion from this study is the positive but insignificant relationship of CEO 
GXDOLW\ WR SHUIRUPDQFH ZKLFK LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH VWHZDUGVKLS YLHZ¶V
predictions.  This finding is surprising because it contradicts the widespread 
perception, according to agency theory, that CEO duality leads to negative 
performance. This study therefore suggests that a better understanding of the 
relationship between firms with a dual CEO leadership structure and the 
performance of charities is required.  
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Another interesting conclusion from this study derives from the negative 
relationship between executive pay and performance. This negative relationship 
confirms the notion that the CEOs of charities should not be paid on the basis of 
performance, as are their counterparts in for-profit organisations. The implication 
here is that high levels of compensation defeat the mission upon which these 
organisations are founded. Indeed, most of the CEOs in charities may want to 
HQJDJH LQ ³ODERXU GRQDWLRQV´, and therefore, pay may not be their main 
motivation. Consistent with the views of Jegers and Lapsley (2003), the study 
cautions against the blanket transference of business sector practices to the 
charitable sector and note the possibility that monetary incentives can crowd out 
intrinsic motivation when attempting in order to attract the right kind of manager.  
 
Despite the contribution of this study in elucidating the complex and unexplored 
phenomenon of board structure, executive pay and performance issues in charities, 
further studies appear warranted. Future study should use both case studies and 
surveys to probe deeper into the effects of board structure on performance along 
similar lines to those used in this study.  
 
The final chapter presents a summary of the research findings and discusses the 
implications of the results regarding executive compensation and performance in 
the UK charities. 
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Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusions  
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a summary of the research findings and discusses the 
implications of the results regarding executive compensation and performance in 
the UK charities. This chapter is organised into eight sections. The next section 
summarises background and objectives of the study. Section three provides a brief 
description of the methodology used in the study. Section four presents a summary 
of the main findings. Section five and six presents implications and contribution of 
the study respectively. Section seven describes the main limitations of the study. 
The study concludes with an outline of potential future research in section eight.  
 
7.2 Background and Objectives of the Study:  
During the past decade, the voluntary, third sector has experienced enormous 
growth, which has seen it employing 600,000 people an increase of  about 25% 
over the last decade (Hyndman and Connolly, 2010) and contributing an estimated 
annual turnover of £52.5 billion (Charity Commission, 2010). However, this 
growth, together with well publicised scandals has led to increased visibility and 
public scrutiny by diverse stakeholders including government oversight agencies, 
private donors and foundations, clients, the media and the public at large 
(Connolly and Hyndman, 2004) and has heightened concerns about the 
accountability of charities (Kreander et al, 2006). Of particular concern are issues 
like the nature of executive pay and its disclosure, increased and multiple 
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pressures to demonstrate excellence in performance and calls to improve the self-
regulation of charities at board level (through, for example, non-executive 
directors, an audit committee, and a separation of chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer). As a result, there have been a string of significant reports and reforms 
and a constant review of the charity Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP) 
in the UK aimed at addressing these concerns as well as improving the 
effectiveness and accountability in the sector (Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 1995; 
Hampel, 1998 Higgs, 2002 and SORP 2005). However, despite the fact that many 
regulations executive compensation in charities continues to be on the rise for 
many chief executives in the nonprofit sector (Schwinn and Wilhelm, 2003) 
proving that the monitoring system is fraught with problems. Even the issue of 
measuring performance has remained an issue as the search for appropriate 
performance metrics to satisfy stakeholders is still some way off, due to the multi-
dimensional nature of sector (Oster, 1998; Speckbacher, 2003; Hallock, 2002). 
Furthermore, from the current literature it is apparent that most studies, (for 
example, Hallock, 2002; Jobome, 2006 and Frumkin and Keating, 2001) have 
looked at only financial measures of performance neglecting the prominent non 
ILQDQFLDO PHDVXUHV WKDW IRUP WKH EHGURFN RI WKH FKDULWLHV¶ PLVVLRQ. The recent 
(2003) version of the Code combines the Cadbury and Greenbury reports on 
corporate governance, also recommended that there be a clear division of 
responsibilities between the chairman, who is in charge of the board, and CEO of 
an organisation, whose main concern should be running the business. However, 
regardless of the growing concern of CEOs possessing excessive power and 
authority in both firm management and governance control (Henry et al., 2005), 
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and the recommendation of the combined code (2003), some firms still persist 
with this combined leadership structure in their corporate governance 
arrangements (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). The continuing prevalence of CEO 
duality leadership structure, coupled with lack of empirical investigations in 
charities points to the need for further study to help improve our understanding of 
the corporate implications of this corporate leadership structure. Therefore, the gap 
in research regarding executive compensation, governance and performance in UK 
charities has laid the stone for further research in this field. The purpose of the 
study was to examine:  a) the main determinants of CEO compensation in the UK 
Charities b) the performance measures used in the UK Charities c) the effects of 
board composition and the executive compensation on performance in UK 
charities.  
 
8.3 Summary of Research Methodology: 
The methodology for this study is based on a multi-method approach, combining 
both the qualitative and quantitative approaches. While in the qualitative phase of 
the study a combination of literature with semi structured interviews were 
employed, as detailed in the previous chapter, the quantitative phase consisted of a 
mail survey to top managers of charities. A listing of the charities which served to 
provide sample frame was obtained from two online sources, CharitiesDirect.com 
and Charity commission website which are established by law as the regulator and 
registrar of charities in England and Wales. The survey was based on 500 large 
UK charities, and 105 usable responses were received, representing a response rate 
of 21%. For the survey, data were gathered via a cross- sectional survey using the 
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web-based and the email questionnaire. The design of the questionnaire is heavily 
influenced by the recommendations of Dillman (1978) and Oppenheim (1992). 
Consistent with their advice, the layout consisted of a series of sections each 
relating to a particular aspect of the study. Pre-testing was conducted in two phases 
to enhance the validity and reliability of the data. Firstly, the questionnaire was 
subjected to critical review by 4 UK academics and 3 managers of charities. 
Revisions were made in light of the various suggestions made by these academics 
and managers. The survey was then pre-tested with 8 organisations, and due 
attention was given to the suggestions received from those who participated in this 
phase. In order to improve the response rate, Solomon (2001) recommendations 
were considered. These included personalising the cover letter with the university 
logo to indicate the auspices under which the research was undertaken, simpler 
formats and uncomplicated designs, guarantee of confidentiality and anonymity 
and follow up reminders were made. A considerable effort was made to give 
specific instructions for each queVWLRQDFFRUGLQJ WR%U\PDQ¶VVXJJHVWLRQV
that, it is worth being meticulously careful in giving instructions on how to do the 
answers as mistakes that occur can invalidate a whole questionnaire. Potential non-
response bias was checked by implementing the procedure used by Armstrong and 
Overton (1977). This procedure tests the non- response bias by implementing a t-
test comparing early and late response rate along a number of key descriptive 
variables. This was to test the null hypothesis, and that there was no difference 
between early and late responses along a number of chosen descriptive variables 
such as the sector of the charity, number of employees (used as a proxy for the size 
of the organisation) and the size of the board. 
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For the qualitative phase, 14 charities participated in the interviews. The non-
probability sampling was used to choose the participants because an attempt was 
made to choose from the large UK charities with turnover of £1m and over which 
had not participated in the survey.  The interview questions generated were based 
on the aims of the study. Pre-testing was also conducted in two phases. The 
questions were first subjected to critical review by 2 UK academics and then 3 
managers of charities after being revised. Since Lincoln and Guba, (1985); Shah 
and Corley, (2006) regard the protection RI LQIRUPDQWV¶FRQILGHQWLDOLW\as one of 
the elements needed to ensure the trustworthiness of qualitative research, the 
interviewees were assured of anonymity. Following Churchill (1999) and Malhotra 
(2004) recommendations, some easy and non controversial questions were 
included as opening questions and potentially sensitive and controversial questions 
were placed late. The length of interviews varied from 45 minutes to 60 minutes. 
The semi-structured interview technique (Minichiello et al., 1995) was used. An 
interview script involving the same open-ended questions was employed for all 
interviews. 
 
Several analytical techniques have been used in the analysis of the data. 
&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDZDVXVed to assess the reliability of the measurement of the scale 
used in the questionnaire. Descriptive statistical tools were also used to describe 
the general characteristics of sampled charities. The study also conducted factor 
analysis using varimax rotation to find out a parsimonious set of distinct, financial 
and non-financial performance measures utilised in charities. Data analysis was 
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conducted using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) for Windows 
(version 17), and as reported in detail in Chapters four to seven. 
 
7.4 Summary of Main Findings: 
This section provides the summary of the main findings of this study in light of the 
proposed research objectives. The developed hypotheses have been analysed using 
a variety of approaches.  
 
 
7.4.1 Determinants of Executive compensation: An Examination of the UK 
Charities 
 
The main goal of this part of the study was to examine the determinants of 
executive pay in the UK charities. The findings suggest that size has a strong, 
positive impact on executive pay providing a support for previous work, (for 
example, Rosen, 1982; Agarwal 1981; and Frumkin and Keating 2001) which 
suggests CEOs are paid according to the size of their organisation.  The result also 
suggests positive and significant relationship between the CEO qualification and 
&(2¶V pay and renders support to hypothesis 3. This finding is consistent with 
previous research, which documented that better educated CEOs lead to better 
organisational performance. This result supports the human capital theory 
argument, which, views increased wage variation as a function of better education 
in that highly qualified and trained executives tend to perform well leading to 
higher organisation performance (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998 and Leonard, 
1990). 
 
  193 
The results also indicate that the tenure of the CEO has a positive significant 
impact on CEO thereby supporting the resource-based interpretation which asserts 
WKDWWHQXUHLQFUHDVHVWKH&(2¶VSURILFLHQF\RQWKHMRE  Similar results were also 
reported by Jobome (2006). According to this study, CEOs age (proxied as CEOs 
experience) has a negative and significant impact on CEOs, although it was 
expected that experience should be positively associated with CEO pay. However, 
the findings support the stewardship view that the compensation of altruistic 
managers should not be determined by their tenure-based power or experience 
(Jobome, 2006). Therefore, the three human capital measures used in this study, 
namely, qualification, tenure and experience appear to show no clear and 
unequivocal relationship between human capital and executive compensation in 
the UK charities. There was no relationship between duality and executive pay, 
rendering support to the stewardship view, which regards CEOs in charities as 
good stewards of the organisations who are altruistic and dependable and can 
therefore, be trusted not to pay themselves excessively (Jobome 2006). 
 
7.4.2 Measures of Performance used in the UK Charities 
This phase of the study sought to examine performance measures used in UK 
charities. In all 23 individual performance measures were identified and 
programme spending and quality of product/service were ranked as most important 
performance measures in charities. The other performance measures ranked at the 
top were FXVWRPHU VDWLVIDFWLRQ OHYHO RI IXQGUDLVLQJ HIILFLHQF\ DQG FRPSHWLWRU¶V
performance. This study classified the performance measures into five categories, 
RIZKLFKIRXURIWKHPDUHGHULYHGIURP.DSODQDQG1RUWRQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFH
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PHDVXUHPRGHO³WKHEDODQFHGVFRUHFDUG´DQGWKHILIWKRQHµEHQFKPDUNLQJ¶ZKLFK
came from the literature, proved to be valuable.  The findings suggest that four of 
the five performance measures categories used in this study which are, financial - 
measuring various financial performance indicators, the customer - comprising 
measures of customer satisfaction; the internal business process which measures 
internal efficiency and quality; and benchmarking which is comparing 
performance and practice with those of other firms were widely used in UK 
charities. However, Learning and innovation is also valuable measure of 
performance in the UK charities. It is clear from the results that, although 
benchmarking does not appear on the BSC, it is a critical performance criterion in 
charities. The findings reinforce views by researchers like (Jobome 2006; 
Cameron, 1981, 1982; Connolly, Conlon, and Deutsch, 1980; Stewart and Walsh, 
1994 and Sowa et al 2004) thereby pointing to the difficulties of applying only 
financial performance measures  to nonprofit organisations with their distinctive 
cultures, diffuse power structures, different values, multiple stakeholders, and 
multiple goals. The results provide a further justification for the appropriateness of 
including both financial and non-financial measures to measure performance in 
charities as adopted in this study.  
 
 
7.4.3: 0DQDJHUV¶ Perception of the Factors Influencing Performance in the 
UK Charities 
 
This part of the study examined the impact of firm performance in UK charities. 
The performance measures are composed of 23 factors, identified from the 
previous chapter. Due to potential for conceptual and statistical overlap among the 
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23 performance measures, an attempt was made to produce a parsimonious set of 
distinct, non-overlapping financial and non-financial performance measures by 
means of exploratory factor analysis. The analysis yield five factors, namely, The 
Financial Perspective, The Customer Perspective, The Internal Business, 
Innovation and Learning Perspective and Benchmarking.   Overall the factors 
explained 71.6 percent of performance measures. In terms of the overall 
performance measure, the study used a composite index (an arithmetic average 
score) consistent with the measures used by Sim and Ali, 1998; Boateng and 
Glaister, 2002.   
 
The findings suggest that four factors, namely, board size, board independence, 
CEO pay and sector of operations, have statistically significant influences on the 
overall performance of the UK charities.  The results also show that board size and 
board independence have positive and significant influence on performance. 
However, CEO pay and the sector of operations have a statistically negative 
influence on performance. When considering individual performance measures, 
the size of the board has a positive and significant influence in respect to financial, 
customer, internal business and overall performance. In addition, this study finds 
that board size is associated with customer satisfaction and internal business, 
suggesting that larger boards bring in the management resources necessary to 
improve networking, public communication, and the expertise to manage the broad 
set of complex responsibilities charities face.  
The results also indicate that board independence has an influence on financial 
performance, internal business, benchmarking and overall performance. This may 
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be due the fact that the board of directors bring different types of resources to the 
firm (Daily and Dalton, 1994; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and also provide 
services such as external legitimacy and networking to the organisation 
(Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona, 2009). This renders support for resource-based 
theory.  
The positive association between board independence and internal business seem 
to render support for the applicability of agency theory to NPOs by suggesting that 
outside directors play an important monitoring role. The results also indicate a 
positive relationship between CEO duality and the performance measures in the 
model (although not significant) which is consistent with the fundamental premise 
of stewardship theory, which suggests that the CEO in an NPO is highly altruistic 
and, if empowered, is more likely to produce better performance for the firm. The 
results for the relationship between CEO pay and performance suggest that CEO 
pay has a negative and significant influence on all of the performance measures in 
the model (with the exception of benchmarking), which is consistent with the 
prediction of Hypothesis 4. On the contrary, benchmarking has a positive, but not 
significant, relationship with CEO pay. The results are consistent with the 
conclusion drawn by 2¶5HLOO\ 0DLQ DQG &U\VWDO  ZKR indicate that CEO 
compensation strategies in non-profit organisations are based on a process of 
social comparison or benchmarking against inside employees and rival firms. The 
gender of the CEO appears to have a positive, but not significant, impact on the 
&(2¶V SHUIRUPDQFH (with the exception of innovation and learning), thereby 
rendering support to hypotheses 3. The results are surprising, as they are at 
variance with views in the literature that female directors bring distinctive and 
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YDOXDEOH UHVRXUFHV WR ERDUG¶V WKDW HQKDQFH GHFLVLRQ-making (see Brammer, 
Millington and Pavelin, 2009).  
 
7.5 Contribution of the Study:  
The main focus of this study was to examine the determinants of executive 
compensation, governance and performance in charities. Executive compensation 
is a topic that has produced a huge amount of academic literature in past decades. 
The importance of the topic cannot be overemphasised, especially given the 
widespread public perception of executive compensation as excessive, unfair, and 
difficult to explain. However, there has been a disproportionate concentration on 
for-profit organisations compared to non-profit making organisations, charities in 
particular. Furthermore, most studies seem to have focussed on executive pay 
determinants in US nonprofits as compared to the UK. Given the vast differences 
between the nature, purpose, financial structure and ownership type of profit and 
non-profits organisations, it would be fair to expect that equal empirical efforts are 
devoted to nonprofit organisations to test applicability of existing theories in the 
context of non-profit organisations. The issue of performance measurement in 
nonprofit organisations has recently gained impetus, but still continues to be 
shrouded with controversy, as researchers have failed to come to an agreement on 
the criteria by which performance should be measured and operationalised. The 
widespread controversy regarding performance measures in charities as well as the 
scarcity of research in this area made the findings of this study immensely 
valuable.  
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First, this study contributes to the ongoing literature on executive compensation in 
nonprofit organisations by eliciting the opinions of CEOs of the UK large charities 
via a survey instead of just relying on secondary data like the previous studies, (for 
example, Frumkin and Keating, 2001; Hallock, 2002 and Jobome, 2006). While 
very few of previous studies done in this area have looked at nonprofit 
organisations in general, this study makes a contribution in this direction by 
examining the determinants of CEO pay in the UK charities which have witnessed 
a substantial growth since the assumption of power by the labour government over 
a decade ago.  
 
Second, as the issue of the measurement of performance continue to plague 
empirical work in nonprofit organisations, this study sought to establish the 
performance measures that are being used by charities. It extends the quantitative 
studies that have attempted to shed light on performance measures issues in 
charities by the use of interviews. In terms of theoretical contributions, this study 
proposes a stronger conceptualisation of performance measures, by combining 
survey and qualitative empirical evidence with literature in order to identify the 
performance measures used in charities from top level managers who make key 
decisions in large charities, thereby narrowing the gap in the literature. It is 
therefore, perceived that the incorporated qualitative aspect in this study has 
SOD\HGDGHFLVLYHUROHLQVWUHQJWKHQLQJWKHTXDOLW\RIWKLVVWXG\¶VFRQWULEXWLRQVIRU
both theory and practice. From the findings, it was apparent that the performance 
measures directly linked to charity's main purpose or objectives such as 
programme activities, efficiency, customer satisfaction quality of service and 
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fundraising are widely used. However, other measures which contribute to the 
overall efficiency of the NPO are also important. This study makes a contribution 
in this direction by incorporating financial and nonfinancial measures of 
performance, to reveal the comprehensive picture of what measures performance 
in the UK charities. Previous researchers normally used one or two financial 
measures of performance. This study serves an important reminder for researchers 
attempting to measure performance with one or two variables that charities have 
multiple objectives and therefore measuring performance with one or two 
measures could be misleading at best.    
 
Third, by eliciting the opinions of CEOs on the effects of board characteristics and 
executive pay on performance, it is also perceived that this investigation has 
extended the knowledge on the performance measures in charities in that, it has 
expanded the empirical research on charities by submitting its key constructs 
previously identified in the literature to a rigorous, quantitative test and has also 
integrated qualitative evidence, thereby providing a strong conceptualisation of 
performance measures in charities. This study departs from previous studies by 
using both financial and non financial measures of performance in charities it 
reveals the comprehensive picture of performance measurement in charities. The 
study uses the BSC in addition to benchmarking to assess the relationship between 
board structure and performance in UK charities. The new multidimensional 
model of performance measures, which combines the balanced score card and 
benchmarking, to the authoU¶VNQRZOHGJHKDVQRWEHHQXVHG LQSUHYLRXV VWXGLHV 
Therefore, this study also contributes to the models of performance, for example, 
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by suggesting benchmarking as an additional performance measure of the balanced 
scorecard.  
 
Fourth, another significant contribution of this study is to exploring other 
theoretical approaches that can be useful in explaining executive compensation, 
particularly in charities. Previous studies on executive compensation seem to have 
concentrated on the economic perspective, which is fundamentally based on 
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). It views compensation as a way of 
control that is used to align the interests of shareholders with those of the 
executives. However, not only does the theory fail to give explanations to other 
non-economic questions, it seems to be inapplicable to charities, since they do not 
have shareholders but numerous stakeholders. Therefore, this study adopts 
stewardship/stakeholder; executive power, equity and social comparison 
approaches with the view that, a combination of several theories would be more 
capable for embracing all the complexities of CEO compensation (Baron and 
Cook, 1992; Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt, 1993) particularly in charities. 
Furthermore, to date, numerous empirical investigations have been performed to 
examine the effects of CEO duality on firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998; 
Mallette and Fowler, 1992), but there has been extremely little academic research 
on the impact of duality on executive pay particularly for the UK charities. This 
study also contributes to filling this gap. 
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7.6 Implications of the Study: 
This research suggests several implications for policy makers and managers, as 
well. The findings of this research indicate that organisation size accounts for 
single most influential determinant for CEO pay in the UK charities. This indicates 
that organisation size represents complexity which involves a more demanding 
tasks and management of such difficult tasks to achieve overall goals of the 
organisation. This requires people with the right education and training to meet the 
challenging tasks. The resource based view highlights that the growth in the 
VHFWRU¶VUROHhas led to greater expectation for high quality professional service and 
competition for skilled workers. The level of pay is cited as the biggest issue 
behind staff turnover, and this may partly explain why 75% of charities experience 
difficulties in filling some vacancies (Third Sector, 2004). The implication of this 
result is that, policy makers should not overlook the fact that charities, due to the 
µYLRODWLRQ RI QRQ-GLVWULEXWLRQ FRQVWUDLQW¶ are legally prohibited from making 
distributions of their earnings to individuals who exercise control over it, like 
CEOs. Furthermore, they are also prohibited from paying their managers equity-
based incentive compensation that could also be used to alleviate agency problems 
(Frumkin and Keating, 2001). $V D UHVXOW WKH FKDULWLHV &(2V¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ
packages are always lagging behind those of their for profits counterparts. 
However, since charities engage in relatively substantial competition for 
employees with for-profit institutions, there is a need to structure compensation 
policies and programmes that will enable them to attract and retain the human 
capital needed to achieve the goals of organisations, in line with the resource based 
  202 
theory (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). However, these have to be fair and 
competitive, without crowding out altruism and yet maintaining public trust. 
 
Another implication of the analysis bears on the enduring performance 
measurement predicament that confronts so many nonprofit organisations. The 
results in this study indicate that the performance measures directly linked to 
charity's main purpose or objectives such as programme activities, efficiency, 
customer satisfaction quality of service and fundraising were rated at the top and 
are also widely used in charities. The implication here is that, the financial 
measures of performance that have traditionally dominated previous study need to 
be complemented with non financial measures, when it comes to measuring 
performance in charities. Adherence to social purposes does not, however, 
necessarily generate financial returns that are readily apparent, so assessments of 
nonprofit performance must continue to consider attitudes and perceptions of 
multiple constituents (Brown, 2005). It is also evident that the same performance 
measures cannot be generalised across the charities because of their wide ranging 
and complex missions with varied and diverse constituents (Oster, 1998; 
Speckbacher, 2003; Hallock, 2002). Therefore, the implication is that, policy 
PDNHUVVKRXOGFRQVLGHUWKHSHUIRUPDQFHPHDVXUHVWKDWFDQEHVWVXLWHDFKFKDULW\¶V
mission and objectives. 
 
Analysis was conducted to determine the extent to which board characteristics 
accounted for performance DFFRUGLQJWRWKHPDQDJHUV¶RSLQLRQV. The results seem 
to support the premises of the stewardship perspective to the detriment of agency 
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theory, which is a clear indication that business-type corporate governance 
mechanisms are not significantly associated with performance in charities; all of 
which are consistent with a pattern of intrinsic motivation and support the altruistic 
nature of charities managers. The implication, therefore, is that, the policy makers 
in these organisations should employ approaches that explicitly recognise the 
altruistic and stewardship ethos of the voluntary sector. Therefore, the managerial 
recruitment and retention issues should focus relatively more on intrinsic 
incentives, in order to attract mainly managers with a significant level of altruistic 
motivation. Different theoretical perspectives (agency theory, resource 
dependency theory, stewardship/stakeholder; executive power, equity and social 
comparison) provided the framework to consider how CEO duality might affect 
executive pay in this study. Agency theory, which posits the CEO as an adversary 
of stakeholder interests, is the most widely used theoretical model to explain 
corporate governance, but its applicability to nonprofits has been questioned. This 
study suggested that agency theory is only limited to economic perspective, but 
fail to give explanations to other non-economic issues like organisational and 
motivational issues which have been the bedrock of charities and other pertinent 
characteristics such as altruism associated with managers working for such 
organisations. It was therefore not surprising that the findings suggest a positive 
link between CEO duality and firm performance, rendering support to the 
stewardship premise that CEOs in NPOs are motivated by the cause of the 
organisation. Furthermore the findings for the relationship between CEO pay and 
performance also suggest a negative and significant influence on all of the 
performance measures in the model (with the exception of benchmarking), thus, 
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support the stewardship premise that, CEOs in charities do not seem to take 
advantage of their position, but they behave altruistically and are intrinsically 
motivated. The managerial and policy implications are that CEO-chair positions 
should not be split as recommended in the combined code (2003) and Donaldson 
and Davis (1991). Also, since the evidence indicates that that CEO compensation 
strategies in non-profit organisations are based on a process of social comparison 
or benchmarking against inside employees and rival firms, charities should strive 
to create proper  network connections with similar organisations, so they can also 
use benchmarking a as a valuable mechanism for performance improvement as 
well. 
 
7.7 Limitations of the study: 
Like any other research, there are limitations to this study. The focus of this study 
has been primarily on understanding the performance measures used by the U.K 
charities, the factors that affect firm performance in the charities. The study 
addresses research questions and hypotheses which are based upon empirical and 
theoretical studies undertaken by others and not usually relating to charities. The 
main criticism for this study may be that, while there is much emphasis on 
empirical and exploratory research, there has been little in the area of theory 
development. However, although the aims of this study did not include theory 
development, future research in this field may benefit from the development of 
theory.  
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One other limitation of this study is the possible omission of how government 
funding of charities can affect executive compensation in charities. Charities who 
receive government funding are expected to comply with a myriad of rules and 
regulations that accompany government support (Frumkin, 2002; Oliver, 1999). 
The regulatory codes include financial management and accounting requirements, 
maintenance of minimum quality standards, promotion of basic programme 
objectives, and adherence to certain national policy goals to ensure uniformity in 
the delivery of services (Krashinsky 1990). I am of the view that, the adherence of 
the above may lead to excessive bureaucracy and therefore may be detrimental to 
performance.  
 
Finally, the study focuses exclusively on large UK charities and therefore 
generalisations may not be applicable to other charities beyond this group. 
 
7 .8 Areas of Future Research: 
Charities represent a rich and relatively unexplored opportunity for better 
understanding the complex phenomenon of executive pay, governance and 
performance. Though some effort has been made to ameliorate the problems in 
this study, there are still several areas which merit further investigations. From the 
extant literature; it was clear that CEO pay-setting is not a straightforward 
economics issue because the process involves the social psychology of group 
EHKDYLRXU2¶5HLOO\DQG0DLQDVZHOODVPRWLYDWLRQDOIDFWRUVSDUWLFXODUO\
in charities were monetary rewards are accused of crowding out altruism, thus 
leading to attracting the wrong kind of manager (Jobome 2006). There is, 
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therefore, need for future researchers to examine the effects of reciprocity and 
social influence on CEO pay determination as well as identifying other 
determinant variables that explicitly recognise the altruistic and stewardship ethos 
of the sector. Also, future research will benefit from looking at whether 
government funding of charities has effects on executive pay setting and 
performance. A major contribution of this study has been to provide new empirical 
evidence of performance measures used in UK charities, as well as extending the 
knowledge on the performance measures in charities by incorporating financial 
and non financial measures of performance. However, more research is needed to 
validate the findings in this study and to provide a more comprehensive picture, 
possibly by identifying and testing additional measures of performance in the 
charities which could lead to improvement on the current multidimensional models 
of performance. The methodology used in this study was based on cross-sectional 
surveys and case studies. While the approach was appropriate for this initial study, 
it only provided only a snapshot view of the issues examined. As already been 
highlighted, it is also evident that the same performance measures cannot be 
generalised across the charities because of their wide ranging and complex 
missions with varied and diverse constituents (Oster, 1998; Speckbacher, 2003; 
Hallock, 2002). In future, longitudinal research could explore the factors 
influencing the adoption of particular performance measures by different charity 
sectors and their effects on accomplishing the organisational mission. 
Furthermore, while this study has looked at the relationship between board 
characteristics and performance, exploring the processes and dynamics of the pay-
setting relationship between managers, their boards (Jobome 2006) might provide 
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another rich area for further research. Finally, given the fact that this study 
concentrated on large charities, yet the majority of charities are smaller than the 
ones studied in this research, future research on small charities might be useful.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Survey Questionnaire 
 
Executive Compensation and Firm Performance: An Examination of UK 
Charities. 
 
Thank you very much for taking the time to complete this questionnaire.  As indicated in the 
letter, your responses are completely confidential  
 
Background Information 
 
1. Name of your organisation««««««««««««««««««««««««« 
2. Main activities «««««««««««««««««««««««««««« 
3. Sector of charity? (Please tick as appropriate)   ««««««««««  
 
 Main 
Focus 
Minor Focus 
(a) Health   
(b) Arts and culture  
  
(c).Social Services and relief 
  
(d) Media 
  
(e).Sports and recreational charities 
  
(f) Education 
  
(g) Religious charities 
  
(h) Environmental charities 
  
(i) Museums 
  
(j) Aid overseas 
  
 
4.  Number of employees««««««««««««««««««««««««««« 
5. What is the size of the board? (please tick as appropriate 
 
6. (a) 0-5 [   ]  (b) 6-10 [   ]  (c) 11-15[   ]     (d) 16-20 [   ]   
 
 (e) Over 20 [   ]  
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7. Is the CEO also the chair of the board? (Please tick as appropriate) 
(a) Yes [   ]                (b) No [   ]  
 
 
 
8. 'RHV\RXURUJDQLVDWLRQUHFHLYHJRYHUQPHQW¶VJUDQWV"SOHDVHWLFNDVDSSURSULDWH 
(a) Yes [   ]             (b) No [   ]  
 
9. Does your organisation do any trading activities to make Profits? (Please tick as 
appropriate) 
(a) Yes [   ]                (b) No [   ]  
 
Personal information 
 
10. Gender of the CEO. (Please tick as appropriate)   (a) Male [   ] (b) Female [   ] 
11. Age of CEO  (Please tick as appropriate) 
(a) Under 25  [   ] (b) 25-34 [   ]          (c) 35-44 [   ]      (d) 45-54   [   ]    
(e) 55-64 [   ]       (f) 65 and over       [   ] 
12. How long have the CEO been working for company? 
        (a) 0-5 years             [   ]  (b) 6-10 years  [   ]         (c) 11-15 years [   ] 
        (d) 16-20 years         [   ]  (e) Over 20 years [   ] 
 
Techniques used as compensation packages 
13. Which of these techniques do you use to compensate the CEO? ( Tick all appropriate 
answers) 
(a) Annual salary/ Base salary [   ]                     (b) Bonus on turnover growth  [   ] 
(c) As a proportion of funds raised         [   ]  
(d) Other (Please specLI\««««««««««««««««««««««««. 
14. As far as you are concerned how effective are the following compensation packages in 
your organisation? 
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 A B     C D     E 
(a) Annual /Base salary 1 2 3 4 5 
(b) Bonus on turnover growth 1 2 3 4 5 
(c) Bonus on turnover growth 1 2 3 4 5 
(d) Other (Please specify) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
KEY 
A - Not effective at all       B- Less effective   C ± Neutral      D ± Effective      E ± Very effective 
 
15. What is your annual compensation in total? ( Please tick as appropriate) 
a) Under £50 000          [   ]   (b) £50 000 to >100 000 [   ]   (c) £100 000 to >250 000       [   ]  
(d) £250 000 to > 500 000   [   ]    (e) £500 000 to £1m    [   ]   (f) over £1m                     [   ] 
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Factors influencing Executive Compensation 
 
16. How influential are the following factors in determining your executive compensation?  
(Please circle as appropriate) 
 
 A B       C    D         E 
(a) Size of the Company 1 2 3 4 5 
(b) Nature & complexity of the company 1 2 3 4 5 
F&RPSHWLWRU¶VSDFNDJHV       1 2 3 4 5 
(d) Difficulty & demands of the job 1 2 3 4 5 
I'RQRUV¶SUHIHUHQFHV 1 2 3 4 5 
(g) Government grants                                             1 2 3 4 5 
(h) Manager length of education & training 1 2 3 4 5 
L0DQDJHU¶VOHYHORIH[SHULHQFH 1 2 3 4 5 
(j) CEO length of employment with the company 1 2 3 4 5 
(k) Perception of outsides/ media 1 2 3 4 5 
(l) Level of independence of compensation committee
  
1 2 3 4 5 
(m) Managerial reputation at the time of employment 1 2 3 4 5 
(o) Government legislation/ code of practice 1 2 3 4 5 
(p) Operational costs 1 2 3 4 5 
(q) CEO performance 1 2 3 4 5 
(r) Organisational growth 1 2 3 4 5 
(s) Quality of Service 1 2 3 4 5 
 
KEY 
A - Not influential at all       B- Less influential   C ± Neutral      D ± Influential       
E ± Very influential 
 
 
Performance Measures 
 
17. Which of the following factors does your Organisation use to measure performance? (Tick 
all appropriate answers) 
 
Financial performance 
(a) Revenue growth [   ]       (b) percentage of earned income [   ]      
(c) Diversification of    revenue    sources [   ]       (d) Programme spending [   ]      
(e) Investment performance [   ]       (f) High level of fundraising [   ]      
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(g) Donor Sustainability [   ]       (h) Adequate working capital [   ]      
L2WKHU3OHDVHVSHFLI\««««««««««««««««««««««««««« 
Program Effectiveness 
(a) Quality of Product/Service    [   ]    (b) Customer Satisfaction       [   ]    (c) Efficiency      [   ] 
(d) Employee Satisfaction rates [   ]    (e) Board involvement           [   ]    (f) Output           [   ] 
(g) Accountability                        [   ]    (h) Community involvement [   ]    (i) Job Creation [   ] 
-&RPSHWLWRUV¶SHUIRUPDQFH [   ]       [   ] 
M2WKHU3OHDVHVSHFLI\«««««««««««««««««««««««««««««« 
 
Management Effectiveness 
(a) Board meeting attendance           [   ]       (b) Employee turnover rates               [   ]      
(c) Percentage of board members as donors [   ]       (d) Technology competency ratings [   ]      
(e) Improve skills (number of people 
trained)   
[   ]         
I2WKHU3OHDVHVSHFLI\«««««««««««««««««««««« 
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18. In your opinion how important are the following performance measures? 
 
 A B      C      D      E 
(a) Financial Measures                                              1 2 3 4 5 
(i) Revenue growth                                 1 2 3 4 5 
(ii) Percent of earned income      1 2 3 4 5 
(iii) Diversification of revenue sources     
 
1 2 3 4 5 
(iv) Programme spending                     1 2 3 4 5 
(v) Investment performance                     1 2 3 4 5 
(vi) High level of fundraising     1 2 3 4 5 
(vii) Donor Sustainability                          1 2 3 4 5 
(viii) Adequate working capital     1 2 3 4 5 
(b) Programme Effectiveness 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
(i) Quality of Product/Service    1 2 3 4 5 
(ii) Customer Satisfaction       1 2 3 4 5 
(iii) Efficiency 1 2 3 4 5 
(iv) Employee Satisfaction rates 1 2 3 4 5 
(v)  Board involvement           1 2 3 4 5 
(vi) Output 1 2 3 4 5 
(vii) Accountability 1 2 3 4 5 
(viii) Community involvement 1 2 3 4 5 
(ix) Job Creation 1 2 3 4 5 
(x) &RPSHWLWRUV¶SHUIRUPDQFH 1 2 3 4 5 
© Management Effectiveness 1 2 3 4 5 
(i) Board meeting attendance                            1 2 3 4 5 
(iii) Employee turnover rates               1 2 3 4 5 
(iv) Percentage of board members as donors      1 2 3 4 5 
(v) Technology competency ratings 1 2 3 4 5 
(vi) Improve skills (number of people trained) 1 2 3 4 5 
 
KEY 
A - Not influential at all       B- Less influential   C ± Neutral      D ± Influential       
E ± Very influential 
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Board composition and Firm Performance 
 
19. In your opinion how influential are the following factors on performance in charities? 
(Please circle as appropriate) 
 
 A B    C   D    E 
(a) The size of the board size                                                        1 2 3 4 5 
(i) Small board    (0 to 8 members)                                                 1 2 3 4 5 
(ii) Big board       ( over 8 members)                                               1 2 3 4 5 
(b) Ratio of  inside directors to outside directors in the 
board 
1 2 3 4 5 
(i) More inside directors                                                                  1 2 3 4 5 
(ii) More outside directors                                                               1 2 3 4 5 
(c) Gender ratio of directors in the board 1 2 3 4 5 
(i) More female directors on the board                                            1 2 3 4 5 
(j) More male directors on the board 1 2 3 4 5 
(d) Managerial Power 1 2 3 4 5 
(i) CEO as the chair of the board 1 2 3 4 5 
(ii) CEO not the chair of the board 1 2 3 4 5 
(iii) When CEO elects the board members 1 2 3 4 5 
(e) Board Governance Committees   1 2 3 4 5 
(i) Audit committee 1 2 3 4 5 
(ii) Nomination committees 1 2 3 4 5 
(iii) Remuneration committees 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
KEY 
A - Not influential at all       B- Less influential   C ± Neutral      D ± Influential       
E ± Very influential 
 
Company Details: 
If you or your company would like to receive a copy or a summary of the research findings please 
give your details below or enclose your business card: 
<RXUQDPH«««««««««««««««««««««««««««« 
-REWLWOHRI5HVSRQGHQW««««««««««««««««««««««« 
$GGUHVV«««««««««««««««««««««««««««««« 
««««««««««««««««««««««««««««««««« 
7HOHSKRQH1XPEHU««««««««««««««««««««««««« 
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Once again thanks for taking time to complete this questionnaire 
 
For further inquires, please contact: 
Girlie Ndoro on lixgn1@nottingham.ac.uk or Dr Agyenim BOATENG on  
agyenim.boateng@nottingham.edu.cn 
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Appendix 2 
 
Specimen Cover Letter 
 
 
Date: 10 November 2007 
 
The Chief Executive Officer 
Mrs Rebecca Wood 
AO]KHLPHU¶V5HVHDUFK7UXVW 
The Stables 
Station Road 
Great Shelford, Cambridge 
CB22 5LR  
 
Subject:  Request for your kind participation in a survey on Executive 
Compensation and performance: An examination of UK Charities. 
 
 
Dear Mrs Wood, 
  
We are undertaking a research on executive compensation and performance using 
evidence from the UK charities.  Your charity has been chosen to be part of the 
sample. We therefore kindly request you to complete the attached questionnaire to 
help in this research. We wish to stress that the replies to the questions will be 
treated in strictest confidence. Neither you nor your organisation will be identified 
at any stage of our analysis, nor in the publication of the results. 
 
We have a number of aims in carrying out this research, but we are particularly 
interested to find out the determinants of executive compensation and performance 
in the UK charities. Despite systematic research regards to this issue, executive 
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compensation still continues to generate controversy among academics and 
practitioners. Furthermore, the issue of the measurement of performance continue 
to plague empirical work in charities, therefore this study intent to establish the 
performance measures that can help charities to be accountable of the good work 
they are doing and counter criticism for poor management and ineffectiveness.  It 
is therefore anticipated that the findings will be useful, not only to academics 
interested in this area but also help to find better methods of aligning executive 
FRPSHQVDWLRQWRVWDNHKROGHUV¶LQWHUHVWVDQGDOVR help charities to a certain extent 
to choose suitable performance measures that will suit their missions of their 
organisations and thereby assuring donors, governmental funders, and business 
sponsors, they have the organisational capacity to deliver services effectively. 
Again we will stress that the results will be presented in highly aggregated form 
and no other person or organisation will be able to identify your responses. 
 
Although the questionnaire will occupy a short period of your time, your answers 
will be enormously valuable to this project. When the analysis is completed we 
will be pleased to send you a summary of the findings. We would be grateful if 
you respond by the 30/11/ 2007. 
 
Thank you for your time and co-operation. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Girlie Ndoro, (PhD student) Nottingham University and Professor A. Boateng 
Senior Lecturer and Supervisor. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Specimen Reminder Letter 
 
 
Date: 3 June, 2008 
 
 
The Chief Executive Officer 
Mrs Rebecca Wood 
AO]KHLPHU¶V5HVHDUFK7UXVW 
The Stables 
Station Road 
Great Shelford, Cambridge 
CB22 5LR  
 
 
Subject:  Request for your kind participation in a survey on Executive 
Compensation and Firm Performance: An Examination of UK Charities. 
 
 
Dear Mrs Wood, 
  
You may recall that I recently send you a questionnaire concerning research that I 
am undertaking on the determinants of executive compensation and performance 
in the UK charities. Despite systematic research regards to this issue, executive 
compensation still continues to generate controversy among academics and 
practitioners. Furthermore, the issue of the measurement of performance continue 
to plague empirical work in charities, therefore this study intent to establish the 
performance measures that can help charities to be accountable of the good work 
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they are doing and counter criticism for poor management and ineffectiveness. 
This study aims to feel that gap with your valuable contribution. 
 
I appreciate how busy you may be at the moment. However, your views on this 
subject are of great importance to this study, and for that reason I would like to 
request you yet again to complete the questionnaire at your earliest convenience. 
Once more, I will stress that your responses will be treated in the strictest 
confidence and no other person or organisation will be able to identify your 
responses. 
 
I have attached herewith, another copy of questionnaire for your convenience.  
When the analysis is completed we will be pleased to send you a summary of the 
findings. Please your details in the questionnaire if you wish to receive a copy.  
 
Thank you in advance for your time and co-operation in this research. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Girlie Ndoro, (PhD student) Nottingham University and Professor A. Boateng 
Senior Lecturer and Supervisor. 
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Appendix 4 
 
Interview Questions 
 
Executive Compensation and Firm Performance: An Examination of UK 
Charities. 
 
The questionnaire for the interviews is divided into three main parts as 
follows: 
(1) The first SDUWLVFRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHFRPSDQ\¶VEDFNJURXQG.  
(2) The second part of the questionnaire has questions about the CEO 
compensation. 
(3) The last part deals with questions relating to performance. 
Background Information 
1. Which sector of industry is your organisation involved in? 
 
2. What are the main activities of your company? 
 
3. What is the approximate number of employees within your organisation? 
 
4. What is the annual turnover of your organisation? 
 
5. (a) Age of the CEO,      (b) Level of education (c) gender (d) How long has 
the CEO worked for the company? 
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CEO Remuneration 
 
6. Do you have a guide in respect of how CEO is paid in your organisation? 
 
 
7. Please can you give me the main provisions contained in the guide (Also if 
you have the code in written form, I would be glad to have a copy for 
further analysis) 
 
8. :KRGHWHUPLQHVWKH&(2¶VFRPSHQVDWLRQ" 
                  (If the answer is the - board) 
 
(a) What is the size of the board?  
(b) How many of the board members are paid?  
 
 
9. In your opinion what are the determinants of CEO compensation in the UK 
Charities? 
 
10. Which ones do you regard to be the most influential in order? (please rank 
them) (To suggest the rest if they omit some) 
 
11. In your opinion how influential are the following board composition 
factors in determining performance in your organisation?   
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 A B C D E 
(a) The size of the board size                                                                    
(i) Small board    (0 to 8 members)                                                                 1 2 3 4 5 
(ii) Big board       ( over 8 members)                                                                               1 2 3 4 5
(b) Ratio of  inside directors to outside 
directors in the board 
     
(i) More inside directors                                                                    1 2 3 4 5 
(ii) More outside directors                                                                  1 2 3 4 5 
(c) Gender ratio of directors in the board      
(i) More female directors on the board                                               1 2 3 4 5 
(j) More male directors on the board 1 2 3 4 5 
(d) Managerial Power      
(i) CEO as the chair of the board 1 2 3 4 5 
(ii) CEO not the chair of the board 1 2 3 4 5 
(iii) When CEO elects the board members 1 2 3 4 5 
(e) Board committees        
(i) Audit committee 1 2 3 4 5 
(ii) Nomination committees 1 2 3 4 5 
(iii) Remuneration committees 1 2 3 4 5 
 
KEY 
A - Not influential at all       B- Less influential   C ± Neutral      D ± Influential       
E ± Very influential 
 
12. In your opinion, is there any relationship between the Executive 
Compensation and Charitable donations in nonprofit organisations?  
 
13. If so, how? 
 
14. Does the level of government grants to charities influence how Chief 
Executives are compensated? 
 
15. If yes, please indicate how? 
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16. Between which ranges does your CEO receive annually as total 
compensation? 
 
Performance Measures 
 
17. Which factors does your organisation use to measure performance?  
 
 
18. From these performance measures which ones do you consider to be 
influential in determining executive compensation in UK charities? 
 
19. In your opinion do you think there are any relationship between pay and 
performance in the UK charities? Why? 
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Appendix 5 
 
Reliability Analysis for the UK Charities Performance Measures  
 
Variable  &URQEDFK¶V$OSKD 
Revenue growth 0.916 
Percentage of earned income 0.914 
Diversification of revenue sources 0.914 
Cost efficiencies 0.913 
Investments performance 0.913 
High level of fundraising     0.914 
Donor Sustainability                          0.912 
Adequate working capital     0.911 
Quality of Product/Service    0.912 
Customer Satisfaction       0.910 
Efficiency 0.912 
Employee Satisfaction rates 0.907 
Board involvement           0.910 
Output 0.908 
Accountability 0.910 
Community involvement 0.910 
Job Creation 0.912 
&RPSHWLWRUV¶SHUIRUPDQFH 0.912 
 Board meeting attendance                            0.912 
Employee turnover rates               0.910 
Percentage of board members as donors      0.915 
Technology competency ratings 0.912 
Improve skills (number of people trained) 0.911 
Number of items = 23 
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